|
International
Journal for Construction Marketing |
P Lan*, JT Jackson**
*School of Marketing and International Business, Queensland University of Technology, Australia, **School of Social Science and Planning, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Australia
Keywords
China, construction
industry, main stakeholders, bargaining power
Contents
Abstract
Introduction
Research Methodology
Clients' bargaining power
Government Intervention
Competition among Contractors and Subcontractors
Bargaining
Power of Suppliers
Threat of new Entrants
Conclusion
References
Although economic reform has brought Chinese construction practices more in line with international conventions, they are still different from those in the free-market world due to a number of underlying factors. This paper, by using a modified industry competition analysis model, systematically examines the main stakeholders in the Chinese construction industry with respect to the following aspects: shifts in government intervention, problems between contractors and subcontractors, new entrants, the bargaining power of clients, and the bargaining power of suppliers.
In contrast to the saturation of construction markets in western countries and the recent shrinkage of most Asian economics, the increase in size of the Chinese construction market continues to be very impressive. Overall market size was $160 billion in real terms in 1995, eight times that in 1985. It is expected to reach $220 billion in 1998 with an annual growth rate over 10 percent from 1996 to 1998 (Lan and Jackson, 1998). This rapid expansion of the construction market in China, caused by a combination of increasing industrialization and urbanisation, parallels a growing demand for superior construction technology and management and improved building materials. It offers enormous opportunities for overseas construction companies, manufacturers, and other service providers.
However, in trying to grasp a share of the Chinese market, quite a few overseas contractors have burnt their fingers. One important reason for their failure is their lack of understanding of the operational environment in which they seek to compete (Lan and Jackson 1997). As defined here, "operational environment" includes the overall state of economic and political conditions, as well as the state of the construction industry, and the nature of market demands (Hillebrandt et al, 1995).
Previous studies, however, have shown a bias towards the overall economic and political conditions in China, and few of them have concentrated on revealing the current state of the construction industry. For example, research undertaken by the Australian government (East Asia Analysis Unit, 1997) examined how China's infrastructure shortcomings constrain growth; how the Chinese government is addressing these impediments; and how government policies have changed to encourage the foreign private sector to participate in infrastructure development. However, it excluded from discussion the characteristics of Chinese construction practices and the nature of local competition. Other research (He, 1996), although addressing the costing system used in the Chinese construction industry, concentrated largely on the characteristics of China's highly centralized, planned economy before economic reform. Given this background, it is difficult for foreign construction enterprises to fully understand the differences between themselves and their Chinese counterparts, and so formulate appropriate business development strategies. According to Porter's analysis, "a firm's competitive strategy must grow out of a sophisticated understanding of the structure of the industry and how it is changing" (Porter 1990, p.34).
In attempting to fill a gap in the literature, this article adopts a modified version of Porter's model of industry competition, in which five driving forces behind industrial structure change in China's construction industry are highlighted, namely:
It should be understood, however, that in different industrial sectors and other countries, key stakeholders may be different. Indeed, even a single stakeholder may have different roles. This article is organised into seven sections.
First, it modifies Porter's industrial analysis model to fit the characteristics of the construction industry. Sections two to six apply the model and systematically analyse the five main forces that determine competition in the China construction industry. Based on these analyses, the final section highlights the features of the China construction industry at the present time.
It should be understood, however, that in different industrial sectors and other countries, key stakeholders may be different. Indeed, even a single stakeholder may have different roles.
This article is organised into seven sections. First, it modifies Porter’s industrial analysis model to fit the characteristics of the construction industry. Sections two to six apply the model and systematically analyse the five main forces that determine competition in the China construction industry. Based on these analyses, the final section highlights the features of the China construction industry at the present time.
