

'Transition to What?'

Evaluating the transitional shelter process in Leogane, Haiti

'Transition to What?'

Evaluating the transitional shelter process in Leogane, Haiti

Avery Doninger
September 2013

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the MA degree in
Development and Emergency Practice, Oxford Brookes University

Lay out by Elliott Woolworth © 2013
elliottwoolworth.wordpress.com

Abstract

This study evaluated the progress of the transitional shelter (t-shelter) process in Leogane, Haiti following the 2010 earthquake. In Leogane, 80-90% of buildings were destroyed and thousands of people were displaced. As a part of the shelter sector response plan (SSRP), many aid agencies provided t-shelter, an approach to post-disaster shelter needs that has been subject to debate on whether it is an effective sheltering solution or detrimental to long-term recovery. It has been three and a half years since the earthquake; a critical juncture as typical t-shelters are only designed to last 3-5 years. As the structures erode, they will become increasingly unsafe for the occupants. It is essential that the transitional process be underway. Additionally, it is imperative to the development of best-practices for t-shelter programs that the successes and failures in Haiti are comprehensively evaluated.

The purpose of the research was to illuminate how and why the transitional process in Leogane is working effectively or how and why the process is stagnating, including to what extent NGOs are facilitating the transitional process. The evaluation was conducted through interviews with t-shelter beneficiaries, visual observation, and interviews with key NGO staff. This study reviewed the process of linking relief efforts to development, the evolution of the transitional shelter approach, the current debate on transitional shelter as an effective sheltering solution, and the implementation of the transitional shelter approach in Haiti.

The Haiti shelter response was challenging and while NGOs did the best they could in very complex conditions, the reality is that the majority of t-shelters have not transitioned and NGOs have done little, if anything to facilitate the process. The lack of NGO involvement in the transitioning process may largely be due to funding constraints. Additionally, financial limitations seem to be the primary barrier to beneficiary self-transitioning. Although there have been some beneficiaries able to transition through upgrades or rebuilding, most have not done so safely. While this research was able to provide a foundation for recommendations, such as implementing small grants programs for safe reconstruction, improved communication between NGOs and communities, and increased dissemination of safe reconstruction information and trainings, it examines a very small sample of t-shelters and the findings should not be generalized for all t-shelter programs.

Statement of Originality

This dissertation is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.

Signed: _____ Date: _____

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

Signed: _____ Date: _____

Statement of Ethics Review Approval

This dissertation involved human participants. A Form E1BE for each group of participants, showing ethics review approval, has been attached to this dissertation as an appendix.

*All photos were taken by the author unless otherwise stated.

*The question 'Transition to What?' was first posed in the 2009 article "Capacity building lessons from a decade of transitional settlement and shelter" by Estaban Leon, Ilan Kelman, James Kennedy, and Joseph Ashmore.

Table of Contents

ix	Acronyms & Abbreviations
x	Glossary
xi	List of Tables and Figures
xii	Acknowledgements
1	Part A Introduction
1.1	Background and Rationale
1.1.1	Shelter after Disaster
1.1.2	Haiti 2010 Earthquake
1.1.3	Rationale and Research Questions
1.2	Aims and Objectives
1.2.1	Aims
1.2.2	Objectives
1.3	Methodology
1.4	Research Scope & Limitations
1.4.1	Scope
1.4.2	Limitations
1.5	Ethical Considerations
1.6	Structure of the Study
9	Part B Literature Review
2.1	Shelter: From Relief to Development
2.2	Transitional Shelter Approach
2.3	Transitional Shelter Debate
19	Part C Context
3.1	Haiti
3.1.1	A Brief History
3.1.2	Transitional Shelter in Haiti
3.2	Case Studies
3.2.1	NGO-A
3.2.2	NGO-B
3.2.3	NGO-C
27	Part D Analysis and Discussion
4.1	NGO-A
4.2	NGO-B
4.3	NGO-C
43	Part E Conclusion
5.1	Key observations
5.2	Lessons Learned
5.3	Recommendations
5.4	Areas for further research
51	Appendices
65	References
70	Ethics Forms

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CENDEP	Center for Development and Emergency Practice
E-shelter	Emergency Shelter
HERR	Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PRA	Participatory Rapid Appraisal
SC	Shelter Cluster
SSRP	Shelter Sector Response Plan
Tarpaulin	Tarp
TSA	Transitional Shelter Approach
T-shelter	Transitional Shelter
UN	United Nations
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

Glossary

Blan: the Haitian Kreyol word for foreigner or white person.

Casec: the Haitian Kreyol term for the elected community leader. Each community has a Casec, which in some communities are referred to as Asec.

Cluster System: the cluster system emerged in 2006 and is a coordination strategy meant to strengthen disaster response effectiveness by dividing the work (e.g., roles and responsibilities) into a number of sectors, (e.g., shelter, early recovery, health, protection, etc.) (IFRC, 2011b). Clusters are meant to enhance coordination between the many actors responding to a humanitarian crisis as well as support national and local authorities (IFRC, 2011b).

Contiguum Approach: when relief, rehabilitation, and development are implemented simultaneously by integrating the three forms of assistance to be carried out side by side (VENRO, 2006).

Continuum Approach: a linear series of shelter provisions (VENRO, 2006).

Humanitarian Community: organized groups of actors who help to provide assistance to those in need, often during a crisis.

Leogane Commune: Haiti is divided into 140 communes, which are communities similar to districts, of which Leogane is one.

Marronage: Altering others' perception of you or a situation in the way that you want them to perceive it; this is often used as a survival technique. See section 1.4.2 Limitations for further discussion.

Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA): "...an intensive, participatory, systematic but semi-structured learning experience carried out in a community by a multi-disciplinary team which includes community members. It can be used for the following purposes: needs assessments, feasibility studies, identifying the importance and priorities for the development activities, implementing the development activities if it necessary to gather new information, monitoring or evaluating development activities" (NGO&DEV, 2012). This approach requires community participation, showing respect and interest toward community members, patience, listening, and methods of engagement which empower community members to share and express their knowledge and opinions (NGO&DEV, 2012).

Peri-urban: an area that is not fully urban, but not rural; often immediately surrounding a city or town.

Shelter Cluster: one of the sectors within the global cluster system that works to coordinate the humanitarian shelter response.

Transitional Shelter: See section 2.2 Transitional Shelter Approach (TSA)

Vulnerability: "...the physical, economic, political, or social susceptibility or predisposition of a community to damage in the case of a destabilizing phenomenon of natural or anthropologic origin" (Bankoff et al, 2004, p.38).

List of Tables

- Table 1: List of NGO Interviewees
- Table 2: 5 Characteristics of Transitional Shelter
- Table 3: 6 Transitional Settlement Program Options
- Table 4: 6 Transitional Reconstruction Program Options
- Table 5: NGO-A t-shelter features
- Table 6: NGO-B t-shelter features
- Table 7: NGO-C t-shelter features

List of Figures

- Figure 1: Examples of eroding t-shelters
- Figure 2: Author, Avery Doninger and Translator, Berlyne
- Figure 3: Map of Haiti
- Figure 4: Steep hikes to NGO-A t-shelters
- Figure 5: Incremental sheltering process vs. phased approach
- Figure 6: 18 transitional shelter assistance methods
- Figure 7: NGO-A, t-shelter A1
- Figure 8: NGO-B urban t-shelter model (t-shelter B18)
- Figure 9: NGO-B rural t-shelter model (t-shelter B3)
- Figure 10: NGO-C, t-shelter C5
- Figure 11: NGO-A, t-shelter A2
- Figure 12: Crumbling foundations
- Figure 13: Color added to the concrete slab foundations
- Figure 14: Concrete fenced porch
- Figure 15: Painted t-shelter
- Figure 16: Example of repaired home
- Figure 17: Rain-damaged plywood
- Figure 18: Slowly the elements deteriorate t-shelters
- Figure 19: Repaired home
- Figure 20: NGO-A, t-shelter A29
- Figure 21: 3 Types of upgraded walls
- Figure 22: Business built onto t-shelter
- Figure 23: Tailor shop built into t-shelter
- Figure 24: Land where sold t-shelter once stood
- Figure 25: Abandoned t-shelters
- Figure 26: NGO-B t-shelters that are transitioning
- Figure 27: Double t-shelter
- Figure 28: Painted t-shelter
- Figure 29: Relocated t-shelter
- Figure 30: Steel polls recycled from a t-shelter sold for parts
- Figure 31: NGO-C t-shelters that are transitioning

See Appendices for photos and information regarding each t-shelter evaluated.

Acknowledgements

DEP Lecturers & Cohort, for being a source of inspiration, learning, and the lifetime supply of tupperware.

Jolinda Hackett, Mwen pa't kapab fe sa san ede w. Mesi anpil pou tout bagay, zanmi mwen.

David Sanderson, for your guidance and advice.

CENDEP, for the scholarship.

Berlyne Bien-Aime, my translator and my friend whom I could not have done this without - mesì zanmi mwen.

Research interviewees, your insights have been invaluable – mesì anpil.

Elliott Woolworth, for always being there, for being an endless source of encouragement, and for your help with the layout.

Junior Andre Leopold, Mèsi pou amitye ou - pi bon zanmi pou lavi. Sonje sa: "Plan ak motivasyon."

Thom Banks, for being a brilliant proofreader.

Fiona Kelling and Tom Newby, for your thoughtful emails and advice.

Dr. Helma de Vries, for being my mentor.

My family, for your love and support.

My mom, for everything.

Mayengwen danse, men li pa bliye janm li.

The mosquito dances, but it doesn't forget it's legs.

Celebrate your success, but don't forget those who have helped you.

(Turnball, 2005, p.94)



PART A INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Rationale 1.1.1 Shelter after Disaster

One of the international humanitarian community's biggest challenges is providing adequate shelter after disaster (Burnell and Sanderson, 2011). Disasters often leave people homeless and in need of new housing and/or temporary accommodation. Rental assistance programs, camps, and host family schemes are common shelter solutions implemented by aid agencies for internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005). The typical response for land-owning IDPs has been emergency shelter (e-shelter) provisions such as tents, tarpaulins, plastic sheeting, and tools (SC, 2012). These shelter provisions are only meant to satisfy short-term shelter needs and are often inadequate in the long-term, as the reconstruction phase can take much longer than emergency provisions are meant to last (SC, 2012). Consequently, emergency provisions are utilized by communities much longer than they are intended to be, putting the disaster-affected people in a greater peril. The humanitarian community has been attempting to address this shortfall and in doing so has identified shelter as an ongoing process that must happen in parallel with reconstruction (Davis, 1978; Collins et al., 2010). Agencies should consider how to support post-disaster shelter needs at the onset of the disaster while sorting emergency provisions (Kelman et al, 2011).

It often takes many years for homeowners to rebuild; securing land tenure and the resettlement of former tenants have been perverse challenges, particularly in compact urban environments. When shelter needs of the affected population are not adequately met over the reconstruction period, other aspects of their lives are adversely affected, such as their health and livelihoods, which further stifles their ability to reconstruct and recover (SC, 2012). The humanitarian community has been making efforts to address these critical shelter needs, however according to a Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) report, "[p]roviding adequate shelter is one of the most intractable problems in international humanitarian response" (DFID, 2011, p.25).

1.1.2 2010 Haiti Earthquake

Leogane, Haiti was the epicenter of the January 2010 earthquake which destroyed 80-90% of buildings (Julmy, 2011). Tents and tarpaulins were provided as e-shelter provisions, but when it was recognized that the reconstruction process would take a number of years, the need for a more durable solution became apparent (IASC, 2012). The transitional shelter approach (TSA) was adopted to assist people in the transition from post-disaster improvised housing to the reconstruction of a permanent home. Transitional shelter (t-shelter) is a process that upgrades and eventually transitions shelters to permanent housing over time (IASC, 2012).

In 2006, the cluster system emerged as a coordination strategy to strengthen disaster response effectiveness by coordinating roles and responsibilities between sectors, or 'clusters' (e.g., shelter, health, protection) (IFRC, 2011b). Clusters are meant coordinate the many actors responding to a humanitarian crisis as well as support national and local authorities (IFRC, 2011b). In Haiti, a shelter cluster was formed to address the overwhelming shelter needs following the earthquake. Twenty-three organizations registered with the Leogane Hub Shelter Cluster and contributed to over 20,000 t-shelters constructed in Leogane (IASC, 2011). Most t-shelters have a 3-5 year lifespan (IASC, 2012).

1.1.3 Rationale and Research Questions

It is a critical time for t-shelter occupants in Haiti. Three and a half years post-earthquake represents a critical juncture as typical t-shelters are only designed to last 3-5 years and the deterioration of the structures is accelerated by Haiti's tropical climate. As the structures erode (see Figure 1), they will become increasingly unsafe for the occupants. It is essential that the transitional process is underway. In addition, it is imperative to the development of best-practices for t-shelter programs that the successes and failures in Haiti are comprehensively evaluated.

According to Kelman et al (2011), it is rare for agencies to return to past project sites to conduct an evaluation of how their shelter activities impacted long-term recovery of the communities. Studies that are done are usually 'one-off' and do not re-examine and analyze the long-term effects over time (Kelman et al, 2011). Reviewing the long-term impact of the transitional shelter response in Haiti (and not just the immediate post-building outputs) illuminates which processes are successful and which processes put vulnerable populations at greater peril; this information may impact how future disasters are managed.



Figure 1: Examples of eroding t-shelters

This evaluation is particularly relevant to the current debate on whether or not t-shelters are a viable post-disaster shelter solution. There has yet to be a wide and comprehensive evaluation of the ongoing transitional process in Haiti; therefore, the following research questions were posed as the basis of this evaluation:

Are the transitional shelters provided after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti transitioning? If so, how and why? If not, why?

Are the NGOs that provided the t-shelters facilitating the transitioning process? If so, how and why? If not, why?

1.2 Aims and Objectives

1.2.1. Aims

This research aims to evaluate progress of the transitional shelter process in Leogane, Haiti by examining three different t-shelter programs, each implemented by a different international NGO. This evaluation was conducted through interviews with t-shelter beneficiaries, visual observation, and interviews with key NGO staff. Given the tremendous difficulties humanitarian agencies had in delivering shelter assistance in Haiti and given ongoing debates on whether or not t-shelters are an effective sheltering solution or detrimental to long-term recovery, an evaluation is critical to understanding current progress, challenges, and how the humanitarian community can immediately adapt efforts to improve the process and learn from this shelter response. This research aims to illuminate how and why the transitional process is working effectively or how and why the process is stagnating.

1.2.2. Objectives

- The objectives of this research are:
- Identify whether or not transitional shelters are transitioning and why.
- Find out to what degree, if at all, NGOs implementing t-shelter programs are facilitating the transitional process.
- Highlight areas of necessary intervention to better facilitate the transitional process.
- Contribute to the field of knowledge on the application of the transitional shelter approach and shelter after disaster

1.3 Methodology

This research was conducted through primary and secondary source data collection. The secondary source data was collected through a review of the literature on the t-shelter processes. The majority of the research, however, was focused on the primary data source which was gathered through field research in Leogane, Haiti. Three organizations (NGO-A, NGO-B, and NGO-C), which have implemented t-shelter programs in Leogane, were selected based on their differing t-shelter models, locations of program implementation, and organizational size and capacities.

¹NGOs and beneficiaries were kept anonymous because the initial research methodology required utilizing confidential information provided by NGOs, as NGOs were reluctant to participate unless confidentiality was ensured. Although the methodology changed, some consent forms had already been signed and it would not have been ethical to alter the agreement. Anonymity also encouraged full reporting by NGO staff.

