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Oxford Brookes Business School
+44 (0) 1865 485743
CLC 2.28, Headington Campus
Dr. Sara le Roux has a PhD in Economics from the University of Exeter (2012). Her thesis focused mainly on experiments in decision-making and was conducted under the supervisory team of Prof. David Kelsey and Prof. Dieter Baklenborg.
She has received a Masters diploma in Economics from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and an MSc degree in Economics and Experimental Economics from the University of Exeter (2009), for which she was awarded a Dean's Commendation.
She joined Oxford Brookes University in 2012, as a Senior Lecturer in Economics.
Sara has taught a wide variety of undergraduate and postgraduate modules while at Oxford Brookes. These include:
and supported undergraduate modules on Macroeconomics II.
She has also lead a Post-Graduate module on Industrial Organisation and supervised undergraduate dissertations in Economics & Finance.
Sara is currently supervising two PhDs on topics in development economics. She would be interested in supervising PhD dissertations in Game Theory, Industrial Organisation, Decision Theory, Behavioural and Experimental Economics, Development Economics and Climate Change.
Sara's research interests include the theoretical and experimental analysis of individual's perception of ambiguity and risk; decision choices made by individuals in the presence of ambiguity; threshold effects in environment (climate change); game theory; public economics; behavioural and neuro-economics.
She has published papers in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Theory and Decision, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Technology Forecasting and Social Change, Energy Policy, Journal of Business Ethics and in a feschrift in honour of Professor Reinhard Selten (1994 Nobel Laureate in Economics), among many others.
Successful External Grants:
2019 Research Lead for Project : ‘Blenheim Estate: Economic Impact Study 2018-19’, funded by Blenheim Supporting Ltd. pFACT ID – 9921, Project ID: A180380898.
2019 Research Lead for Project : ‘Bicester Motion: Economic Impact Study’, funded by Bicester Heritage Ltd. pFACT ID – 9660, Project ID: A180505486.
2018 Research Lead for Project : ‘Blenheim Estate: Economic Impact Study 2017-18’, funded by Blenheim Supporting Ltd. pFACT ID – 9353, Project ID: A-27883.
2017 Research Lead for Project : ‘Blenheim Estate: Economic Impact Study 2016-17’, funded by Blenheim Supporting Ltd. pFACT ID – 9018, Project ID: A-27668.
Successful Internal Grants:
2014 Oxford Brookes University Central Research grant (principal investigator) £7,500
2015 Oxford Brookes Business School Internal Small Grant (principal investigator) £2,866
2016 Oxford Brookes Business School Internal Small Grant (principal investigator) £4,862
2017 Royal Economic Society Conference Grant £300
For additional information please see:
Purpose. This study presents theoretical and empirical arguments for the role of mobile telephony in promoting good governance in 47 sub-Saharan African countries for the period 2000-2012. Design/methodology/approach. The empirical inquiry uses an endogeneity-robust GMM approach with forward orthogonal deviations to analyse the linkage between mobile phone usage and the variation in three broad governance categories — political, economic and institutional. Findings. Three key findings are established: First, in terms of individual governance indicators, mobile phones consistently stimulated good governance by the same magnitude, with the exception of the effect on the regulation component of economic governance. Second, when indicators are combined, the effect of mobile phones on general governance is three times higher than that on the institutional governance category. Third, countries with
lower levels of governance indicators are catching-up with their counterparts with more advanced dynamics. Originality/value. The study makes both theoretical and empirical contributions by highlighting the importance of various combinations of governance indicators and their responsiveness to mobile phone usage.
This paper attempts to study how individuals respond to the availability of an insurance that would safeguard their interests if a climate change catastrophe occurred. If such an insurance is available to them, do individuals insure themselves sufficiently? Further, the study investigates if information regarding the past occurrence of the catastrophic event leads to an increase in insurance subscriptions and/or the emergence of a lemons market. Finally, policy implications are investigated - Can an indirect intervention in the form of a “nudge” ensure a better outcome?
Motivated by a recent World Bank report on achieving of Millennium Development Goals which shows that poverty has been declining in all regions of the world with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), this study puts some empirical structure to theoretical and qualitative studies on the reconciliation of the Beijing Model with the Washington Consensus. It tests the hypothesis that compared to middle income countries, low income countries would achieve more inclusive development by focusing on economic governance as opposed topolitical governance. The empirical evidence is based on interactive and non-interactive fixed effects regressions and 49 countries in SSA for the period 2000-2012. The findings confirm the investigated hypothesis. As the main policy implication, in order to address inclusive development challenges in the post-2015 development agenda in SSA, it would benefit low income countries in the sub-region to prioritise economic governance. Other theoretical and practical contributions are also discussed.
This paper studies the impact of ambiguity in the best-shot and weakest-link models of public good provision. The models are first analyzed theoretically. Then, we conduct experiments to study how ambiguity affects behavior in these games. We test whether subjects' perception of ambiguity differs between a local opponent and a foreign one. We find that an ambiguity-safe strategy is often chosen by subjects. This is compatible with the hypothesis that ambiguity aversion influences behavior in games. Subjects tend to choose contributions above (respectively, below) the Nash equilibrium in the best-shot (respectively, weakest-link) model.
Economic Impact studies
Decision Theory, Behavioural and Experimental Economics
Economic Impact studies capture the breadth of an organisation's impact on its community - both locally as well as to the UK GDP.Sara has led a team of analysts that has conducted the economic impact analysis of the following organisations:• Blenheim Palace • Bicester Motion
2019 ‘The effects of information asymmetry in a modified threshold public goods game’, Public Economic Theory Conference, Strasbourg, France.
2018 ‘Climate Change Catastrophes and Insuring Decisions’, Foundations of Utility and Risk Conference, York.
2017 ‘Climate Change Catastrophes and Insuring Decisions’, International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Social Sciences, Barcelona, Spain; European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Athens, Greece; Economic Science Association, Vienna, Austria.
2016 ‘Strategic Ambiguity and Decision-making: An Experimental Study’, GW4 Conference, Bristol, UK; Foundations of Utility and Risk Conference, Warwick.
2015 ‘Strategic Ambiguity and Decision-making: An Experimental Study’, Public Economic Theory Conference, Luxembourg; Economic Science Association, Conference, Heidelberg, Germany.
2014 ‘Dragon Slaying with Ambiguity: Theory and Experiments’, Public Economic Theory Conference, Seattle, USA; Foundations of Utility and Risk, Conference, Rotterdam, Netherlands, Royal Economic Society Conference, Manchester, UK.
2013 ‘An Experimental Study on the Effect of Ambiguity in a Coordination Game’, Risk, Uncertainty and Decision Conference, Paris, France; Brookes-Burgundy Research Conference, Dijon, France.
2011 ‘Deviations from Equilibrium in an Experiment on Signaling Games: First Results’, NUS Behavioural Economics Summer Institute, Singapore; IAREP/SABE/ICABEEPConference, Exeter, UK.
2010 ‘Deviations from Equilibrium in an Experiment on Signaling Games: First Results’, Economic Science Association Conference, Copenhagen; Europäische Wissenschaftstage, Steyr, Austria.
Before joining Oxford Brookes, Sara was a Graduate Teaching Assistant at the University of Exeter Business School.