Since Porter’s (1980) initial work, his framework involving five competitive forces has become a popular tool for analysing industry competition. According to Porter, in any industry, whether domestic or international, the nature of competition is embodied in five competitive forces:
The five competitive forces determine industry profitability because they shape the prices firms can charge, the costs they have to bear, and the investment required to compete. According to Porter (1980, 1985, 1990), the strength of each of the five competitive forces is a function of industry structure, or the underlying economic and technical characteristics of an industry. Thus:
Others agree that Porter’s model describes the market side of industry analysis well (Watson 1992). The work of Porter has been applied in the Chinese construction market by others (Chen, 1997; Flanagan and Li Shirong, 1997). This paper complements and adds to these previous analyses. There application of the work of Porter has some shortcomings. The non-market side, particularly government intervention in transformation economies such as China, is not covered in Porter’s analysis of the five competitive forces.
Besides that, every industry is unique and has its own particular structure. The strength of each of the five competitive forces varies between different industrial sectors. In the construction industry, the threat of substitute products or services is not as pressing as in manufacturing industry, because of the non-substitutional nature of most products or services provided by the industry.
Based on the above discussion, this research, therefore, replaces "threat of substitute products or services" by "government intervention" in Porter’s framework. The main stakeholders discussed in the article are integrated into the framework in the following ways. Firstly, contractors and sub-contractors (according to China’s statistical practices, both are called construction enterprises) are dealt with together, since there is not as yet a clear clarification between contractors and sub-contractors in China.
Secondly, rural construction teams are treated as entrants instead of suppliers. Although many rural construction teams serve as labour suppliers for construction enterprises, many of them also act as independent contractors in construction projects, particularly in small-scale projects. Foreign construction companies are also treated as new entrants.
Thirdly, clients and building material manufacturers and consultants are put into the category of customers and suppliers respectively. The reason for only building material suppliers and various consultants being chosen as suppliers is that they provide materials and services which are continuously consumed in construction activities. By contrast, other suppliers such as construction equipment manufacturers are excluded in this analysis, because their relationship with contractors is only occasional and is comparatively weak.
The information used in this article is based on publications, either published or unpublished, and a survey conducted by authors in Australia and in China in 1996-97. During the survey, 22 Australian companies with current operations in China, various Chinese construction enterprises and government agencies in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Zhengzhou were contacted. Among the 22 Australian companies, half are contractors and the other half are manufacturers and services providers. Using Australia as a benchmark, the analysis below aims to put the Chinese construction industry into an international perspective. The reason for using Australia as the benchmark is that the Australian construction industry, according to Mitchell (1996), demonstrates world class efficiency in terms of productivity.
Clients create demand and have the power to directly influence industry performance. Their influence can be positive or negative depending on circumstances. In China, as in other countries, clients are a heterogeneous group. Their interests and the approaches they take to project initiation and delivery tend to be diverse. Nevertheless, Chinese clients have several distinguishing features at the present stage of the country’s development.
Being a socialist country, the state-owned sector still plays an important role in China’s economy. Therefore, it is understandable that about half the construction market consists of clients from state-owned units (Table 1). However, it is also worth noting that the dominance of this kind of client has been decreasing since the late 1970s, and clients other than state-owned units have increased steadily.
Another distinguishing characteristic of Chinese clients is their short-term views on projects. Many clients from state-owned companies are not conscious of environmental control and quality control. This stems from a short-term planning horizon, which is also rooted in the "economic reform" in China (Lan, 1996).
Market-embracing reform, having started in China in the late 1970s, effectively changed state-owned firms from being pure production units to being increasingly independent market players. Now, they are partly responsible for their own profits and losses. However, the transformation is far from complete. Most state-owned enterprises are currently at a stage being akin to "semiconductors"; that is, they are sensitive to some market signals. They rush to produce certain products when market signals are flashing. However, they are not aware of the consequences of oversupply or simply do not take the full responsibility for the oversupply they create, because their losses can be labelled "tuition fees" and be written off from their bank loans, either totally or partially. In such circumstances, long-term concerns give way to short-term concerns such as the immediate costs of construction.