Organizations were also chosen based on their willingness to provide program information and participate in interviews, as well as if they defined their shelter model as transitional. By evaluating a range of models, implemented by NGOs of varying capacities, this evaluation attempts to sample the diversity of t-shelter programs.

The participatory rapid appraisal (PRA) was utilized to locate specific t-shelters and gather information in interviews. PRA is a way to gather information via "...an intensive, participatory, systematic but semi-structured learning experience carried out in a community..." (NGO&DEV, 2012). This approach requires community participation, patience, listening, and methods of engagement which empower community members to share and express their knowledge and opinions (NGO&DEV, 2012).

NGO staff provided names of communities where t-shelters were built and their general locations were located on IASC maps. Upon arrival in these locations, the PRA approach was utilized to identify beneficiaries. T-shelters were easily identified by their specific design which is distinct



Figure 2: Author, Avery Doninger and Translator, Berlyne

from Haitian-built infrastructure. The PRA was used to locate the community in which t-shelters were built and then to identify specific t-shelters within the community. Residents or local leaders voluntarily acted as tour guides and interviewees directed us to neighboring t-shelters.

Sixty percent of interviewees were women, 37% were men, and 3% were men and women interviewed together. The majority were the head of household, which made for an age range of mid-twenties to elderly. In a few cases, interviewees were the owner's relatives who also lived there or relatives who lived next door. Usually, owners were available or easily accessible for interviews.

Qualitative research methods were employed including semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 2 for guiding questions) with t-shelter beneficiaries and key NGO staff (see Table 1). First-hand accounts obtained from beneficiaries on their progress in the transitioning process were instrumental to the evaluation. An accompanying translator allowed all interviews to be conducted in beneficiaries' native language, Haitian Kreyol. Additionally, t-shelter conditions were visually assessed and documented to illuminate interviewees' reports. Interviews with key NGO staff members provided an alternative perspective as well as information on external factors which may have hindered or supported NGOs' ability to implement programs and facilitate transitions.

Table 1: List of NGO Interviewees

NGO	Position	Location	Date
NGO-A	Project Manager	Leogane, Haiti	11 July, 2013
NGO-A	Construction Advisor	Skype	27 June, 2013
NGO-A	Area Coordinator	Skype	28 August, 2013
NGO-B	Project Manager	Skype	13 August, 2013
NGO-B	Informant 1	Port au Prince, Haiti	9 July, 2013
NGO-B	Informant 2	Port au Prince, Haiti	9 July, 2013
NGO-C	Desk Officer	Email Correspondence	1 & 20 August, 2013

1.4 Research Scope and Limitations

1.4.1 Scope

This study focused on the post-disaster Haiti transitional shelter response implemented by NGOs; specifically, the process of transitioning meant to occur as a part of the TSA. While this study is about shelter, it primarily focuses on the sheltering process and other qualitative aspects such as decision making, and context, rather than technical aspects. Two primary stakeholders' perspectives and accounts of the t-shelter process are examined: beneficiaries and the NGOs which provided the t-shelters. Three NGO shelter programs in the Leogane Commune were examined. Leogane, an area comprised of a mix of peri-urban and rural communities, was closest to the epicenter of the earthquake. Leogane was chosen for study due to the substantial infrastructure damage and subsequent large-scale t-shelter response; twice as many t-shelters were constructed in Leogane than in Port-au-Prince (IASC, 2011). Additionally, Leogane was chosen for the security reasons. A larger city, such as Port-au-Prince, would have been much less safe for a young, white, female researcher. Leogane is a smaller, tighter-knit community which I, the researcher, was already familiar with from previous disaster relief work in 2010 (two months) and 2011 (three months).



Figure 3: Map of Haiti

1.4.2 Limitations

Initially, the study was designed with the assumption that thirty participants would be selected at random from each organization's beneficiary lists. By utilizing beneficiary lists and choosing people at random, beneficiaries who transitioned by upgrading or dis-assembling their shelters to reuse, recycle, or resell would have been accounted for rather than overlooked. However, none of the NGOs could share this confidential information; therefore a new approach was adopted. Instead, beneficiaries were asked whether they knew anyone who had transitioned their t-shelter, by

selling, upgrading, recycling, renting, or rebuilding. However, most beneficiaries either evaded this question, replied that they did not know anyone who had done this, or said maybe people had done this, but they do not know them. Occasionally, someone said that yes, people sell and rent t-shelters, but they would never admit to it.

While it is not entirely clear as to why this was the case, people seemed to think they were not supposed to be selling or renting and therefore they may get in trouble with the NGOs or not receive any additional assistance should the NGOs find out. This is perhaps because Haitians generally associate all 'blans' with NGOs. Therefore, regardless of my explicit explanations, I could have been viewed as connected with NGOs. As a result, this approach may not have produced samples quite as representative as the original approach would have.



Figure 4: Steep hikes to NGO-A t-shelters

Due to time constraints, only 30 beneficiaries of each NGO t-shelters were interviewed. This is a small sample of the t-shelter beneficiary populations in Leogane from each organization. Although general conclusions about the t-shelter process can be drawn from research findings and about the specific organizations studied, these are only a sample of the transitional shelter response in Haiti.

Households were sometimes chosen based on accessibility. Though households in remote and mountainous communities were visited, some locations on steep single-track trails were inaccessible due to time constraints. While interviews were obtained with staff from NGO-A and NGO-B, efforts to interview staff from NGO-C were unsuccessful. NGO-C was only able to provide information via email correspondence with a desk officer, as opposed to someone who directly managed the project. The information acquired was useful, though less robust than information acquired from the key staff of other NGOs.

Marronage

"Degage pa peche." To make-do is not a sin.
*Doing what one must to survive is not evil.**

One of the most prominent and yet, discrete limitations of the research is the Haitian practice of 'marronage'. It is a complex concept that is best explained by this mindset:

'What I give you is what I want to give you. I don't permit you to enter in my habit, in my way of life. I show you what I want to show you.' [M]any people apply it to their life and to the perception they give. They are very, very careful about the perception that they give. They want you to catch this perception and not the other one. [M]arronage is a survival technique, a sort of psychological smokescreen to stop people having real information and power...People spin an illusion for you (Frontline, 2011).

Like many aspects of Haitian culture, marronage dates back to the slave trade and is still prominent today, particularly following the earthquake, as marronage is used as a survival technique for Haitians looking for NGO assistance.

²In total, NGO-A built 300 t-shelters and did 200 repairs, NGO-B built 1250 t-shelters, and NGO-C built 4,427 t-shelters.

*Turnball, 2005, p.94

[P]eople that you have in the camps, many are not victims of the earthquake. What they did, they have their house in Jalousie which is OK. But the camps are an opportunity, because they think that maybe the state or the international community will come and build houses – I’m in a tent, and they will take my name, etc., and maybe they will build me a house. I’m at my house during the day, and at night I go back to the tent ... it’s a way to position the possibility to have a house. It’s another face of the marronage (Frontline, 2011).

The use of marronage by beneficiaries was apparent. Combatting marronage, or attempting to discern the truth from a barrage of misconceptions (whether fully intentional or not), was challenging and likely not always successful, though follow-up questions were developed in attempts to elicit more truthful responses. Beneficiary interviews must be considered along with interviews from NGO staff since the truth likely lies somewhere in-between. Keeping interviewees and NGOs anonymous also encouraged honesty.

1.5 Ethical Considerations

A critical ethical consideration was how easily a foreign researcher’s presence can create false expectations among interviewees. Such false expectations could include believing they will get something out of the interview (e.g., help or money). Additionally, a foreigner’s presence could potentially cause frustration and perpetuate ‘NGO fatigue’ or ‘blan fatigue’, as so many people have already performed assessments or interviews.

Precautions taken to avoid false expectations and minimize NGO/blan fatigue, which included thoroughly explaining the intentions of the research and its voluntary nature, as well as informing them that they will not be compensated for participating. While there is no way to guarantee people will say they understand when they actually do not, it is hoped that by communicating this in their native language, it will be understood. Although there was little that could be done to minimize NGO/blan fatigue, precautions included only engaging with those interested and willing to participate, as well as conducting interviews around the schedules of the participants and during a time and place that was most comfortable for them.

Other ethical considerations included gaining consent from all research participants. With Haitian t-shelter beneficiaries, informed verbal consent was obtained before the interview and before taking photographs. Written consent was not obtained as it was advised against by Haitian contacts. NGO staff received an information sheet and a consent form to read and sign before the interview. Data confidentiality was ensured through anonymity for all participants and NGOs. Participant names and organization names were omitted and any identifying information has been altered in a way that has not affected the outcome of the research.

1.6 Structure of the Study

This study is organized into the following five sections:

- Part A Introduction
- Part B Background
- Part C Context
- Part D Analysis and Discussion
- Part E Conclusion

Part-A has covered critical background information on shelter after disaster and the 2010 Haiti earthquake. It also included the rationale, research questions, aims and objectives, methodology, scope and limitations, and ethical considerations. Part-B includes a review of the literature, specifically a discussion on the process of linking shelter relief efforts to long-term development, the evolution of the TSA, and the current debate on the effectiveness of transitional shelter. The context, Part-C, provides a brief history of Haiti which illuminates conditions which led to a disaster of such magnitude and the socio-cultural context which affect the transitional process and provides a brief description of each NGO and their t-shelter programs. Part-D discusses the findings from each NGO studied. Finally, Part-E concludes with key observations, lessons learned, recommendations, and areas for further research.

PART B LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Shelter: From Relief to Development

The gap in sustainable shelter provisions between relief and development has been increasingly recognized within the sector as a necessary area for intervention and nuanced innovation (Saunders, 2004). In the 1970s, shelter expert Fred Cuny made an early connection between disaster relief and development work. Cuny (1982) argued disaster relief could not be effective unless tied to development. Aid agencies focus heavily on initial emergency responses following disasters, with little consideration for how these actions can have long-term consequences affecting recovery and sustainable development of disaster-affected communities (UNHCR, 1999). The challenge, according to UNHCR (1999), has been integrating this knowledge into practice.

Regardless of this recognition, little was done to address the gap, as agencies had their respective mandates and the shelter sector lacked clear policies or best practices (Saunders, 2004). Consequently, most agencies focused largely on short-term solutions such as temporary shelters, tarpaulins, tents, or collective settlements. These efforts primarily focused on the emergency phase, with minimal consideration for how these e-shelter provisions might make the leap to durable homes. Short-term provisions alone will likely result in re-emerging shelter needs down the line (Saunders, 2004). This was a reoccurring problem because while most agencies supplied emergency provisions following disasters, few remained to support permanent housing and long-term development.

According to VENRO⁴ (2006), sustainable development through self-supporting mechanisms should be founded in initial relief projects. Development which allows people to help themselves following future disasters can reduce vulnerability (VENRO, 2006). In 1996, the European Commission summed up the advantages of linking relief, rehabilitation, and development (LRRD):

Better 'development' can reduce the need for emergency relief; better 'relief' can contribute to development; and better 'rehabilitation' can ease the transition between the two (European Commission, 1996 as quoted in VENRO, 2006).

As LRRD became increasingly popular, agencies began adopting a continuum approach (a lin-

⁴VENRO, Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen e.V., is the association of development non-governmental organisations (NGOs) comprised of about 100 German NGOs.

ear series of shelter provisions) (VENRO, 2006), often called a ‘phased’ approach. The initial emergency relief is followed by rehabilitation, and finally development; actors responsible for each phase come in at their respective ‘turns’ (GAA, 2003 as cited in VENRO, 2006). Later, the contiguum approach emerged, whereby relief, rehabilitation, and development are integrated and implemented simultaneously. This approach attempts to assist with acute needs while simultaneously building structures which reduce vulnerability so that disaster-affected people can help themselves in the future (VENRO, 2006).

While an integrated contiguum approach is increasingly popular, many agencies still largely focus their efforts on the emergency phase or a continuum (‘phased’) approach (see Figure 5) compounding the problem Saunders (2004). Funding mechanisms, response capacities, and political constraints often artificially define the boundaries between relief and development, making a phased approach difficult to evade (Twigg, 2002). Addressing long-term solutions may become political, deterring agencies from intervening (Saunders, 2004). Few agencies focus on permanent housing reconstruction and even fewer specialize in the field (Barakat, 2003). Agencies often contract short-term specialists (e.g., shelter experts) during the response phase, who often lack awareness of, or interest in, long-term development issues (Disaster Mitigation Institute et al., 2001, as cited in Saunders, 2004); this maintains the gap and compounds the problem.




Figure 5: Incremental sheltering process vs. phased approach (SC, 2012)

Kelman et al (2011) cite funding as a major obstacle for appropriate and adequate t-shelter programs. Funding is rarely consistent with the needs of the affected population and time constraints, limiting impact. For example, emergency funds typically last no more than a year, creating a rush to produce the agreed upon number of shelters, and causing critical aspects of the sheltering process to be overlooked, such as community participation. Additionally, funding is typically allocated disproportionately to need, such as when permanent sheltering strategies do not receive nearly

as much funding as emergency provisions, despite the fact that implementing agencies require more funding for permanent solutions (Kelman et al, 2011). Funding constraints such as these put aid agencies in positions where they have to choose whether or not to implement poorer quality programs that will assist many people or adequate, quality programs that will assist much fewer (Kelman et al, 2011). VENRO (2006) contends that although this institutional financing gap is well known, there have not been any improvements to better LRRD.

Further widening the gap between relief and development is the sector wide emphasis on delivering a shelter product rather than supporting the sheltering process (Saunders, 2004). Prefabricated shelters or shelter kits are often rapidly produced abroad, ignoring both local resources, (Stevenson, 2003 as cited in Saunders, 2004) and the cultural context, which could have negative consequences for long-term development (Saunders, 2004). The delivery of shelter as a product is common to continuum approaches.

Until it is fully and widely understood that shelter is a 'process' rather than a 'product' many housing programs, however well-meaning, will fall short of expectations – especially in the developing countries." (Davis, 1982, p.iii).

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, both shelter experts Davis (1982) and Cuny (1983) argued for incremental shelter upgrades; a process which the humanitarian community has been slow to adopt (Saunders, 2004). While the shelter sector and humanitarian community has recognized the need to narrow the gap between relief and development, the current system structure has become so entrenched and inflexible that change has been slow and minimal. However, over the last decade, efforts have been made to narrow the gap through a new sheltering model, the TSA.

2.2 Transitional Shelter Approach (TSA)

In 2005, following the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the TSA to shelter after disaster was introduced by Shelter Centre (Collins et al, 2010). Since then, there have been a variety of interpretations of what transitional shelter means. In 2005, Corsellis and Vitale (2005) defined transitional shelter as:

Shelter which provides a habitable covered living space and a secure, healthy living environment, with privacy and dignity, to those within it, during the period between a conflict or natural disaster and the achievement of a durable shelter solution (Corsellis and Vitale, 2005, p.11).

This definition has been interpreted in a variety of ways, namely with t-shelters as a single phase in a continuum-style response, often consisting of prefabricated structures (usually procured overseas), semi-permanent housing, or even tents, which are provided after e-shelter provisions and before reconstruction (SC, 2012). In 2011, IFRC redefined transitional shelter more specifically as:

Rapid, post-disaster household shelters made from materials that can be upgraded or re-used in more permanent structures, or that can be relocated from temporary sites to permanent locations. They are designed to facilitate the transition by affected populations to more durable shelter (IFRC, 2011, p.8).

As the humanitarian community learned what are not appropriate shelter responses, the TSA has evolved accordingly and been redefined while in operation. This constant evolution has resulted in a lack of one common understanding of the aims and implementation of the TSA (SC, 2012).