Under-capitalisation is another characteristic of Chinese clients. It is commonplace that a client develops a project without necessary capital. The following factors contribute to the problem. First, during the rapid expansion of the economy, enterprises in China were perpetually short of capital. Secondly, it is a tradition for Chinese enterprises and local authorities to have a "hidden capital gap" when they submit their project proposals to relevant authorities for approval. Indeed, "debt triangles" are common in which firms delay or refuse due payments to each other. Thus, in many cases, a client’s capital while appearing in their balance sheets is not available in practice. When China tightened its capital supply in the early 1990s to fight two digit inflation, the shortage of capital among clients became more obvious. More and more clients are asking contractors to undertake projects with their own capital.
The fourth feature of Chinese clients is that they tend to use improper, sometimes illegal practices in the management of their projects. By the end of 1995, only about one third of all projects in China involved open tender. Many deals were made "under the table". Since the open tender system is not yet widely applied, corruption is pervasive in the Chinese construction industry. It is common for clients to ask for "kick-backs", or insist on using certain poor quality building materials. Their behaviour has not yet been regulated effectively due to problems in the enforcement of various regulations (Li, 1996). The promulgation of the first Chinese Construction Law, which is effective from the 1st March 1998, aims to tackle these difficulties.
The fifth feature of clients in China is the increase in their overseas numbers. The market share of foreign clients increased from nil in the early 1980s to about 10 percent in 1995. Inflowing foreign direct investment (FDI) is concentrated in several sectors as shown in Table 2, together they accounted for 97 percent of the total contracted FDI inflow in 1995. These investments are closely connected with the construction industry and not only offer opportunities for overseas contractors, but also facilitate the modernisation of the China construction industry.
In combination the above changes have been dramatically transformed the relationship between clients and construction enterprises in China. More complicated relations are being forged as various independent investors have replaced government as the main clients of construction enterprises, so diversifying linkages between a construction enterprise and its clients. However, such clients are more adept at playing the market than contractors, the general result being the increase in the bargaining power of clients.
Unlike western countries, where there is only limited capacity for the government to intervene in the market to influence or regulate demand, the role of government in China is still all-pervasive. Government intervention in the construction market remains much more influential, as the discussion below will demonstrate.
Government acts as a client. Before the 1980s, the Chinese government, under a "pure" socialist system, was the major or sole client for Chinese contractors, especially for large ones. With the deregulation of the Chinese command economy, this role of government as client is decreasing. For example, the share of state budget in total investment in fixed assets (Table 3) dropped from 18 percent in 1985 to 3 percent in 1995.
It is worth noting, though, that different governments still play an important role in influencing the construction market. The national government continues to directly run large public projects such as the Three Gorges Dam, for example. It still, to a certain extent, directly controls state-owned enterprises which remain a main market for construction projects. The more entrepreneurial local authorities remain deeply involved in local economic development. In each of over 600 cities in China, an airport, a toll road, a mobile phone system and other infrastructure projects are wanted, and every local authority annually sets up its own "priority projects" to intervene in the operation of the construction industry.
Government acts as a financier. Differing from western countries, the Chinese government is directly involved in the operations of "commercial banks". Therefore, over 20 percent of construction projects, which rely on domestic loans, are directly controlled by different levels of governments. The intervention of government, through the operations of "commercial banks", indirectly influences other construction projects.
Government acts as a regulator. In addition to promulgating various rules to regulate or change the operational environment of construction enterprises, the Chinese government promotes strong protectionism. At the national level, the Ministry of Construction in China, through a licensing system, limits the local operations of overseas contractors to the following four situations:
It is apparent that the national Chinese government sets technology and capital as two preconditions for foreign contractors into China. This can also be observed from China’s control over the inflow of foreign investment into its construction industry. In order to gain more advanced technology, China does not allow foreign contractors to set up a wholly-owned subsidiary in its territory and limits foreign contractors’ local operations to the same scope as their local partners. In order to generate more capital inflow, the Chinese government requires that the registered capital for foreign-funded construction enterprises be over US$16 million (MOC, 1996).
At the provincial level, local authorities worry more about employment. Every government, no matter what level, always wants construction companies from their own region to win contracts. Therefore, when competition is stiff, interference from local government is strong. By the end of 1995, over one third of municipalities and provinces in China were formulating special regulations to protect "their" construction market.
Summarizing the above discussion, government intervention in the China’s construction industry is decreasing as can be seen by the following trends:
COMPETITION AMONG CONTRACTORS AND SUBCONTRACTORS
During the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, China has gradually loosened its control over construction enterprises. State-owned contractors are no longer assigned construction work by the government. They have to hunt for work through market competition. Construction costs are no longer fixed by government. They are subject to the market fluctuations. The Construction Bank no longer solely handles transactions. All of these changes are mainly driven by deregulation and adoption of a "contracting system", which separates ownership and management. However, reform in the China construction industry does not go much beyond these measures. Therefore, a new management regime is far from settled. At the present stage, contractors and subcontractors, which are defined as construction enterprises in China, are connected through a two-tier hierarchy.
All construction enterprises in China are divided into two types. The first includes general contractors. They usually have the capacity to design, build, deliver a project and undertake related R&D. According to their track records and capitalisation, general contractors are divided into two classes (Table 4).
Further down the contractual chain are construction contractors. Their role is to build the projects. These contractors are divided into 33 categories according to the nature of the work involved, such as electronic contractor, foundation contractor, tunnel contractor. In each category, there are two to four classes. The criteria are similar to the ones for general contractors, but with more emphasis on certain specified technical requirements.
The relationship between contractors and subcontractors in China, however, is problematic. In developed countries, no matter whether contractors are service-oriented or production-oriented, their relationship with subcontractors is reasonably clear, although it varies significantly from long-term strategic alliances to one-off project-based cooperation. For example, a subcontracting system is well developed in Australia, where contractors are service-oriented and subcontractors deliver between 75 and 85 percent of the value of the industry’s production (DPWS 1996).
In China, however, there is not a clear relationship between contractors and subcontractors. During the decades of centralized control, the main contractor in China did all of the work on a project. In recent years, due to the fast rate of development and the huge demand for construction labour, subcontracting has become unavoidable. However, a system for governing subcontracting has not been set up. It is unclear what percentage of construction jobs are undertaken by subcontractors. The Chinese government is now concerned about over-subcontracting with many contractors and designers seeking profits by illegally leasing their licences or by subcontracting their jobs to unqualified firms (Jin 1996).
Clause 3.29 of the new Construction Law, which is intended to deal with the problem, requires contractors to undertake the "main structure" construction of the project by themselves, and forbids subcontractors to further subcontract out any work. However, the vagueness of the law in defining "main structure" and the impractical limitation of restricting the contractual chain to only two links will not offer much help in overcoming the problem.
Lack of an established contractor-subcontractor system not only hinders the development of specialisations amongst construction firms in a full contractual chain, but also increases the competition among contractors and subcontractors, which can have a deteriorating effect on the performance of most construction enterprises. In 1995, profit margins were below 2 percent. In order to gain new orders, many enterprises had to work at even lower margins. By the middle of 1996, over half of state-owned enterprises were in loss or just breaking even. The problem is not limited to small and medium-sized firms: the top contractors also face similar problems.
Given this situation, the efficiency gap between China and developed countries is obvious. Table 5 compares the cost differences between China and Australia in building materials, wages, unit rates and building costs. The first two indicators can be seen as pure input measurement. The last two indicators can be seen as measurement of output efficiency from the standpoint of construction, because they represent the synergy of machinery, materials and labour committed to certain construction jobs. As Table 5 shows, the massive cost input advantages of China are significantly dissipated when overall Chinese and Australian building costs are compared.
The bargaining power of building material manufacturers has been eroded generally speaking during the last decade, although building materials account for a large portion of total building costs. Reasons for this relate back to the over-supply of conventional building materials caused by deregulation, the low concentration of production among the manufacturers, and the inroads made by contractors in the production of building materials.