This led Shelter Centre to develop TSA guidelines based on the many lessons learned and redefine the TSA as:

...[A]n incremental process which supports the shelter of families affected by conflicts and disasters, as they seek to maintain alternative options for their recovery. Through its five characteristics, transitional shelter can be:

- (1) upgraded into part of a permanent house;
- (2) reused for another purpose;
- (3) relocated from a temporary site to a permanent location;
- (4) resold, to generate income to aid with recovery; and
- (5) recycled for reconstruction.

The process starts with the first support offered to families and extends over the period of securing land rights and reconstruction, which may take several years. For tenants, the process is appropriate only when land rights and safe shelter close to their livelihoods cannot be achieved immediately. For owners, the process should be considered only when repairs or reconstruction cannot start immediately. The process should only be considered as part of the ongoing development and maintenance of a coordinated, integrated and comprehensive inter-sector strategy for shelter, settlement and reconstruction (SC, 2012, p.2).

This definition differs from others by emphasizing transitional shelter as a process, rather than a product. This definition is how transitional shelter will be defined for the remainder of this paper.

The shelter sector has struggled with the absence of common understanding and terminology (Saunders, 2004). The multitude of definitions used within the sector has caused misperception regarding different shelter provisions such as between temporary, transitional, and semi-permanent shelter. To clarify, temporary shelter is occupied for a limited time immediately after a disaster (Jha, 2010). Temporary shelters are typically prefabricated, imported, and designed for global use, non-specific to culture or climate (Barakat, 2003). Transitional shelter begins at the onset of the disaster and is incrementally improved until a permanent shelter is constructed⁵ (Jha, 2010). Although semi-permanent shelter is similar, transitional shelter is differentiated by its mobility and flexibility in post-disaster conditions (Jha, 2010).

The transitional process begins with the first distribution of shelter materials and continues through securing land rights and reconstruction of permanent structures, which may take many years (SC, 2012). There are five distinct characteristics of transitional shelter, found in *Table 2*.

⁵For example, a homeowner might replace the plastic sheeting with something more durable like tin, while still using the original framework and the roof (Barakat, 2003).

Table 2: 5 Characteristics of Transitional Shelter

Characteristic	Applied to Transitional Shelter
Upgradable	The t-shelter can be incrementally upgraded while being lived in through maintenance, extension, or by replacing wearing materials with more durable alternatives
Reusable	If reconstruction is occurring while the t-shelter is being in habituated, once reconstruction is completely the t-shelter can be utilized for something different such as a shop or kitchen
Relocatable	When t-shelters are built on insecure or temporary land, they can be disassembled and relocated once land tenure issues are resolved or secured
Resaleable	Reconstruction takes place while t-shelters are inhabited; therefore once reconstruction is complete, t-shelters can be disassembled and materials can be sold and used to generate income
Recyclable	As reconstruction takes place during t-shelter occupancy, the t-shelters can be slowly disassembled during the reconstruction process to utilize the materials in the construction of the permanent home

(SC, 2012)

Should transitional shelter be chosen as a response, it must be comprehensive enough to address varying needs within affected communities (SC, 2012). The response should be prioritized upon levels of vulnerability and impact from the disaster. Displaced populations can be supported through a transitional settlement program and non-displaced populations through transitional reconstruction. According to Shelter Centre (2013), within each program, six options may be utilized to address varying needs (see Tables 3 and 4).

Table 3: 6 Transitional Settlement Program Options

Option 1	Host Families	Local families take in displaced people to live with them or live on their property
Option 2	Urban self-settlement	Displaced populations informally settle on unclaimed land or land not affected by the disaster
Option 3	Rural self-settlement	Settlements on collectively owned rural land by displaced populations.
Option 4	Collective centers settlement	Large remaining structures (e.g., schools) can serve as collective shelters.
Option 5	Self-settled camps	Camps created by displaced populations, completely independently without support of aid organizations or the government
Option 6	Planned Camps	Camps organized by aid organizations or the national government

(SC, 2012)

Table 4: 6 Transitional Reconstruction Program Options

Option 1	Occupancy with no legal status	Property informally lived on by the occupant without the owner's permission
Option 2	House tenant	Formally or informally rented land and housing from an owner by an occupant
Option 3	Apartment tenant	Formally or informally rented apartment by occupants
Option 4	Land tenant	When an occupant owns the house, but rents the land
Option 5	Apartment owner-occupier	A housing unit which a part of a larger building is formally or informally owned and occupied
Option 6	House owner-occupier	The ownership or partial ownership of a house and the land by an occupant

(SC, 2012)

T-shelters are primarily a shelter solution for displaced populations or when buildings are too damaged to be habitable (Collins et al., 2010). When possible, the TSA utilizes local materials for construction to stimulate the local economy, providing livelihood opportunities and reducing dependency (SC, 2012). Construction skills and tools are more readily available when constructing with locally familiar methods, which is particularly important for upgrading and recycling shelters, according to the TSA. Importing shelter materials ignores local context and is a costly and time-consuming process that can delay construction (SC, 2012).

Mobility is central to the TSA (SC, 2012) as it provides autonomy for beneficiaries (Jha, 2010) and to address one of the most intractable shelter challenges: land tenure. Most forms of durable shelter require land tenure, however because they are easily relocated t-shelters evade this problem (SC, 2012). Land rights are often unclear when the sheltering process begins and mobility allows people to move the t-shelters to permanent sites once they are secured. In the interim, temporary occupancy rights can be secured until permanent land is found (SC, 2012).

The TSA guidelines were developed to assist agencies in effectively implementing the approach. The 10 principles of transitional shelter provide a simple assessment for shelter practitioners to use in deciding if the TSA is an appropriate approach. It also provides policies for effective implementation. These guidelines can be found in *Appendix 4*.

18 Methods of Assistance

Shelter Centre delineates 18 assistance methods for implementing the TSA (SC, 2012 as cited in UN, 2010). There are four methods of labor assistance (it may be necessary to utilize a combination) and three methods of material support. There are nine support methods, of which any combination can be implemented, however they should be decided according to the transitional settlement and reconstruction options chosen by the affected population. The t-shelter process may take many years, particularly when there are issues securing land tenure. Therefore, it is critical that t-shelters are not only fit for purpose, but also meet government regulations, which is assured by these methods (SC, 2012 as cited in UN, 2010). See *Figure 6 and Appendix 1 for details*.




Figure 6: 18 transitional shelter assistance methods (UN, 2010)

Implemented correctly, transitional shelter provides adequate shelter to disaster-affected people and can adapt to a variety of circumstances (SC, 2012). Materials from damaged structures can be reused in the t-shelter structure and similarly, those materials can be reused in reconstruction. The TSA is cost efficient since materials used are an investment toward a permanent structure. A t-shelter can be incrementally upgraded and transition to a permanent home, be utilized for livelihood purposes (potentially accelerating economic recovery), or resold, among other options. Should a family acquire land, they can move the shelter. The t-shelter will encourage building back better through the construction techniques (e.g., cross bracing, hurricane straps) demonstrated in the design (SC, 2012).

Implementers require substantial human resources for coordinating material procurement, technical aspects of reconstruction, and community participation; a lack of capacity to do this will likely result in an ineffective program (SC, 2012). When implementing the TSA, organizations should be wary of diverting attention and resources away from holistic support by focusing on short-term deliverables. Additionally, the availability of materials may dwindle in the later stages of construction. This needs to be closely monitored, particularly to ensure local resources are not exploited. Finally, if sites are not managed properly, transitional settlements run the risk of becoming slums

(SC, 2012), which is a primary argument against the TSA in the ongoing debate.

2.3 Transitional Shelter Debate

Transitional shelter has become a popular post-disaster shelter approach as the best option for safely housing disaster-affected people (Clermont et al., 2011). However, critics debate whether or not it is effective. This section discusses each argument.

Arguments for the Transitional Shelter Approach

According to IASC (2012), it is unacceptable for IDPs to live in the limited e-shelter provisions for the many years it may take to reconstruct; a more durable solution is necessary. T-shelters bridge the gap between e-shelter provisions and a permanent shelter solution and provide the critical, secure housing needed during reconstruction (IASC, 2012). UNOPS (2011) contends t-shelter projects often create employment (e.g., community mobilizers for assessments, construction) for local people. According to Fysh (2010 as cited in Desvarieux, 2010), t-shelters are practical because "...you can help 40 families vs. four"; more people can be assisted because they are quick and inexpensive to build. Proponents argue that misunderstanding the TSA has founded the majority of concerns and criticisms against it (SC, 2012).

Appealing aspects of the TSA to agencies:

- Minimal experience required to implement
- Cost reductions seen by utilizing local materials and resources
- Shelter production can begin the training process on safe reconstruction for local builders
- Jumpstarts local economies and supply chains
- Designs are flexible to accommodate varying family sizes, locations, cultures, and materials

Appealing aspects of the TSA to beneficiaries:

- May reduce the frequency at which families have to move around during the gap between disaster and the completion of reconstruction
- T-shelters should last for, what could potentially be, years of reconstruction
- Because of the mobility and flexibility, families have more control and therefore are able to return to their original plot, where they have security of tenure, in order to protect remaining assets, begin rebuilding, and to re-establish their livelihoods
- Good t-shelter designs are upgradable, meaning they can be transformed into permanent structures or the materials from the shelter can be reused in permanent reconstruction
- (Jha, 2010)

While there are many attractive features to transitional shelter programs, t-shelters must be balanced with the construction of permanent homes and diligently monitored so that t-shelter construction can be scaled back to support reconstruction (IASC, 2012).

There are six shelter challenges faced by agencies and disaster-affected people that Collins et al (2010) contends the TSA assists in addressing:

1. *Reconstruction cannot occur until land rights are acquired or re-established.*
In a post-disaster context, the process of re-identifying and securing land rights can often be made more elaborate and official than local tradition requires, resulting in slower assis-

tance, prolonged displacement, and delayed reconstruction (Collins et al, 2010). T-shelters are not stifled by this process due to their mobility (IASC, 2012).

2. *Assisting former squatters*
T-shelters offer a durable, interim solution that does not require security of land rights.
3. *Multi-story buildings displace more people and are more challenging to reconstruct*
T-shelters provide a safe place to live for former tenants and allow time for the multi-family dwellings to be safely reconstructed (Collins et al, 2010).
4. *Agencies' capacity in shelter is limited⁶*
T-shelters are quick and simple to build and are designed around the skills and capacity of the disaster-affected people (Collins et al, 2010).
5. *Post-disaster assistance rarely reflects the priorities of the disaster-affected population*
Aid agencies tend to focus on emergency provisions instead of the desired permanent reconstruction, which often does not begin for many months. While t-shelters do not directly address this challenge, they provide adequate, durable shelter in the interim (Collins et al 2010).
6. *Inappropriate housing is often the result of quickly implemented post-disaster reconstruction*
This poor, fragmented approach often perpetuates the vulnerability of disaster-affected people (Collins, et al 2010). For example, if traditional construction methods are unsafe, new norms and training must be quickly established (Jha, 2010). The TSA provides additional time for adequate planning to improve reconstruction efforts and reduce future vulnerability (Collins et al 2010; Lyons et al 2010).

While the TSA has addressed many challenges in post-disaster shelter needs and shelter assistance, some (e.g., Lloyd-Jones, 2006; Desvarieux, 2010; Burnell and Sanderson, 2011; Clermont et al, 2011) argue this 'solution' may be creating additional problems in the long-term.

Arguments against the Transitional Shelter Approach

The TSA approach to shelter after disaster has received a barrage of criticism in recent years.

T-shelters transition to permanent slums

Although t-shelters are designed to transition to something permanent, this often does not happen within the intended period (i.e., during the 3-5 year lifespan of a typical t-shelter) or at all (Burnell and Sanderson, 2011). If communities of t-shelters do not transition, they begin to deteriorate and the temporary structures turn into permanent slums (Rivard, 2010 as cited in Desvarieux, 2010). According to Lloyd-Jones (2006), after t-shelter construction, minimal financial and human resources remain; poor planning may result in t-shelters turning into poor quality permanent housing and often slums emerge, rather than completing the transitional process to permanent homes. T-shelters remove political incentives for governments to assist in reconstruction (Jha, 2010; Clermont, et al., 2011). Sustainable reconstruction and development are among the ultimate goals and if t-shelters are counterproductive to that, then they are a waste of valuable money and resources (Desvarieux, 2010; Burnell and Sanderson, 2011).

⁶Few agencies have shelter departments and those that do lack full-time shelter specialist. This results in fewer shelter projects implemented, fewer opportunities to learn from previous responses, and fewer agencies to take on shelter programs (Saunders, 2004; Collins et al, 2010).

Long-term reconstruction should be prioritized

Agencies should prioritize long-term homes as opposed to building short-term structures (Clermont et al, 2011). If short-term provisions like t-shelters are inevitably resulting in poor shelter conditions later on and perpetuating, not mitigating, vulnerabilities, then these emergency relief provisions are hampering long-term recovery and development. According to IASC (2010) as cited in Sanderson et al (2012), there are ethical considerations to take into account. Transitional shelter indirectly defers permanent reconstruction Shelter programs should consider the long-term interests of the affected population (ALNAP, 2012).

The TSA is a rural approach, not an urban approach

T-shelters are essentially a rural concept (Clermont, et al., 2011) increasingly implemented in urban disasters. Although a key feature of the TSA is the mobility (meaning land rights and tenure issues can be evaded), the best examples of the TSA being implemented are in areas of secured, original plots, where mobility is not necessary. And even these successes are minimal in relation to the need overall. The TSA is difficult to implement in compact urban environments and t-shelters may occupy the only space where reconstruction can occur (Clermont et al, 2011)

T-shelters benefit NGOs, not local people

Clermont et al (2011) contends that t-shelters are not in the interest of long-term needs, but rather suit the budgets, timeframes, and marketing needs of NGOs.

T-shelters are seldom appropriate or sustainable

When possible, the TSA aims to utilize local materials in t-shelter construction, however this does not always happen. Instead, NGOs often import mass-produced, prefabricated units which are quick to ship in and assemble (Lloyd-Jones, 2006). These shelters are rarely socially or culturally appropriate, suitable to the local need, or sustainable. Centrally-planned solutions like these are common because governments and agencies are eager to provide adequate housing for people quickly and cheaply. As a result, the disaster-affected population is never consulted and it often ends up being inappropriate (Lloyd-Jones, 2006).

Shelters may meet *Sphere* standards, without being occupied with dignity or at all (Oxfam, 2005 as cited in Lloyd-Jones, 2006). It is essential that t-shelters are appropriate as this 'temporary' solution can often be a long time (Lloyd-Jones, 2006). Additionally, should t-shelters be occupied longer than intended, they are likely to no longer meet basic humanitarian standards (IFRC, 2012). Their continued occupation could undermine reconstruction and self-recovery efforts (IFRC, 2012).

Risks and challenges

Shelter is inadequate without provisions of basic services such as water and sanitation (Jha, 2010). Governments must provide interim services (e.g., water delivery, latrines) until infrastructure is rebuilt, but t-shelters programs may reduce their motivation to do so. If land rights are never resolved, some beneficiaries may be left occupying land illegally. Additionally, prices of materials and t-shelter production time may increase if local materials and supply networks are strained by the demand during t-shelter construction. Lastly, if there is not enough experience among program implementers, shelters may be constructed poorly or on unsafe sites without basic services (Jha, 2010). Essentially, there are many ways the TSA can go wrong and the negative consequences could have severe impacts on how communities recover.

PART C CONTEXT

Dèyè mòn gen mòn.