Before the economic reforms, the manufacture of building materials in China was controlled by the State Administration of Building Materials Industry (SABMI). All construction materials were distributed by the government. Since 1980 deregulation has caused a fever of investing in building material production by different industries in different regions. It is known as "investing into building materials by all the sectors" in China. As a result of the investment fever, the monopoly of the SABMI on building material manufacturing was broken, and the boundary between the building materials industry and other industries became unclear. Currently, only a minority of the total output of building materials is controlled by the SABMI. For example, in Shanghai, only 20 percent of cement production and 25 percent of ready-mix concrete supply are under the control of the local branch of the SABMI. Another result of the investment fever is over-supply. For example, in 1996, there was a 2.2 million ton cement surplus from the top 70 cement producers and an oversupply of 5 million cases of glass from the top 23 flat glass manufacturers.
Table 6 shows that concentration of production in building material manufacturing in China is very low. This stems from two causes. One is the domination of rural firms in building material manufacturing. There were over 200, 000 building material suppliers throughout China in the mid-1990s. Among them, rural manufacturing firms account for 70 percent of enterprises and 40 percent of total output.
The other cause is that there are no ministry-owned firms in the China building materials industry, unlike other industries. Ministry-owned firms are usually regarded as a key player. Because of their national importance, they usually get privileged treatment such as early possession of advanced new technology and gain from economies of scale. Because of a lack of such key players, no single supplier is able to greatly influence the market. It is also difficult to promote technological progress nationwide. Table 7 compares the technology used in cement and flat glass production between China and developed countries. It is apparent that most cement and flat glass in China is produced using out-of-date or medium-level technology.
Since the replacement of a centrally-controlled construction materials distribution system by a market procurement system, many Chinese contractors, particularly large construction companies, have become both manufacturers and final users of building materials as part of their diversification strategies. Setting up joint ventures with foreign investors is a common way of doing this. In Shanghai, 20 percent of ready mixed concrete and 25 percent of plasterboard is manufactured by the Shanghai Construction Group, the largest construction company in Shanghai. This backward integration of contractors further diminishes the bargain power of building material suppliers.
In contrast to building materials suppliers, the impact of consultants on construction enterprises in China has become more influential. The most outstanding feature of consultant services in China is the dual structure, with state-owned institutes tackling technical issues, and private consultants dealing with personal contacts.
Highly specialised technical jobs such as architectural and design work in China, as in other countries, occurs at the "front end" of projects. Architects and designers are well placed to set the framework for improving project outcomes. Currently, there are about 800,000 surveyors and designers working in this sector. Architectural and design works are mainly undertaken by the design institutes, which are set up by the Chinese authorities. Typically, these design institutes live off government works, private projects being only secondary. Experienced professionals occupy senior management levels, but there is a gap in the middle layer of professionals, and the lower end includes many poor-quality designers. Although private consultants are increasing in number, the monopoly of state-owned institutes in this sector remains. This could be attributed to either the lack of reform in these institutes, or the lack of entrepreneurs among the professionals themselves.
One reason for such institutes having a strong influence on contractors is that they still enjoy Chinese government protection. A foreign firm, particularly an architectural firm, is required to have a local partner to ensure that their submissions for doing business in China are approved. The local partner usually needs to be located in the appropriate city, since registration recognised in one city does not necessarily mean being able to work in another, despite the national character of registration.
Regarding non-technical issues, particularly those related to winning contracts, consultant services are mainly run by private individuals. This kind of service focuses on forging various personal relationships. It is not confined to the "front end" of projects, but goes through the whole life cycle of a construction project. The people who provide such services normally use highly personal networks. The core of the network is having good relationship with various authorities. Various favorable treatments, therefore, can be generated from having good personal relationships.
The general recognition of the importance of personal contacts sets the market for such services. People who hold positions in the relevant authorities, who are relatives or close to officers in these authorities, who have good relationships with banks and clients, are well placed to be the providers of the services. Unlike design and other technical specialists consultants, "personal contact" consultants are dominated by private concerns. They may be run in various legal or illegal forms. Compared with other consultants, "personal contact" or "guanxi" consultants are more market driven and more flexible.