*Beyond the mountains, more mountains.**

3.1 Haiti

3.1.1 A Brief History

On January 1st 1804, the Republic of Haiti became the first independent black republic in the Western hemisphere, born from the first successful slave revolt in history (Farmer, 2011). Many of Haiti's deep-rooted issues of poverty, instability, and poor governance date back to this struggle to freedom and the political turmoil that followed (Farmer, 2011). After declaring independence, the international community, led by Haiti's former colonist, France, refused to recognize Haiti and boycotted the government from 1804 to 1825, devastating the export-based economy, which subsequently affected the government's ability to provide infrastructure and services (e.g., healthcare, education, roads) (Pierre-Louis, 2011). Haitians turned to informal markets for trading and, without access to foreign technology, agricultural and economic systems stagnated (Pierre-Louis, 2011).

By 1825, there was an international movement to abolish slavery. France demanded to be repaid for their losses from the revolution. Haiti's decision to pay this debt had a massive economic impact, further stifling their development (Pierre-Louis, 2011). As Haiti fell further behind, the country became a hotbed for military coups, revolutions, and instability (Pierre-Louis, 2011). Haiti's misfortune continued into 1915 under United States military occupancy the country. When the US ran out of steam in 1957, Francois Duvalier took the presidential reigns in 1960; Duvalier's regime contributed to the continued deterioration of economic and social conditions (Pierre-Louis, 2011).

When Duvalier's son, Jean Claude Duvalier took over in 1971, Haiti had begun its slow transition to dependency on foreign NGOs. To evade corruption, the international community sourced aid to NGOs rather than funneling it directly through the government. According to Pierre-Louis (2011), the boycott of Haiti's government by the international community in the 18th and 19th centuries, the internal tug-of-war among Haiti's elite for control of state power and the weakening of state structures with the increased presence of NGOs have hampered the government's ability to meet

*Turnball, 2005, p.94

the basic needs of citizens and cope with catastrophe.

We've had to face not only the needs and the pain and suffering of people that have lost their house in the earthquake, but really a whole level of society which never had a safe house to begin with. Land tenure has been a problem facing Haiti since independence; the lack of formality, the lack of clear legal structures, the lack of documentation on land that is a problem that has been evolving and that Haitians have had to deal with for generations.

- Lucien Lefcourt, Shelter Coordination Team (IFRC, 2011)

3.1.2 Transitional Shelter in Haiti

Following the 2010 earthquake, the IASC implemented the cluster system to respond to the disaster. As a part of the cluster system, the Shelter Cluster (SC) produced a two-phased shelter sector response plan (SSRP). A 3-month emergency phase would be followed by a 12-month interim phase to provide transitional shelter (CERP, 2011). The SC was lauded for its success in the emergency phase implementation, delivering plastic sheeting, fixings, poles, and household items (SSRP, 2010), but the transitional phase was less successful (CERP, 2011).

The Strategy

The SSRP planned to focus on "...traditional materials that can be re-used by affected families in the longer term as they move to more durable housing solutions (transitional shelter)" (SSRP, 2010, p.22) in the interim, between distribution of e-shelter provisions and permanent reconstruction. The response planned a continuum approach to facilitate the quick delivery of t-shelter solutions as well as permanent shelter assistance (IFRC, 2011). Despite the plan, a continuum approach was adopted over time (IFRC, 2011). What was intended as an incremental transitional sheltering process transformed into a phased response.

The SSRP aimed to prioritize displaced populations with transitional shelter, information campaigns about construction techniques, cash, vouchers, and material distributions, and rubble clearance. Non-displaced populations would be provided with material distributions, technical advice, relocation assistance, rental assistance, and extending credit (SSRP, 2010). Despite these goals, most NGOs focused on the direct provision of t-shelters for both displaced and non-displaced populations with little support for other transitional solutions (IFRC, 2011).

There were no specifications on how the t-shelter strategy should be implemented (IFRC, 2011). The construction of t-shelters can be supported in a variety of ways, such as through cash or material distributions, but most agencies implemented their programs only through deliverable products (e.g., prefabricated wooden shelters or temporary houses) (IFRC, 2011), which is directly against SSRP recommendations. This supply-driven (rather than needs-driven) approach was adopted because it was "...based on [agencies] previous know-how, supposed ease of implementation, outcome control, liability concerns and/or visibility, and not so much on the demand (affected population's plans and needs)" (IFRC, 2011, p.6). T-shelter projection numbers were based on agency pledges, rather than need assessments (IFRC, 2011).

Logistical Bottlenecks

Massive imports of materials were required to construct t-shelters due to a lack of local availability (Hirano, 2012). Damaged ports and airports became congested by imports causing bottlenecks and further delays (IFRC, 2011) in construction which was already hindered by 19 million cubic meters of rubble and debris (DEC, 2013). SC donors were reluctant to fund rubble removal, large-

ly as these efforts were less visible in comparison with t-shelters, which they had already 'reserved' funding for (IFRC, 2011). Ironically, with other clusters ill-equipped to handle the enormous task, slow rubble removal meant there was nowhere to put t-shelters and agencies faced logistical challenges in delivering the materials (IASC, 2010) since urban roads were blocked by debris and rural communities were difficult to access (IASC, 2010).

Housing Land and Property (HLP) Challenges

According to Levine et al (2012), problems surrounding land ownership date back prior to the earthquake. Land tenure and occupancy arrangements have always been complex, poorly documented, and often informal (IASC, 2010), presenting serious challenges in relocation and reconstruction. What little formal documentation that did exist was destroyed in the earthquake (Hirano, 2012). Because aid agencies cannot reconstruct formal documentation and permission, t-shelters became an attractive option as they essentially 'skirt' tenure issues by securing temporary occupancy rights, rather than ownership rights. They are also relocatable so once land tenure is secured, beneficiaries can move.

However, acquiring temporary occupancy rights also proved difficult. Land had to be the right size and shape, sufficiently distant from dangerous structures, and in environmentally stable areas. In Haiti's compact urban environment, suitable land was limited (Hirano, 2012), further contributing to delays. Some guidelines were developed to assist in the complexity of these tenure issues, such as issuing the t-shelter to the beneficiaries, not landowner then making arrangements with the owner to ensure they could stay for at least three years (IFRC, 2011).

Agencies aimed to quickly provide simple, hazard resistant t-shelters that met standards for adequate shelter (IFRC, 2011), but this proved unrealistic within limited budgets. Many agencies upgraded their models (e.g., to withstand category 1 hurricanes), which increased expenses and construction complexities. This decreased the number of shelters agencies could produce by their deadlines. Shelters became more expensive, less mobile, and longer-term, increasing land tenure issues. Organizations mainly provided t-shelters to people returning to their original plots, which did not target the most vulnerable, the landless (Hirano, 2012).

Overall

The TSA in Haiti has had endless challenges. The strategy was inflexible and unrealistic in timing and cost. According to IFRC (2011), over time, other shelter solutions such as rental support and housing repairs would have been more cost efficient and relevant to the need, but shelter programs were too rigid to adapt to a comprehensive sheltering solution. NGOs and donor priorities were put before the needs and plans of the affected population. The response was based on a single solution without sufficient capacity to implement, particularly under the challenging circumstances (IFRC, 2011). Regardless, over 111,000 t-shelters have been built since 2010 (UN, 2013) and there have been few comprehensive evaluations on their transition, begging the question: Transition to what?

3.2 Case Studies

Three NGOs that provided transitional shelters in the Leogane Commune were evaluated for this research. See *Appendix 5 (NGO-A)*, *Appendix 6 (NGO-B)*, and *Appendix 7 (NGO-C)* for photos and information regarding each t-shelter evaluated.

3.2.1 NGO-A

NGO-A, a small Christian organization, provided 300 t-shelters and did 200 home repairs (also evaluated) in the Leogane Commune (NGO-A Construction Advisor). NGO-A committed to covering shelter needs in four Leogane districts before there was adequate knowledge of how vast the needs were. Initial targets were scaled back considerably due to funding constraints (NGO-A Construction Advisor).

Table 5: NGO-A t-shelter features

Foundation	Non-reinforced concrete slab
Frame	Treated wood frame
Walls	Plywood walls (will require replacement after 3 years)
Roof	Tin roof (will require replacement after 3 years)
Doors	2 wooden doors (one on the front and one on the back or the side of the shelter)
Windows	4 wooden windows
Bracing	No cross bracing on trusses
Porch	Only some had porch rails – wood was given for the beneficiary to construct the rails.
Additional	Divided into two rooms by plywood walls, but no door in the doorway

The majority of NGO-A t-shelters were built in rural areas. Although they were labeled as “transitional” the t-shelters were constructed to be as permanent as possible and meant to last 15-20 years instead of the typical 3-5, although some components of the shelter must be replaced sooner (NGO-A Construction Advisor). NGO-A designed a model that they label as a t-shelter because donors were only interested in funding t-shelter projects. Land tenure issues are often a barrier to building non-mobile structures. By working in rural communities, land tenure issues were fewer, as most people owned their own land. Therefore, t-shelters were designed to be upgradeable, but not relocatable.

While people did not have land titles, NGO-A was able to verify ownership by requiring beneficiaries to get signed confirmation from the Cassec and neighbors confirming that they live on the land, as claimed. T-shelters were built with more permanence because they would not need to be moved, but the design was simple and required strengthening and replacement of parts over time (NGO-A Construction Advisor). NGO-A



Figure 7: NGO-A t-shelter A1

also implemented a variety of livelihood programs in the same communities, but only some people

benefited from both programs (NGO-A Construction Advisor). After providing the t-shelter, NGO-A did not return to provide any additional support in t-shelter upgrading (NGO-A Project Manager). Beneficiaries from three communities, Nerette, Marie-Chal, and Cormier, were interviewed.

3.2.2 NGO-B

NGO-B is a large organization that has been working in Haiti since 1954; however, it was not until the earthquake in 2010 that NGO-B started working on shelter projects (NGO-B Project Manager). NGO-B had a three-pronged sheltering approach: 15,000 reinforcement kits were distributed to those in camps with no other alternative, 500 homes were repaired in rural Leogane (which included homeowner training on safe construction), and finally, the t-shelter project, aimed at those who could leave camps because they had access to land. The t-shelter program began in March 2010. NGO-B had an agreement with another NGO that they would provide t-shelter frames as an in-kind gift to NGO-B and NGO-B would provide everything else, from the needs assessments, to the distributions, to the plastic sheeting (NGO-B Project Manager).



Figure 8: NGO-B urban model (t-shelter B18)

Table 6: NGO-B t-shelter features

Foundation	Tied down into the ground in concrete footings - homeowners were expected to pour their own concrete slab foundation
Frame	Pressure-treated timber frame*
Walls	Tarpaulin (meant to last between 6 to 18 months, depending on exposure to the elements)
Roof	Coated tin-plated roofing – high quality roofing was invested in because it was the bit of the shelter most likely to be reused and recycled for many years to come
Doors (urban model)	2 wooden doors (one in front, one in back)
Doors (rural model)	3 wooden doors (two in front, one in back)
Windows	4 wooden windows
Porch	Only on rural models - roof over the porch provides storage (particularly useful during floods)
Additional	One room

*The NGO that provided the frame and roof claimed it should last over 15 years, however NGO-B chose to tell beneficiaries the t-shelters would last at least 3-5 years and, because it was treated timber, would last longer if properly cared for (NGO-B Project Manager).

Two different model t-shelters were provided by NGO-B. In the more rural areas, beneficiaries

received a t-shelter with three doors, two in the front and one in back and a porch. This model better reflected the traditional rural homes of the area. In the peri-urban areas, a simple two door (one in front and one in back) shelter, without a porch was provided. Peri-urban areas are denser, and therefore the lack of porch was in response to the space limitations. Additionally, t-shelters in the peri-urban areas were expected to change more quickly into concrete structures, either through upgrades or reconstruction, and therefore the porch was deemed an unnecessary expense (NGO-B Project Manager).



Figure 9: NGO-B rural model (t-shelter B3)

In order to receive a shelter from NGO-B, beneficiaries needed to have a destroyed home and proof of land ownership or signed permission to occupy the land for at least five years. Beneficiaries were then prioritized by vulnerability. About 1250 t-shelters were distributed by NGO-B in the Leogane Commune, in both peri-urban and rural communities (NGO-B Informant-2). NGO-B beneficiary interviews were conducted in the Santo community and in the Leogane city center.

3.2.3 NGO-C

In February 2010, a month after the earthquake, NGO-C began housing assessments (IFRC, 2012b). NGO-C aimed to improve housing conditions in 14 rural and peri-urban communities in the Leogane Commune through the provision of progressive transitional shelters. Progressive t-shelters are t-shelters that receive material improvements to the shelter structure that increases its life span up to 5-15 years. NGO-C implemented their progressive t-shelter program in two phases: a temporary response phase, consisting of a steel-framed structure covered in tarpaulin, and a durable solution phase, upgrades to cement-cladding and a tin roof, creating a more permanent structure (IFRC, 2012b).



Figure 10: NGO-C, t-shelter C5

Table 7: NGO-C t-shelter features

Foundation	Raised plywood floor with tied concrete footings
Frame	Prefabricated, galvanized steel frame modules of 18m ²
Walls	Tarpaulin, later upgraded to cement-cladding*
Roof	Mono-pitch tarpaulin roof , later upgraded to tin
Doors	One door provided - additional doorway left open on cement-cladded structure upon request
Windows	4 windows, barred with metal linked fencing, but no cover
Porch	n/a
Additional	Can be used in a modular manner - putting two side by side to form a double-pitched roof structure

* A variety of closing materials were tested, and according to NGO-C, beneficiaries chose the cement cladding (IFRC, 2012b).

This shelter program was financed through the donations of NGO-C's home country, through home government funds, as well as through an NGO-C branch in another country (NGO-C Desk Officer). This funding mechanism allowed the program to be extremely flexible and adapt to the needs of the Haitian people. Different methods of approach were consistently evaluated; however, it was not the donors who decided what or how to implement the program (NGO-C Desk Officer). Beneficiaries were chosen based on the minimum habitability criterion (IFRC, 2012b). Even those whose homes were not directly affected by the earthquake were assisted if their homes did not meet the minimal condition of habitability (which included space in relation to number of people as well as water and sanitation), in efforts to avoid creating inequalities within the communities. Those targeted were particularly vulnerable and included elderly, dependent or handicapped people or children, single-parent households, and families without income. In addition to shelter assistance, beneficiaries received support in water and sanitation, hygiene promotion, health, disaster preparedness, and livelihoods as a part of an integrated program (IFRC, 2012b).

Workers were hired from all over Leogane and trained in t-shelter construction and good construction practices. By June 2010, t-shelter construction had begun (IFRC, 2012b). In the Leogane Commune 4,427 t-shelters were provided to 3,617 families. The number of t-shelters provided exceeded the number of families assisted because families of six or more people received two shelters that were put together to create a larger structure. A year after the t-shelters were constructed, NGO-C returned to remove the tarpaulin and replace it with cement cladding on 4039 units, which created a more durable structure. Although beneficiary participation was low, aside from the initial debris removal, they did participate in safe construction awareness activities following construction. Upgrades to cement cladding walls started in mid-2011 and the entire project was completed by April 2012 (IFRC, 2012b).

Part D ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This section will evaluate, based on interviews with beneficiaries and NGO staff as well as observations, if and how t-shelters have been transitioning and why some have been able/not able to transition.

Kay piti, ou prann nat ou anba bra ou.

*[When] the house is small, you hold your bedding under your arm.**

4.1 NGO-A

NGO-A went into extremely vulnerable, hard to reach, rural communities, where most NGOs would not work. The logistical challenges were enormous and therefore the costs were steep, limiting the assistance from this small NGO to a much smaller group of beneficiaries than initially promised. Out of the 30 beneficiaries interviewed, only a handful made small efforts to upgrade, two were sold for parts, but the majority remained the same.

Upgrades

Most beneficiaries gave consistent reports: they were grateful for the shelter because they felt they really needed it and as much as they would like to make improvements to it, such as replacing the plywood on the sides that were getting damaged by the elements, they could not afford it (NGO-A Beneficiaries). While 27 of the 30 NGO-A beneficiaries had not made any significant changes to their shelter, 14 redid the surface of the shelter floor because the construction workers did a poor job (see Figure 12).



Figure 11: NGO-A, t-shelter A2

*Turnball, 2005, p.94



T-shelter A4



T-shelter A8

Instead of a solid smooth surface, the slab was uneven and crumbling, perhaps because an incorrect consistency of concrete, sand, and gravel were used. Had it remained that way, the slab would deteriorate over time, particularly those not raised very high, as water poured in and eroded the concrete further.

Figure 12: Crumbling foundations

Ten of the 14 beneficiaries that fixed their floor also added color, which made them look nicer. Two people extended their tin roofs to have a longer overhang, which better protects the plywood from rain and sun. One beneficiary explained that the reason the tin roofs were not hanging over beyond the wood, which supported them from underneath, was because NGO-A had said they would return to put in a rainwater catchment system. Four beneficiaries fenced in their porch (one still incomplete) with concrete blocks, two did this because they had not received enough wood for it.



Figure 13: Color added to the concrete slab foundation (t-shelter A3)

Only one beneficiary actually had a rainwater harvesting system built by NGO-A and only some tin roofs were left short, so it is difficult to know for certain what was actually promised. Out of the 30 t-shelters visited, only four families had painted and only three of which had painted with oil-based paint (which will help protect the wood). It is unclear whether or not people simply did not have the means to paint or whether people waited because the NGO, according to most interviewees, promised they would come back and paint (although most had realized by then, two years later, that they were not coming back) (NGO-A Beneficiaries). NGO-A claimed they never made these promises (NGO-A Construction Advisor); however they did have

a lot of unexpected funding constraints and therefore it is possible, that like the t-shelter program, they committed to doing more rainwater harvesting systems than they could provide in the end.



Figure 14: Concrete fenced porch (t-shelter A9)

their means, or if they will eventually be within their means. While it was clearly explained to interviewees that by participating in the research interviews they would not receive anything nor get any additional support, at times it still seemed as though they were participating in hopes that they may receive more assistance and therefore, perhaps not being as honest about their financial situation.

Repairs

NGO-A had funding from a donor to do home repairs; however they ended up being a lot more challenging than expected (NGO-A Project Manager). According to NGO-A Project Manager, the repair program was a struggle because most structures were not repairable; however, they had to do them in order to satisfy the donor budget. Because most houses were not actually repairable, NGO-A's solution was to completely disassemble the house and rebuild it in a structurally sound way with a mix of recycled materials from the old structure and new materials, provided by NGO-A in a similar design as the t-shelters. The reuse of the materials allowed them to justify the homes as repairs, rather than new constructions.

The locally employed laborers had been putting together the same standard t-shelter model repeatedly for the program, whereas these repairs required a higher-level of skill than they possessed. Local laborers needed to be carefully instructed and monitored by engineers and they often would disagree about the different methods of construction. They wanted to construct the way they knew, instead of a way that would make the shelter more structurally sound and safe (NGO-A Project Manager).

In addition to this method of repairing, NGO-A provided repair kits to families. These kits included plywood, nails, dimensional lumber, and two bags of cement however, according to beneficiaries, no training on safe construction was provided (NGO-A Project Manager). Despite the struggles NGO-A faced with the repairs, the outcomes of the 'repaired' homes, were quite good. The quality and design were equivalent to the newly built t-shelters, but materials were not unnecessarily given

Based on the beneficiary interviews, if the majority of people had money to do so, they would paint the t-shelters, improve the foundation, and replace the plywood (at least the bottom half) with cement blocks. Essentially, they would upgrade the t-shelter, which is one of the ways to transition it. One exception to these reported plans was a woman who said she would not upgrade her t-shelter, rather she would rebuild her old shelter because 13 people is too many for one small room (NGO-A Beneficiaries). Whether or not these upgrades (or reconstruction) will actually happen will depend on people's ability to afford them. It is difficult to gauge whether or not these upgrades and replacements are within



Figure 15: Painted t-shelter (t-shelter A7)



Figure 16: Example of repaired home (t-shelter A7)

when they could be reused from the damaged homes. Ten of the 30 interviewees were repair beneficiaries.

Resold and Reused

One t-shelter in Nerette was lived in by the recipient for a few months until he suddenly passed away (NGO-A Beneficiaries). His family came from Port-au-Prince to sell the t-shelter. The people who bought the shelter took it apart and sold the materials. There is a second t-shelter in the Nerette community that was resold and recycled, however it has a more interesting story. NGO-A built a t-shelter for a family on land where there were believed to be voodoo spirits.

The family moved into the shelter, but not long after they started having bad dreams, which they attributed to the voodoo spirits. One day the mother was outside the house doing some chores and when she came back in there was a giant snake next to her baby on the bed. Apparently, there are no snakes in that area and it is believed the snake was from the voodoo spirits. The family was so terrified that they moved out right away and have not returned. They sold the t-shelter and land to people who disassembled it, sold it for parts, and then planted corn on the land (NGO-A Beneficiaries).

While in all four communities, most t-shelters had good foundations (many as a result of people repairing foundations themselves), a few had bad ones. One man from Marie-Chal said that it was because the NGO-A local laborers took some of the allocated cement bags to sell for themselves (NGO-A Beneficiaries). Although there is no way to know for sure, this does seem likely. Additionally, a few beneficiaries had missing wooden braces and/or other pieces of their shelter. They claimed that they did not remove and reuse these, but rather that insufficient materials were brought to construct it. It is likely this is a result of carpenters taking and selling parts (NGO-A Beneficiaries). Two beneficiaries said that the plywood dividing the rooms in the shelter was bad so they took it down and burned it (for cooking). They have since replaced it with tarpaulins or new plywood (NGO-A Beneficiaries).

T-shelter Maintenance

According to NGO-A Project Manager, the organization held trainings with beneficiaries regarding parts of the t-shelter which cannot be altered. NGO-A found this challenging as people struggled to 'unlearn' unsafe construction practices they had been previously utilizing (NGO-A Project Manager). NGO-A Construction Advisor claimed beneficiaries should have been informed of maintenance practices such as putting oil on the wood to preserve it. According to the 30 beneficiaries interviewed, no such training or instruction occurred (NGO-A Beneficiaries). It is possible that some of this instruction occurred in community meetings, with only one family member in attendance, who may not have been an interviewee, though it cannot be known for sure.

NGO-A imported timber, but had the timber treated in-country (NGO-A Construction Advisor). However, the company that treated the wood was unable to provide a treatment certificate to prove it (NGO-A Construction Advisor). The NGO-A Construction Advisor was not convinced all of the timber was treated or if it was treated to the degree specified. Whether the timber frame lasts up to 10 years depends on whether or not it was properly treated and how well it is cared for and maintained. While all the beneficiaries were keeping up their shelters (i.e., tidy and clean), none



Figure 17: Rain-damaged plywood (t-shelter A29)

were treating the wood with motor oil every 12 months to preserve it; beneficiaries claimed they were not instructed to do this (NGO A Beneficiaries). According to NGO-A Construction Advisor, this type of maintenance is affordable. None of the beneficiaries had replaced the plywood that NGO-A stated would only last around two years, after which it would need to be replaced with different cladding. At the time of the interviews, the plywood walls were approaching two years old and every beneficiary said that while they would like to replace it, they do not have the money (NGO A Beneficiaries). However, not all of the plywood was in need of replacing.

Transitional Support

NGO-A did not provide any transitional support (NGO-A Construction Advisor). While NGO-A would have liked to have done permanent homes, it was not an option; therefore the t-shelters they provided were called transitional, but were robust enough to be a permanent frame. NGO-A did not have the funding to provide additional upgrades, support, or even any follow-up. While NGO-A encouraged other organizations to work on shelter in these communities because they could not meet the need, there was no evidence any other organizations gave support and there was effectively no prospect of follow-up support (NGO-A Construction Advisor).

Funding and Staff Turnover

In order to get funding, NGO-A had to describe their t-shelter model as transitional. According to NGO-A Construction Advisor, “[t]hey were lying to donors to get the money, which is effectively a problem with the donors – it drives the NGOs down the route of doing temporary buildings when maybe they should be doing permanent ones and absolves them of the responsibility of that because nobody would pay for it.”



Figure 18: Slowly the elements deteriorate t-shelters (t-shelter A8)

NGO-A got funding to start the shelter program immediately after the earthquake; however it took three months to find a qualified construction advisor (NGO-A Construction Advisor). This took so long because NGO-A wanted a qualified Christian construction advisor and could not find one. They ended up hiring a non-Christian construction advisor as an emergency provision for the interim. By the time the construction advisor arrived, the program was already three months in with only three months left before the funding had to be spent. The design phase was rushed and the communities were not consulted. The advisor was only contracted for three months and although additional funding was secured following the Construction Advisor’s departure, the funding was not enough to replace the advisor (NGO-A Construction Advisor).

NGO-A is a small organization and does not have the reserves to fund itself in between donor funding (NGO-A Construction Advisor). Therefore, when the money ran out, the project was over regardless of the remaining needs. In an evaluation of NGO-A’s response, the external evalua-

tor recommended the donor extend the amount of time typically allotted (six months) for 30% of their funding to be spent to a year, as delays are common in rehousing affected populations after disaster (Goyder, 2010).

Transition to What?

None of the thirty NGO-A beneficiaries transitioned their t-shelter. The closest any beneficiary has gotten has been a few small efforts toward upgrading. Beneficiaries chosen were among the most vulnerable in highly vulnerable communities (NGO-A Area Coordinator). This included many elderly people, disabled people, and single mothers. According to NGO-A Area Coordinator, “[t]hey were not able to improve their own T-shelter, and in many cases were not able to earn a living because of their high vulnerability; this was found to be especially true for the elderly.” NGO-A’s efforts to get funding for small household gardens were unsuccessful (it required years of follow-up, which donors did not like), however they did receive funding for a goat livelihood scheme (women are given a goat and, through breeding and selling offspring, are able to generate income), which some t-shelter beneficiaries benefited from (NGO-A Area Coordinator).

Based on observations and according to a former NGO-A Construction Advisor, the t-shelters provided were, in terms of size and quality, comparable to the homes people had before the earthquake. Timber homes, built in the traditional Kreyol-style were the norm in rural Haiti, not concrete block homes (NGO-A Area Coordinator). The timber t-shelters provided by NGO-A fit in with cultural norms without any need for upgrades. According to NGO-A Area Coordinator, it may not have even occurred to beneficiaries to change it because that is how all non-t-shelter homes look like in that area. Should beneficiaries not transition, the conditions they will be living in over time, as the shelters begins to deteriorate, may not be substantially different from how they were living before the earthquake. One interviewee said, “I will die before I do anything,” meaning, she will die before she is able to improve the t-shelter because she does not have the money (NGO-A Beneficiary).



Figure 19: Repaired home (t-shelter A16)
Exmple of a typical pre-earthquake home



Figure 20: NGO-A t-shelter A29

While disasters such as these are horrific and tragic, they also provide an opportunity for improvement; to reduce vulnerabilities by building back better and more sustainably. This t-shelter program did not seem to have taken advantage of this opportunity. While it has certainly been successful in providing safer housing for vulnerable people in the short-term, it has not done much to support sustainable housing for the long-term. By giving someone a house that is comparable to what they had before, but perhaps constructed more safely, that person will only live in safe housing for the life of the shelter. However, because they did not receive sufficient instruction on shelter maintenance or safe recon-

struction, and only some beneficiaries received livelihood support, they will not have the tools or resources to improve their t-shelter, transition in any substantial way, or rebuild. In a few years' time these beneficiaries will likely be back to square one.

4.2 NGO-B

Kay koule twompe soley soley men li pa twompe lapil.
*A leaky house can fool the sun, but it can't fool the rain.**

Thirty NGO-B t-shelter beneficiaries were interviewed, four of whom have transitioned through upgrades, two have been sold (and purchased to make one, big shelter), one is rebuilding, three have started upgrading, six have done nothing, 17 have poured foundations and made other minor changes. According to NGO-B informants, the basic idea for the t-shelter was that beneficiaries are given a frame, the bare bones of a home, and over time they will have to replace the tarpaulin with something more permanent. From the beginning, NGO-B only had funding to provide t-shelters (NGO-B Project Manager). Therefore, they made clear to beneficiaries that they were not promising to upgrade the shelters with plywood or anything else; beneficiaries were encouraged to upgrade themselves (NGO-B Project Manager).

T-shelter Upgrades

- **Foundation:** Twenty-two of the 30 beneficiaries interviewed poured a foundation for the t-shelter shortly after NGO-B built it. Most beneficiaries viewed foundations as a necessity and therefore, a priority. The reason some beneficiaries did not pour foundations was because they did not have the financial resources (NGO-B Beneficiaries). Beneficiaries were expected to provide sand and gravel for the concrete footings NGO-B was pouring and, if they provided extra cement bags as well, NGO-B poured the entire concrete slab foundation for them, instead of just the footings (NGO-B Project Manager).
- **Walls:** The biggest problem people had with this t-shelter was the lack of security. Tarpaulin walls do not provide adequate security as anyone can cut it open with a knife and steal, as many beneficiaries claimed happened to them. Two families have attempted to secure the outside with scraps of old tin in a desperate attempt to secure their homes (NGO-B Beneficiaries). They could not afford plywood or blocks, but they did not feel safe with just the tarpaulins. The tarps were also hot during the day and cold at night, creating a particularly unsuitable environment for vulnerable groups such as babies and the elderly.

Most beneficiaries claimed that NGO-B said they would be returning to replace the tarp with plywood, but never did. Twenty-three beneficiaries out of the 30 interviewed never upgraded the tarp. Security against theft was the most commonly reported concern, second only to pouring the foundation (which provided a different type of security) and over two years later they still do not have the means to upgrade. Those who were able to upgrade the tarp to plywood or concrete blocks explained that they did so immediately because they felt they absolutely had to; it was imperative (NGO-B Beneficiaries).

Among the four people that had upgraded part of their t-shelter to blocks or had started

to, none constructed with rebar throughout (NGO-B Beneficiaries). One family has been constructing with no rebar at all and the others only put rebar into the main columns. Every beneficiary interviewed claimed that they were not provided with any information regard-

*Turnball, 2005, p.94

ing safe reconstruction practices (NGO-B Beneficiaries). It is unclear whether people knew how unsafe it was to rebuild without rebar or if they knew, but rebuilt unsafely anyway because they simply could not afford rebar and did not expect to be able to in the future. Although it is speculation, presumably people would not reconstruct without rebar if they knew how unsafe it was, particularly earthquake survivors who have already experienced how poorly constructed buildings can easily collapse.