Although there is not a clear picture about the bargaining power of "guanxi" or "personal contact" consultants nationwide, the authors’ survey found that many contractors in China are willing to pay generously for their services believing it will lead to winning a contract. A new slogan among the Chinese construction companies, "personal contacts are a productive force", is evidence that contractors are regarding these consultants as important suppliers for their business.
Chinese contractors currently face two types of threats generated by new entrants in the industry. One is the penetration of foreign contractors with capital and superior technology into the top end of the market. The other is the low cost, rural construction teams flooding into the lower end of the market.
China’s rural economic reform increased the productivity of agriculture. At the same time, it freed up surplus labour in rural areas. From 1980 to 1995, it was estimated that over 20 million of the 300 million surplus labourers in rural areas entered the construction market. According to official statistics, the number of rural construction teams reached 71,017 in China in 1995 (Jin, 1996), which is about 3 times the number of construction enterprises.
These construction teams are poorly equipped and poorly managed. At first they mainly undertook unskilled labour work. As they gained certain technical and management skills, some of them started to compete with construction enterprises. Due to their very low overheads, low labour costs, low profit margins and usually lawless management, they not only took over construction work in rural areas, small towns and the periphery of cities, but also penetrated into urban areas. Some of them have developed into independent subcontractors and, even, contractors. The emerging closer relationships between unregulated clients and lawless rural construction teams have become the biggest headache for construction enterprises and the government. Many problems such as project quality and corruption are the result (CCIA, 1996).
Although there are some limitations to the entry of foreign contractors and foreign investors into the construction industry, many do get their footholds in China purely on their strength in technology and capital. But to be successful they have to know and follow Chinese government procedures.
Generally speaking, there are two ways for an overseas construction company to operate in China. One is to undertake construction projects without having Chinese "legal person status". Table 8 shows the specialty and national origins of 39 foreign contractors operating in China in this way. Among the 39 companies 30 licences were issued by the Ministry of Construction in China up to 1996. Another 9 firms were granted licences by provincial governments. Under a decree of the Ministry of Construction, an overseas contractor applies for a licence from a particular provincial government if it operates solely in that province, while it must apply for a licence from the Ministry of Construction if it operates in more than one province. Many foreign contractors, which only registered locally, are not on the records of the national Ministry of Construction.
It is apparent that all foreign contractors show certain technology superiority. Among them Hong Kong and Japan’s construction companies are dominant, particularly in trans-provincial operations. As in other industries, Hong Kong contractors entered the China market earlier and on a large scale. Japanese construction companies, such as Kumagai Gumi, Shimizu, and Taisei target large projects. Korean constructors, although they came later, are also very active in the market.
The other way for an overseas construction company to operate in China is to have a local subsidiary, usually a joint venture. Since opening its doors, China has accommodated about 1,600 foreign-funded enterprises in the construction industry. Among them, there are over 100 comparatively large ones (investment of over US$10 million). Table 9 shows the distribution of these projects in construction activities.
Several changes have occurred among these foreign-funded construction enterprises. First, fewer foreign contractors now operate in areas involving relatively low level technology such as earthworks. Second, infrastructure construction, particularly in the transportation and energy sectors, has been the main target for foreign-funded construction companies. However, the pattern is shifting away from purely highway construction to a combination of power station and highway construction and management. Third, the operating scope of foreign-funded construction companies is getting wider over time. Other infrastructure projects such as water supply projects are receiving more considerations from overseas contractors.
Summarising the above analyses of the main stakeholders, several characteristics of the Chinese construction industry emerge. First, the industry currently is becoming more market driven. Government no longer assigns construction work to construction enterprises. Its intervention has shifted from directly providing construction jobs to project financial control. Contractors and subcontractors have to hunt for contracts through market competition, often resorting to illegal methods. The conditional opening of the construction market caused an inflow of foreign direct investment and foreign contractors who are targeting the top end of market. The loosening of control over the movement of surplus rural labours has generated a flood of rural construction teams. All these factors have increased competition in the industry.