Top Left: Tin (t-shelter B7)
 Top Right: Plywood (t-shelter B1)
 Bottom Left: Concrete block (t-shelter B19)

Figure 21: 3 Types of upgraded walls

- Roof: Despite the high quality roof provided by NGO-B, many beneficiaries complained of leaky roofs. One beneficiary attributed this to poor construction (NGO-B Beneficiaries). For example, nailing the roof in, then taking the nail out and putting it elsewhere, creating a hole, and not repairing the mistake. NGO-B confirmed this; in some of the first communities where t-shelters were built, the carpenters made a lot of mistakes (NGO-B Project Manager). However, this happened less frequently as the carpenters gained more experience. NGO-B was responsive to the complaint about holes in the roofs; they went back into those communities and patched the holes, however they may not have held up (NGO-B Project Manager).
- Additions: One family was not in a position to make any



Figure 22: Business built onto t-shelter (B11)

changes to the t-shelter, not even a foundation, but found a way to attach a small business stand in the front (NGO-B Beneficiaries).

Reuse

An older man and his family were separated after the earthquake (NGO-B Beneficiaries). His wife and three children stayed in an IDP camp, while he stayed on the property of his destroyed home. The man received an NGO-B t-shelter and put it on his property after the rubble was cleared. He divided the shelter into two rooms with tin from his collapsed home and used the front half for his tailoring business and the back half to sleep. In the IDP camp, his wife received a t-shelter from another organization and put it on their property as well so now they are all back living on their own property. They do not have the money to pour a foundation or upgrade the tarpaulin. They would like to find a way to upgrade because none of the man's tailoring equipment is secure inside the shop (NGO-B Beneficiaries).

Resold

One man received an NGO-B shelter which he lived in for 1 year and then he sold it for parts and kept the tarpaulin (NGO-B Beneficiaries). He is now renting a t-shelter (from a different NGO) from someone else so he can rebuild on the location where the NGO-B shelter was placed. So far, he has only started making the cement blocks. Another family did not receive any shelter assistance, but was able to buy two shelters from two different people who received them from NGO-B. One of the original recipients sold the shelter because someone died and they needed to pay for the funeral. The other original recipient was originally from Port-au-Prince and had come to Leogane to live in an IDP camp. He was eligible for a t-shelter, but did not have land so a friend let him put the t-shelter on his land temporarily, until the shelter could be sold; this was common (NGO-B Beneficiaries).

Land Security and Relocations

Many people in the Santo community of Leogane did not own their land; they were IDPs squatting on land following the earthquake (NGO-B Project Manager). When NGO-B arrived and told squatters they could get a t-shelter if they got permission from the landowner to live there, people did. However, the primary landowner in the Santo community was the government (NGO-B Project Manager). According to NGO-B Project Manager, the mayor signed papers allowing the beneficiaries to live on the land for five years, which the mayor did not have authority to do, but NGO-B accepted the arrangement anyway.

Every beneficiary living on government land had a different understanding of their arrangement. Some said they pay rent every year, some said they pay every three years, and others said they pay whenever the government comes and asks for money (NGO-B Beneficiaries). When inquiry



Figure 23: Tailor shop built into t-shelter (B21)



Figure 24: Land where sold t-shelter (B6) once stood

was made regarding long-term land security, some interviewees said that if the government wanted them off of the land, they would have to disassemble the t-shelter and leave, while others said they could stay for five years and then had to leave (NGO-B Beneficiaries). NGO-B's response to this was that it, "perfectly explains the situation: unclear" (NGO-B Project Manager).

One beneficiary interviewed said that the government does not think the tarpaulins will last long, meaning they probably assume people will eventually move or build elsewhere (NGO-B Beneficiaries). It is possible the government expects people will move once the t-shelters and tarpaulins begin to deteriorate, instead of upgrading and improving the t-shelters. However, people would not have invested what little money they have into pouring a foundation if they did not expect to stay for a long time; nobody is likely to move unless they are forced to.

Unaltered and/or Unoccupied T-shelters

Beneficiaries targeted to receive t-shelters were among the most vulnerable, meaning many were unemployed or had insufficient incomes. Without a complimentary and robust livelihood program, this situation was not likely to change once they received a shelter; they did not have the income to improve their t-shelters. This has resulted in the deterioration of the tarpaulin walls and, as the years go by without maintenance, it is likely the living conditions will worsen.

Four families in the center of Leogane only lived in the t-shelter for a few months before deciding it was uninhabitable and that they needed to find another place to live (NGO-B Beneficiaries). All four families found places to rent or family to stay with and their t-shelters are sitting empty. None have foundations because they did not have the money to pour them. Each family said they were not interested in selling their t-shelter because eventually they will try and put foundations down and make them more habitable, but right now they do not have the resources (NGO-B Beneficiaries). Unfortunately, not all beneficiaries have an alternative and therefore many t-shelters will continue to deteriorate around them until they are able to make repairs, maintain, and upgrade it.

NGO-B Informant-1 stated that the tarpaulin falling apart eventually was part of the plan; it is important for beneficiaries to take action and assume some sort of responsibility in improving their shelter over time. For those who had the resources, this plan worked because they were able to take action once the tarps began to degrade. Those without the resources could only live with the deteriorating conditions. Despite the lack of upgrades, the t-shelter is a vastly safer shelter than



Figure 25: Abandoned t-shelters (B25 and B26)

The Exceptions

1. In the Santo community of Leogane, there were two families who received transitional shelters from NGO-B and were able to successfully transition them; one through relocation and upgrades and the other through reselling.

Before the earthquake a young man, his girlfriend, his mother, her 4 younger children, and renters, lived in a concrete house on the young man's property. The house was destroyed in the earthquake and, in 2011, the young man received a t-shelter for himself and his girlfriend. His mother also received a t-shelter for herself and her younger children. Both shelters were put on his land and the renters moved elsewhere.

The young man immediately replaced the tarp on his t-shelter with plywood after people broke in and stole his belongings during RaRa (Haitian festival). His mother and siblings lived in their t-shelter for one and a half years and then sold it in order to fund sending her children to school and to invest in the construction of a small concrete structure with her oldest son (the young man), on his property. The mother moved into the Leogane center with her children and rented a place while they started to contract a little boutique.

Not long following, the young man's aunt, who lived in a neighboring community, was eligible for a t-shelter from a different organization, but did not have any place to put it. The young man moved his t-shelter on top of the new store they had constructed out of concrete so that his aunt's new shelter could be built on his property too. Since then, he has upgraded his t-shelter (now located on top of the store, like a second story) by adding concrete block a third of the way up the walls and putting new, treated plywood for the rest. He will not continue with more concrete blocks, but plans to replace the plywood when it becomes necessary. He also painted the plywood to help protect it. In the future, he plans to rebuild on the site of his former house, and is trying to get a loan for this purpose. Once he rebuilds, he hopes his family and former renters will return

2. The same family who bought two t-shelters attached them to make one big shelter and upgraded it. They built a porch, put a new roof on, and replaced the tarp walls with blocks and plywood. There is no rebar in the block walls, except for the front columns supporting the porch roof. There are only two people living there and the reason they bought two t-shelters is because a few months after the earthquake a relative died and they needed a place for people to stay when they came from all over for the funeral.

3. One woman from the Santo community had a baby just after the earthquake. Her family was living in very poor conditions in an improvised shelter where her old home used to stand. When they received a t-shelter from NGO-B, they immediately poured a foundation. The tarpaulin made the shelter too hot for the baby and they did not feel safe in it. As soon as they had the money, they upgraded the tarpaulin to plywood. The family is grateful that they were able to make these upgrades, but is unsure what more they will be able to do in the immediate future. They suspect that they will have to save for a long time before they can rebuild their home, but the hope is that they will one day be able to.

4. The last family who upgraded was a family of eight. They have poured a concrete slab foundation, replaced the bottom half of the shelter with concrete blocks, replaced the top half with plywood, and built a small porch. However, the concrete blocks do not have any rebar to support the structure and the shelter is on government property and therefore, they have no land security.



T-shelter (B4) ontop of newly built boutique



Two t-shelters (B27) put together to make one

Figure 26: NGO-B t-shelters that are transitioning

NGO Staff Turnover

According to the Project Manager for NGO-B, there was pressure to meet target completion deadlines, so much so that it ended up being the driving force of the project. Some of this had to do with the six week gap period between the time the first t-shelter project manager left and the new one arrived. NGO-B Project Manager claims that, had she been involved in the project from the design phase, she would have built it more around the community with increased community engagement, beneficiary identification, and a more involved selection process. This was not possible from the time she arrived, as so much time had been lost and the pressure to deliver was looming (NGO-B Project Manager). While NGO-B did the best they could with the time and resources they had, much of what they were able to do, or not do, was dictated by donors, specifically the donor's time table. According to NGO-B Informant-1 (2013), "the idea was to make as many [t-shelters] as possible in as little time [as possible]."

Transition to What?

While all along there was speculation regarding beneficiary's ability to self-transition, this speculation was not confirmed until NGO-B carried out an extensive evaluation to find out what was happening to the t-shelters (NGO-B Project Manager). According to NGO-B Project Manager, around June 2011, it became apparent that most people were not going to be able to transition the t-shelters themselves, but by that time the tide had turned on t-shelters and there was no longer funding available for t-shelters or upgrades. There were cluster reports stating Leogane was 'covered' for shelter, but the figures were highly disputed (NGO-B Project Manager). As a result, the entire NGO-B shelter department pulled out of Leogane due to lack of funding.

After a year, NGO-B conducted an extensive evaluation to find out what was happening to the t-shelters. It was found that about 50% had poured their own floors and done other miscellaneous improvements such as added electricity, built a porch, and made internal changes (NGO-B Project Manager). Below 10% had upgraded the walls. In addition to the disappointing findings, former NGO-B Project Manager believes this evaluation may have given beneficiaries the impression that, since they had told NGO-B they were not able to upgrade, NGO-B might come back to do it for them. This was despite the fact that staff were instructed to clarify that it was only information gathering and NGO-B was not promising anything (NGO-B Project Manager).

There was no substantial, integrated livelihood project to compliment the t-shelter project; NGO-B justified the local staff hired as the livelihood component, which was insufficient (NGO-B Project Manager). A more multi-sectoral approach with a robust livelihood program may have provided beneficiaries with the financial resources to upgrade or transition their t-shelters. NGO-B Informant-1 stated that even if there was additional funding, he does not think the t-shelter project should be followed up by an upgrading project; resources should go toward the many more vulnerable people who still need assistance.

NGO-B did not do anything to facilitate the transitional process. According to NGO-B Informant-2 (2013), "[w]e pretty much just gave the shelters and went to the next thing - there was no real expectation, plan, or timeframe regarding when or even if the t-shelters would transition within their lifespan." The same informant suspects that beneficiaries are just waiting for the next project. This informant spoke of a man who received a t-shelter and, instead of investing in it with upgrades, built another shelter next to it because he did not want to invest in something he believed the NGO should do. However, if an NGO does not return for over a year, people usually start to realize that they are not going to come back and begin to do things for themselves (NGO-B Informant-2).

When the t-shelters were built, beneficiaries were educated on the important components of the t-shelters, like hurricane straps and cross bracing, so they would not remove them for other uses

(NGO-B Project Manager). No information or trainings on t-shelter maintenance, upgrading, or safe reconstruction was provided to the beneficiaries other than on an ad-hoc basis, such as if a community mobilizer saw beneficiaries doing something unsafe; “it was not a dedicated element of the program” (NGO-B Project Manager, 2013). Trainings were targeted at the workforce, rather than the beneficiaries (NGO-B Project Manager). Perhaps NGOs are providing safe shelters in the interim period, however if or when beneficiaries go to upgrade, transition, or rebuild these t-shelters they are likely to build similar poor, unsafe structures as those that existed before the earthquake if they are not educated on safe reconstruction.

4.3 NGO-C

Byen prè pa lakay.

Very close is not home yet.

Of the 30 beneficiaries interviewed, five NGO-C t-shelters are transitioning: two have begun reconstruction, one has begun reconstruction and done extensive upgrades, one has fully upgraded their t-shelter, and one was sold for parts (and recycled). One t-shelter has begun upgrading, one has been relocated, 21 have only poured foundations, and three have done nothing (See Appendix 7 for photos of all NGO-C t-shelters).



Figure 27: Double t-shelter (C22)



Figure 28: Painted t-shelter (C8)

Families with more than six people were meant to get two shelters and while many did, two families of six and eight people only received one, even though they signed paperwork for two (NGO-C Beneficiaries). According to the families, the locally hired NGO-C workers made them sign for the t-shelters before they received them and then they only brought one. The workers claimed they ran out of materials, but both beneficiaries believe they sold the materials for themselves (NGO-C Beneficiaries), which seems likely. NGO-C Desk Officer stated that in their follow-up satisfaction survey, there were a high percentage of satisfied beneficiaries and these few circumstances could just be an exception. It is also possible that the beneficiaries did not uphold their end of the agreement entirely, such as not clearing the rubble in time to make space for both t-shelters, and therefore did not receive the second shelter, although there is no way to know for sure (NGO-C Desk Officer).

Upgrades

The three primary upgrades made by NGO-C t-shelter beneficiaries were pouring foundations, adding porches, and painting:

1. A foundation was not provided for the beneficiary so 27 families sold their plywood floors so they could pay for a concrete slab foundation (NGO-C Beneficiaries). The remaining three did not yet have the resources. A few families reused the plywood for things like porch constructions and shelves.

2. NGO-C provided three small buckets of paint for the beneficiaries to paint the t-shelter, but 20 beneficiaries never painted it. Many of these beneficiaries said that it either was not enough paint or they had not done it yet (NGO-C Beneficiaries). It is possible some may have sold the paint, but did not want to admit to it.

3. Five beneficiaries built porches onto their t-shelters. For three beneficiaries this was the only upgrade they made (not including the foundation), however one of these porches was particularly well constructed and the beneficiary explained he hoped to turn it into a room one day (NGO-C Beneficiaries).

Two beneficiaries claimed NGO-C said they would come back to do blocks, but never did (NGO-C Beneficiaries). This does not make much sense because they came back to do the cement cladding. It is possible that concrete blocks were one of the materials being tested as an upgrade option, but the cement cladding was chosen in the end, making it an understandable confusion.



Figure 29: Relocated t-shelter (C14)

In the original tarp design, there was only one door on the t-shelter (NGO-C Beneficiaries). When NGO-C came back to upgrade, all beneficiaries interviewed asked NGO-C to leave a second door opening. The workers did this, but the beneficiary had to provide the door. Some people divided the shelter into two rooms, either by using blocks (without rebar), plywood, or a bed sheet. Almost every interviewee spoke of water coming in when it rained. The tin roofs did not extend far enough out and many people resorted to boarding up windows so water would not come in (NGO-C Beneficiaries).



Figure 30: Steel polls recycled from a t-shelter sold for parts (t-shelters C16 and C17)

Relocate

Although some beneficiaries rented land, they owned their t-shelter (IFRC, 2012b). NGO-C facilitated the signing of a document between the beneficiary and the land owner, which authorized the beneficiary to stay in a shelter on the land for at least five years. Should the agreement be broken, NGO-C claimed the shelters are mobile and can be taken down and put back together again (IFRC, 2012b). Out of 30 beneficiaries interviewed, only three were renting the land their t-shelter was constructed on (NGO-C Beneficiaries). The first had a 'rent-to-buy' agreement (common in Haiti), whereby the occupants pay rent and build structures on the property, but with the understanding that they will eventually purchase

the land. The second family had the t-shelter constructed on land they had rented for many years (NGO-C Beneficiaries).

One woman received a tarpaulin wall t-shelter from NGO-C, but shortly after was told by the landlord that she had to move (NGO-C Beneficiaries). Fortunately, one of the NGO-C local workers,

The Exceptions

1. One man from the Brache community has a large family and therefore was given two t-shelters by NGO-C which were put together to make one large shelter. He has since poured a concrete foundation, tiled all the floors, patched the leaky roof, built a porch, and is currently constructing an attached kitchen out of concrete blocks. He also has big future plans for a flush toilet and a garden out front. The contrast between this man's home and the homes that surrounded it was incredible, and yet he still was insistent that he needed more NGOs to come help him with his remaining projects.

2. Just up the road a family of five had begun to rebuild their destroyed home and make small upgrades to their NGO-C t-shelter. The mother of the household explained they poured a foundation, built a porch attached to the t-shelter, and have rebuilt half of their old home. They even were able to reuse the tin from the old collapsed home for the roof on the new construction. Five people were living in the t-shelter, but now only two live there as the other three live in new structure. The family has attached these two structures with a covered porch. They have also begun reconstruction of the second room. When the construction is finished they will use the t-shelter as a kitchen and sitting room.

3. A family of ten lived in a t-shelter provided by NGO-C, but over time have been able to rebuild their home. Now, only two people live in the t-shelter and the other eight live in the new structure. Unfortunately, the new structure was only built with rebar in the columns, rather than throughout the structure, making it a weak structure. While they do not own the land, they have an agreement with the landlord that they will purchase the property in the future.

4. A family of 14 received two t-shelters from NGO-C, however the space has not been enough to accommodate everyone. The head of household invested in the construction of a very small, two story (one room on each floor) concrete structure. He plans to open up a business on the top floor and the bottom floor is being used as an additional bedroom.



Upgraded t-shelter (C26)



Upgraded t-shelter (C4)



New structure to the right.
T-shelter (C13) behind on the left.

Figure 31: NGO-C t-shelters that are transitioning

who had put together her t-shelter, was a friend and helped her relocate the structure onto a new rental property. Even though she informed NGO-C that she was moving, when they came back to replace the tarp with cement cladding a year later, they would not do hers; it is unclear why not. Eventually, the woman upgraded the tarpaulin walls to plywood, but the construction was poor. The roof was so bad she has had to put the old tarp over it so rain would not come in. She also poured a foundation and added a tin-walled porch (NGO-C Beneficiaries). The steel frame of the NGO-C t-shelter was welded together. It is likely that without the assistance of an artisan or tools, she would not have been able to relocate it.

Reselling and Recycling

One beneficiary had utilized steel poles to support the roof extending over a porch he built off of his t-shelter (NGO-C Beneficiaries). These poles looked similar to the frames of NGO-C t-shelters. As it turns out, a neighbor who had received an NGO-C t-shelter had taken it a part and sold it for parts. This beneficiary purchased a few steel poles and used them for the construction of a porch.

Transition to What?

While NGO-C returned to upgrade the t-shelters from tarpaulin walls to cement cladding walls, 24 of the 30 beneficiaries interviewed have done little or nothing to upgrade the t-shelter further, other than pour a foundation (which three still have not been able to do) and, in a few cases, add on a porch (NGO-C Beneficiaries). Since the replacement of the tarpaulin walls and with the upgrade to concrete foundations, these NGO-C t-shelters seem permanent. Families interviewed did not seem in any rush to upgrade and, most did not have anything in particular they wanted to change, other than the leaky roof and perhaps the size (NGO-C Beneficiaries). For people who were accustomed to larger concrete block homes, this was small; however, after living in IDP camps and improvised shelters, people seem grateful to have something more permanent and secure, despite the size. However, while most did not plan to make changes or upgrade their shelter, they did want to rebuild their old home eventually (NGO-C Beneficiaries).

Aside from the four families who have upgraded and/or begun rebuilding, reconstruction does not seem to be within the foreseeable future for most beneficiaries. Even though NGO-C's shelter program considered the number of people who would be living in the shelter, it is still cramped for six people. When asked about their future plans regarding their t-shelter, most said that they would like to rebuild their old home, but they do not know when they will be able (NGO-C Beneficiaries). For now, they will maintain the t-shelter they have the best they can. In the coming years, it is likely that people will just add onto their t-shelter or build another structure next to it, unless the t-shelter is not built where the old foundation was and they have the means to fully rebuild. A few beneficiaries are still utilizing improvised shelters they built before receiving the NGO-C t-shelter, as the t-shelter alone is not enough room. One young man has two improvised shelters made of plywood and tin sitting on each side of his NGO-C t-shelter, all on the concrete slab where his house once stood (NGO-C Beneficiaries).

Six months after the closing of the shelter program, in October 2012, NGO-C began a livelihood program (IFRC, 2013). It is hoped the livelihood program will impact t-shelter beneficiaries' financial ability to rebuild their home, build additions to their shelter, and/or adequately maintain their shelter so they will continue to reside in secure, durable housing (IFRC, 2013)

Part E

CONCLUSION

5.1 Key observations

T-shelters provided do not follow the TSA

The primary method of assistance in all three t-shelter programs was the direct provision of imported, prefabricated t-shelters. Not only is this not a method of assistance under the TSA guidelines, but the guidelines specifically advise against it. However, the TSA was a new approach that donors were eager to fund. Most of the 18 methods of assistance to implement the TSA are not easily communicated in promotional material; they do not necessarily provide a visual display of the impact donors are having with their contributions, whereas the physical provision of a prefabricated t-shelter does, hence the appeal. Therefore, donors primarily funded shelter projects that provided visual deliverables, which impacted beneficiary's ability to transition. This approach was more of a 'stop-gap', interim solution rather than a process. The lack of diversity in methods of assistance to cater to the different situations and needs of the affected population resulted in the inability of most people to transition the t-shelters that were provided on their own.

Beneficiaries do not have the resources to transition independently

I think NGOs massively overestimated the ability/likelihood of beneficiaries to upgrade/rebuild themselves. That may be linked to an underestimation of just how wrecked Haiti was, and the legacy of decades long aid provision (NGO-B Project Manager, 2013).

Few beneficiaries are transitioning their t-shelters in one of the many ways they were designed to transition to. If beneficiaries believed it was critical enough (i.e., necessary to the security and habitability of the t-shelter) and if they are able to pull the resources together to make small changes or upgrades, they did. This was seen specifically with foundations. Every beneficiary of NGO-A that had a poor foundation and had the resources to fix it, fixed it. Every beneficiary from NGO-B and that had the resources to pour a foundation or upgrade to plywood walls (NGO-B only), did it. These people were limited, but it was clear that they felt that these changes were critical to their security.

Those who were unable to make those changes are living insecurely and certainly not by choice.

When these t-shelters begin to deteriorate even further, people might be able to try again to find a way to improve security through small upgrades, but this will likely be the minority. The only reason NGO-C t-shelters transitioned through upgrades was because NGO-C came back to do them. Had they not, NGO-C beneficiaries would be in the same situation as those of NGO A and B. By only giving a family a shelter, vulnerability was slightly reduced; however, their financial situations remain largely unchanged.

Among the few transitioning, most are not upgrading or rebuilding safely

Six out of eight interviewees that had started constructing with cement blocks did so with either no rebar or rebar only in the columns and not throughout the structure. Every beneficiary interviewed was asked whether or not they received instruction, training, or information on safe construction, t-shelter maintenance, or methods of safe t-shelter upgrading. NGOs A and C claimed to have done at least one of these things. Although they very well may have, they clearly were not impactful if not one of the sixty interviewees were able to recall it. There are a number of reasons why this may have happened; this could have been a form of marronage (although it is unclear how it could have been benefiting), the trainings did not actually occur, or the family members interviewed did not attend the training. Either way, what is apparent is that NGOs need to be more thorough and rigorous with disseminating safe reconstruction information and holding trainings.

NGO staff turnover affecting t-shelter program implementation

NGO's A and B both experienced difficulties in staff turnover that has impacted the t-shelter programs. With the limited amount of time NGOs have to implement programs, often due to funding stipulations, adequate capacity and consistent staffing is critical. NGO-A's Construction Advisor came in three months after the shelter program started and once he left, was never replaced. NGO-B did not have one project manager to see the entire project out and there was a gap between the staffing of the position.

Poor communication between NGOs and Communities

One of the most dramatic findings of this study was the discrepancies between the NGOs' account of their shelter program activities and the beneficiaries'. This miscommunication or perhaps misunderstanding has appeared to have stifled t-shelter transitioning. The deep-rooted history of NGOs in Haiti has resulted in an unprecedented amount of dependency on outside assistance. Regardless of people's abilities to make changes to their t-shelter, most will not make them if they are expecting NGOs to do it. On one hand, it is reasonable for Haitians to, for example, not want to buy expensive paint for their t-shelter when an NGO promised they would come back with paint. When there are many mouths to feed, and no steady employment, these opportunities are taken advantage of. However, two years later, people were still waiting for the NGOs to come back. In this time, the elements had already taken a toll on the t-shelters. These expectations for assistance are so deep-rooted that they have affected Haitian's ability to recover and transition. NGO's must be more diligent about communicating with beneficiaries and communities.

Miscommunication or Marronage?

Beneficiaries from all three NGOs claimed that the NGO said they were going to return to do something additional and never did. It is unclear whether or not beneficiaries were telling the truth and perhaps NGOs were unable to return and follow through because of funding constraints or whether this was a form of marronage. In this circumstance, the purpose of implementing marronage (consciously or unconsciously) would be in attempts to receive more assistance; people are trying to survive and if a 'blan,' a type of person with whom wealth is associated, is at the doorstep, people may say what they think needs to be heard in order to get more assistance.

Funding

The different funding mechanisms for each t-shelter program seem to have been a major determinant in what the NGOs were able to provide in terms of follow-up support and facilitation of the transitioning processes. NGO-A wrote a funding proposal specific to what the donors were looking for (had they not, it would have been unlikely that they received the funding), t-shelters as opposed to permanent homes but, like NGO-B, were unable to provide follow-up support and facilitate the transitional process because there was no funding available to do so. NGO-C, on the other hand, did not have to rely on donor funding, but rather had internal reserves and different funding mechanisms which allowed them to be more flexible and adapt their program based on the needs of the population instead of the desires of the donors. It is apparent that this approach was a lot more successful. Although none of the t-shelter programs followed all of the TSA guidelines, NGO-C t-shelters were upgraded and as a result, were far more robust and permanent than the NGO-A and B shelters. NGO-A and B lacked the funding to follow through and complete the process or provide any additional support at all. As a result, their t-shelters will deteriorate more quickly. Additionally, they did not have the initial funding for expensive steel frames, just wooden frames, which have a much shorter lifespan.

If people do not transition, does it matter?

The complexities of this disaster, specifically with rubble removal, land tenure, and lack of Haitian government guidance, were enormous and permanent reconstruction, understandably, was not on any NGO's table. Regardless, the sheltering solutions NGOs were capable of implementing, such as t-shelters, required LRRD, as they always should. Without LRRD, t-shelters are nothing but a stop-gap solution. However, the situation in Haiti was so daunting that many of the NGO interviewees seemed to imply that 'stop-gap' was good enough and simply the best they could do considering the circumstances. T-shelters overcame the minefield of problems with permanent housing enough to get people into the recovery stage, but everything stopped there. There was no forethought to linking shelter efforts to development because NGOs could not even begin to meet the overwhelming needs and assist everyone into recovery.

I don't think [those] key to the [shelter] strategy development and who are both very experienced in humanitarian response ever thought of t-shelters as being THE solution. They envisioned it as being a stop-gap, as it was intended to be, for people who could leave camps, but wouldn't otherwise, and house them until permanent reconstruction could happen. (NGO-B Project Manager, 2013)

It is possible that, despite all the criticism, this t-shelter approach provided the best possible solution for the worst possible situation. The approach may have been stop-gap, but it is difficult to imagine that any other strategy would have provided the same kind of protection. Regardless of the lack of transitioning, it may have been better than nothing. For the circumstances, it may not matter than t-shelters did not transition. However, this is not to say that future development work in Haiti does not require improved, sustainable, adequate housing.

5.2 Lessons Learned

Bite pa tonbe. *Stumbling is not falling.*

Correct your mistakes before it is too late. Hang in there.*

Transitional shelter programs should follow the TSA guidelines

It is not reasonable to dismiss the TSA as unsuccessful in Haiti due to failure to complete the transitional process because the TSA was not properly implemented. Some aspects of the t-shelter

*Turnball, 2005, p.94

response which the TSA discourages, such as the importation of prefabricated materials, were seemingly unavoidable because Haiti did not have the resources or capacity to provide the necessary construction materials in demand. If the context did not match the conditions of the approach, perhaps even attempting to implement the approach was not appropriate. However, it is difficult to imagine that any solution other than the direct provision of t-shelters would have provided the same amount of protection. It is possible that the TSA could have been implemented according to guidelines had the response been less donor-driven or was implemented with more diversity in methods of assistance.

Shelter responses should be need-driven, not donor-driven

Most TSA methods of implementation utilized in Haiti were seemingly donor-driven, arguably, the least qualified stakeholder to decide. Donors primarily funded one method of assistance, whereas the TSA requires a combination of methods to be implemented. NGO-C was the only NGO studied that did not rely on donor funding and the outcome of NGO-C t-shelters was clearly the most successful. It seems likely that if donor funding had fewer stipulations, NGOs would be able to implement more diverse programs based on need.

Upgrading is not the only way to transition a t-shelter

It appears that beneficiaries were only encouraged to upgrade their t-shelters and not informed of the other transitional options. Beneficiaries were hesitant to reveal that they (or others) had bought, sold, or rented t-shelters; for some reason people thought it was something they should not be doing. It is unclear how or why this mindset came about, however, NGOs should certainly be making efforts to diminish it. Selling and renting t-shelters are not necessarily bad; the ultimate goal is to house people in safe, adequate housing and these actions are generally achieving it. If a t-shelter is rented out, another family is being housed affordably. If a t-shelter is sold for parts, the money generated may be funding reconstruction and the parts bought are being used to upgrade or rebuild someone else's home. There seems to be a lot of misunderstanding, not only at the beneficiary level, but also at a higher up level. There are five ways to transition a t-shelter and only one (upgrading) seems to be adequately understood by the Haitian people as being acceptable.

5.3 Recommendations: Moving Forward in Haiti

Kote ki gen dife a, gen dlo tou. *Where there's fire, there's water, too.*

Every problem has a solution.*

The transitional shelter response in Haiti received a lot of criticism. Below are recommendations for moving forward in Haiti and transitioning existing t-shelters as well as recommendations for future t-shelter responses, in Haiti and elsewhere.

Small grants for safe reconstruction

A primary barrier of beneficiaries transitioning their t-shelters is their financial limitations. People should not have to choose between their security and their child's education. Haitian families would benefit substantially from small grants to assist them in the shelter upgrades and/or reconstruction. It is recommended that small grants or vouchers be made available for applicants motivated to transition their t-shelter. This system could support the use of quality, locally sourced materials through carefully researched stipulations on where the money or vouchers are used. However, providing shelter upgrade/reconstruction grants or vouchers would all go to waste if the money is used for unsafe construction. Haitians need to be building back better, rather than building back utilizing the same, unsafe construction practices and techniques that contributed to vulnerability in

*Turnball, 2005, p.94

the first place. This could be encouraged through mandatory safe construction trainings for grant or voucher recipients. Additionally, if recipients are preparing to hire someone to construct for them, both should be required to attend together.

Improved communication between NGOs and communities

Regardless of whether or not the discrepancies in the NGO accounts and the beneficiary accounts are a result of marronage or simply miscommunication, nothing but good can come from improving communication. It is recommended that NGOs utilize informational bulletin boards in each community in which they are working. This board would communicate important information, contacts, community meetings regarding NGO work, and when the NGO is leaving permanently. Beneficiaries should not be expecting NGOs to come back a year after a project has ended. NGOs need to improve communication with communities so that beneficiaries will be less expectant and hopefully not wait to take action on their housing situation.