Second, the Chinese construction industry is a fragmented one and is poorly regulated. Due to the low entry barriers, the importance of local personal contacts and the variety of local regulations, there are a large number of small and medium-sized companies in the industry, some with potential to grow rapidly. But the lack of an effective framework for setting up a full construction industry hierarchy among contractors and subcontractors continues to hinder the development of construction firm specialisation. Indeed, illegal behaviour, fermented by lawless rural construction teams and unregulated clients, erodes the enforcement of laws and regulations. Therefore, the potential profits of construction enterprises are eaten away. And, more generally, the potential for the orderly development of the industry is reduced.
Third, although economic reform has brought Chinese construction practices more in line with international conventions, differences remain. To list a few:
The above characteristics make the Chinese construction market difficult for foreign contractors to "read". Therefore, in targeting the Chinese construction market, foreign contractors have, first, to give far more attention to a detailed understanding of national and local construction practices, then focus their strategies towards appropriate market niches and, finally, they have not to expect success immediately.
Chen, J. (1997) China’s Construction Industry And Foreign Investment, Building Research & Information, 25(1), pp. 5-10.
China Construction Industry Association (1996) On the Strategies for Advancing the Development of the Construction Enterprises Group, Construction Economy, 1, pp. 8-13.
Department of Public Works and Services (1996) The Construction Industry in New South Wales: Opportunities and Challenges, NSW Government Green Paper.
East Asia Analysis Unit (1997) China Embraces the Market: Achievements, Constraints and Opportunities, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia.
Flanagan, R. and Li Shirong (1997) International Construction: A Perspective on China, CIOB.
He, Z. (1996) Understanding the Chinese Construction Costing System, Cost Engineering, 38(1), pp. 19-21.
Hillebrandt, P.M. et al (1995) The Construction Companies In and Out of Recession, London, Macmillan.
Jin, M.Q. (1996) The Only Way Out to Develop Vigorously the Construction Industry, Construction Economy, 1, pp. 3-7.
Lan, P. (1996) Technology Transfer to China through Foreign Direct Investment, Aldershot, England, Averbury.
Lan, P. and J.T. Jackson, (1997) Problems Faced by Australian Contractors in China, The Building Economist, December, pp. 4-9.
Lan, P. and Jackson, J.T. (1998) Catching the New Opportunities in China’s Construction Market, The Building Economist, March, pp. 24-29.
Li, D.Q. (1996) Research into the Improvement of State-owned Construction Enterprises, a Report for the Ministry of Construction, China.
Mitchell, A. (1996) Tariffs are No Boon to Battlers, The Australian Financial Review, November 20.
Ministry of Construction (1996) A Collection of Documents for Project Construction and the Construction Industry, Beijing, Metallurgical Industry Press.
Porter, M.E. (1980) Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analysing Industries and Competitors, New York, The Free Press.
Porter, M.E. (1985) Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, New York, The Free Press.
Porter, M.E. (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London, Macmillan.
State Administration of Building Materials Industry (1996) Information for the Building Materials Market, Beijing.
Wang, Y.M. (1996) An Introduction to China’s Building Materials Industry, Beijing, China’s Building Materials Industry Press.
Watson, G. H. (1992) The Benchmarking Workbook: Adapting Best Practices for Performance Improvement, Portland, Oregon, Productive Press.
Yao, B. (1996) The General Introduction of Overseas Enterprises Contracting Projects in China, Beijing, Ministry of Construction.
Zhang, W. (1996) Adjustment of Investment Structure is the Key for Improving the Building Materials Industry, Statistics & Calculation of Building Materials, 1, pp. 15-18.
International Journal of Construction Marketing
ISSN 1463-7189 (web)
ISSN 1463-770 (hardcopy)
© Oxford Brookes University
This page is maintained by the Centre
for Construction Marketing
at Oxford Brookes University.
Editor Brian Wood .
Last Modified: Friday, 12-Apr-02 17:25:17 BST.