This method of communication should not replace current methods of communication such as community meetings and community mobilizer staff, but rather be an addition. It is critical that these information boards adequately communicate to literate and non-literate populations, incorporating plenty of visual aids. While this may be somewhat difficult to implement in very rural communities where beneficiaries are spread out, there are always public buildings and areas where people gather, no matter where they live, which would be suitable for the information boards such as wells, churches, markets, riverbanks, and schools.

Increased dissemination of safe reconstruction information and trainings

Among the few beneficiaries that had begun upgrades and/or reconstruction, most were not building safely, putting them at greater peril. Beneficiaries must be provided with more safe construction information. It is recommended that beneficiaries are provided booklets detailing ways they can upgrade and/or transition and safe ways to do so, not only with a specific shelter model, but with local construction practices, tools, and techniques. This information could come in the form of a booklet or perhaps a calendar so it is always visible on the wall. They should include a lot of visuals for those who are not literate.

NGOs need to be mindful of the kind of safe reconstruction training they provide beneficiaries. Steel framed shelters are not typical housing frames in Haiti. Even if beneficiaries are taught to maintain and upgrade these t-shelters, they need to be taught how to safely reconstruct using the tools and materials available to them after the NGOs leave. If a family decides to expand their shelter, they may construct something similar to the building they had before the earthquake, which collapsed. Safe reconstruction training will help prevent this from happening.

Increased diversity in transitional shelter provisions

The way to reach the most vulnerable populations is through a wide variety of assistance methods that will address the varying needs and situations of the affected people. The Haiti shelter response was narrow; although there were other sheltering initiatives that took place on a smaller scale, the primary method of assistance was the direct provision of t-shelters. The people eligible to receive t-shelters were those with access to land, those who owned land or could afford to rent it. Having access to land automatically provides an advantage over those who have been squatting illegally. While targeting this group is critical to motivating rubble clearance and movement out of camps, a wider variety of t-shelter assistance methods might have been able to also assist the most vulnerable group: those without access to land. NGO-B seems to have been the most effective in reaching those without access to land, such as those living in IDP camps on government land; however, it does not appear as though they have any formal land security for the long-term.

Strong livelihood programs

Temporary, provisional livelihood programs are insufficient and do not address the long-term needs. While temporary employment such as 'cash-for-work' programs may help in the short-term, strong livelihoods programs need to follow cash-for-work or other provisional programs and be implemented alongside t-shelter programs, particularly if the implementing NGO is not planning on assisting or at all facilitating the transitional process through to completion. Beneficiaries cannot be expected to make the transition on their own if they do not have the resources.

Future project evaluations

NGOs should be returning well after the project is finished to evaluate their long-term impact in order to improve their effectiveness in future shelter responses. Small sample 'satisfaction surveys' do not adequately portray the impact that the program has had on people's lives over time. Additionally, social and cultural factors such as marronage must be taken into account, particularly with evaluations. In Haiti, people will likely act more pleased than they actually are with the services provided in hopes they may obtain more assistance.

Educating donors and NGOs

Typically, NGOs are able to gauge the needs of communities through assessments and community engagement. Programs to address these needs are developed accordingly and often are altered over time according to changes in needs. If donor funding is limited to specific types of assistance or is inflexible, it can affect the ability of NGOs to meet needs. This seems to be a reoccurring problem for NGOs and has certainly been an issue with the Haiti shelter response. It is recommended that donors are more thoroughly educated on the processes and intricacies of humanitarian responses so that they may be able to more appropriately and effectively fund disaster responses, recovery, and development. Similarly, NGOs should be well-informed on the importance of an integrated, multi-sectoral shelter response that, regardless of the situational complexities, adequately LRRD. The goal should always be to be implementing sustainable solutions, not stop-gap solutions.

5.4 Areas for further research

Drop in the bucket

Each group of NGO beneficiaries interviewed was a small percentage of the total number of beneficiaries. Additionally, these three NGOs were among many NGOs implementing t-shelter programs. Therefore, this study examines a very small sample. While effort was made to choose three, very different t-shelter programs that would be representative of the many diverse programs implemented, this study certainly does not cover them all. There would be value in examining more samples from more NGOs, particularly to compare the strengths and weaknesses of programs for future responses.

Too soon to tell?

This research was conducted three and a half years after the earthquake. T-shelters are meant to last 3-5 years and it was thought this would be a critical time to evaluate whether or not t-shelters are transitioning, as it may allow time for intervention if they were not. However, most beneficiaries did not receive t-shelters until a year after the earthquake, therefore t-shelters have not quite reached their minimum lifespan. Once the t-shelters reach that point and begin to deteriorate at a faster rate, it would be interesting to see how many beneficiaries take action. It may be valuable for a similar study, perhaps on a larger scale, to be conducted at the five or six year mark.

Improving funding

While donors provide a valuable service to the humanitarian community, their funding stipulations and time constraints have often hindered diverse, needs-based shelter interventions and sustainable sheltering solutions. Investigation into improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the donor funding system and/or alternative funding options for NGOs would be valuable.

Appendix 1

18 Methods of Transitional Shelter Assistance Methods

4 Labor Methods

Direct Labor: Construction activities are directly undertaken by hired labor when compensation or incentives for the work will assist the recovery of those affected.

Contract Labor: In complex situations, such as when large scale projects must be completed in a short time or specialist skills are needed, contractors can be hired to support the project capacity.

Community Labor: A collective effort whereby groups (among the affected population and host communities) voluntarily undertake construction activities together.

Self-Help: Transitional shelters being reconstructed by the beneficiaries themselves. This is most appropriate in communities with strong traditions of self-construction as well as when sufficient construction skills are available and there is disaster risk reduction strategies integrated into the traditional construction techniques.

(SC, 2012 as cited in UN, 2010)

3 Material Methods

General Items: Items that do not require any instruction, promotion, or education before delivery.

Shelter Construction Items: Items that require instruction, promotion, or education, such as tool kits and shelter/construction materials.

WASH Items: Water, sanitation, and hygiene items that require instruction, promotion, or education, such as mosquito nets and household water treatment.

(SC, 2012 as cited in UN, 2010)

9 Support Methods

Cash: The direct distribution of cash to affected populations.

Environmental and Resource Management: Acknowledgement of the environmental damages caused by the disaster and the risk for environmental degradation that may occur as a result of post-disaster shelter operations (e.g., high demand for materials).

Vouchers: As an alternative to cash, vouchers can be exchanged for materials and services provided by select local suppliers.

Local Information Centers: Important information regarding disaster assistance can be provided to affected populations through a network of local and regional information centers (mobile or stationary).

Return and Transit Items: Packages to support the transportation and return of displaced people to their land or new and safer areas.

Advocacy, Legal, and Administrative: Low cost or free legal and administrative assistance that supports beneficiaries in issues such as property rights and land tenure issues.

Market Interventions: Includes the local and national construction industry in all stages of reconstruction from material acquisition to contracting professionals. This ensures the private sector is

supporting the affected population in reconstruction efforts.

Insurances, Loans, and Guarantees: Aid agencies, the government, national banks, and donors can provide insurance, loans, and guarantees in times where there is no direct access to credit.

Infrastructure and Settlement Planning: Improved safety of transitional settlements and access to essential communal facilities can be supported through proper planning of infrastructure and settlements.

(SC, 2012 as cited in UN, 2010)

2 Quality Assurance Methods

Supervision and Technical Expertise: Shelters must be constructed in compliance with the minimum standards. Adequate technical support and quality assurance must be provided during the implementation of the program to ensure shelters are constructed to meet these standards. This is particularly important when self-help and community labor methods are selected.

Capacity Building: Long-term investment is encouraged through capacity building programs which provide opportunities to make improvements such as developing standards and codes. This can be achieved through workshops, trainings, skills development, as well as resource and information services.

(SC, 2012 as cited in UN, 2010)

Appendix 2

Guiding Interview questions

T-shelter recipient interview questions:

- How did you get this t-shelter? When did you get this t-shelter? Did you have to do anything to receive the shelter?
- Where did you live before?
- What organization did you receive the t-shelter from?
- Who owns this shelter? Who owns the land?
- Did you buy this shelter? Are you renting this shelter?
- What information were you provided about the t-shelter (e.g., how long it would last, how to upgrade it, how to maintain it, etc.)?
- Have you changed the t-shelter at all?
- Is there anything you want to change about the t-shelter?
- Have you done anything to maintain the t-shelter (e.g., oil on wood, paint, replace plywood, etc.)?
- What are your plans? Do you have plans to move, upgrade, or rebuild a more permanent home? If no, why? If yes, are any NGOs helping you do this?
- Is the NGO coming to help with anything else?
- Do you know anyone who received the same shelter as you, but has disassembled it, sold it, upgraded it (replaced plywood or replaced plywood with blocks), recycled it, rented it, or rebuilt? If so, can you provide their name and where I might be able to find them?

NGO staff interview questions:

- Can you tell me your role with NGO-X?
- Can you tell me a bit about the t-shelter program and how it was implemented?
- What have been the main challenges in providing t-shelters here in Leogane?
- How long was this shelter design meant to last? Have they been lasting or have they begun to deteriorate earlier than expected?
- What characteristics of your shelter made it transitional?
- Is your NGO's t-shelter designed to be upgradable?
- Were there any conditions attached to beneficiaries receiving a t-shelter?
- Did beneficiaries receive any training or materials on safe construction should they start to rebuild or upgrade their shelter?
- Who advised the t-shelter construction – Does your NGO have a shelter team? Did they hire temporary shelter consultants?
- Can you tell me about how the project was funded?
- Have you followed up with any beneficiaries on the status of their t-shelter (e.g., to find out if they have begun to upgrade or transition?)?
- Did your NGO do anything to facilitate the transitional process? Why or why not?
- When did your NGO expect the t-shelters to start transitioning to more permanent solutions?
- How did your NGO expect t-shelters to transition? Did your NGO assist in the transition or did they expect people to transition on their own?
- Do you know if any of the t-shelters you have provided have been upgraded or transitioned in any way? Do you suspect they will? Why or why not?
- In hindsight, is there anything you would have done differently in the implementation of your t-shelter program? Why or why not?

Appendix 3

10 Principals of Transitional Shelter

Assess situation: Communities have varying capacities to cope with disasters (Jha, 2010), transitional shelter may not be an appropriate response (SC, 2012). This cannot be decided without a comprehensive assessment of the need and impact each shelter approach may have on the affected population (SC, 2012).

Involve community: The decision to utilize the TSA approach should be made with the affected population (Jha, 2010); community participation is always critical to a successful shelter response, particularly in ensuring local knowledge of local hazards and cultural needs are considered as well as the most sustainable and rapid approaches to recovery (SC, 2012).

Develop strategy: It is essential that transitional shelter incorporates and considers other clusters, such as camp coordination and camp management (CCCCM), health, early recovery, protection, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) issues in the implementation of an integrated, cross-sectoral approach (SC, 2012). Shelter provides a critical platform for health, livelihoods, protection, and WASH; therefore, it is never adequately addressed without consideration for these other aspects.

Reduce vulnerability: Transitional shelter should reduce the vulnerability of the affected population. This can be done through incorporating hazard resistant techniques and disaster risk reduction strategies into the entire sheltering process including site selection and preparations, shelter design, as well as building community capacity. Examples of this may include building shelters able to withstand hurricanes and training community members to construct hurricane-resistant roofs.

Agree standards: Transitional shelter does not have a standard design, therefore they should be agreed upon with the local government and disaster-affected community (SC, 2012).

Maximize choice: Disaster-affected populations have a wide range of needs, resources, and capacities, therefore the combinations of interim shelter and settlement options utilized drastically vary (SC, 2012). One universal solution to shelter would be inappropriate and inefficient. Shelter construction methods and designs should be flexible, maximizing the amount of choice beneficiaries have in how they proceed in securing a permanent home. This is not only in regards to choosing a method of assistance, but also options which include recycling, upgrading, reusing, reselling, or relocating their transitional shelters (SC, 2012).

Buy time: Transitional shelter bridges the time gap between the short lifespan of emergency shelter provisions, such as tents and tarps, and the sustainable reconstruction of permanent homes (SC, 2012). This reconstruction period may take many years to complete, particularly considering obstacles such as securing land tenure and often slow processes such as agreeing upon standards and community engagement. Transitional shelter supports shelter needs during this time so that sustainable reconstruction can take place (SC, 2012).

Incremental process: Transitional shelter is an incremental process, not a phase, which begins with the first aid distribution and continues in parallel with reconstruction. Upgrading, reusing, reselling, or recycling of the t-shelters should occur at the pace of the beneficiary (SC, 2012).

Plan site: Site planning, to include hazard risk reduction, zoning, and service integration, will ensure that transitional shelters are located on safe, legal, and appropriate land. Needs of the entire

community should be considered throughout this process (SC, 2012).

Reconstruction: Implementation of transitional shelter programs should occur alongside permanent reconstruction programs. T-shelters should not be additional structures, but rather complimentary structures which will contribute to reconstruction either through an upgrading process, material reuse or recycle, or by reselling it (SC, 2012).

Appendix 4

NGO-A	No Significant Changes	Reuse	Relocate	Resell	Recycle	Upgraded	Started Upgrade	Rebuilding	Transitioning	No Land Security
A1	X									
A2	X									
A3	X									
A4	X									
A5				X	X					
A6				X	X					
A7†	X									
A8	X									
A9							X			
A10†	X									
A11	X									
A12	X									
A13	X									
A14	X									
A15	X									
A16	X									
A17	X									
A18	X									
A19†	X									
A20							X			
A21	X									
A22†	X									
A23†	X									
A24†	X									
A25†	X									
A26†	X									
A27†	X									
A28†	X									
A29	X									
A30	X									
TOTALS	27	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0

† Denotes Repair



A1



A2



A3



A4

SOLD
No photo

SOLD
No photo

A5

A6



A7



A8



A9



A10



A11



A12



A13



A14



A15



A16



A17



A18



A19



A20



A21



A22



A23



A24



A25



A26



A27



A28



A29



A30

Appendix 5

NGO-B	No Significant Changes	Reuse	Relocate	Resell	Recycle	Upgraded	Started Upgrade	Rebuilding	Transitioning	No Land Security
B1						X			X	
B2	X									X
B3	X									X
B4			X			X			X	
B5				X					X	
B6				X				X	X	
B7	X									X
B8	X									X
B9	X									X
B10							X			X
B11	X									X
B12	X									X
B13	X									
B14	X									
B15	X									
B16	X									
B17	X									
B18	X									
B19							X			
B20	X									
B21	X									
B22	X									
B23	X									X
B24	X									X
B25	X									
B26	X									
B27				X		X			X	
B28	X									
B29							X			
B30						X			X	X
TOTALS	21	0	1	3	2	4	3	1	6	11



SOLD
No photo

B5





Appendix 6

NGO-C	No Significant Changes	Reuse	Relocate	Resell	Recycle	Upgraded	Started Upgrade	Rebuilding	Transitioning	No Land Security
C1	X									
C2	X									
C3	X									
C4		X					X	X	X	
C5	X									
C6	X									
C7	X									
C8	X									
C9								X	X	
C10	X									
C11	X									
C12	X									
C13		X						X	X	
C14	X		X							
C15	X									
C16					X		X			
C17				X					X	
C18	X									
C19	X									
C20	X									
C21	X									
C22	X									
C23	X									
C24	X									
C25	X									
C26						X			X	
C27	X									
C28	X									
C29	X									
C30	X									
TOTALS	24	2	1	1	0	1	2	3	4	0



C1



C2



C3



C4



C5



C6



C7



C8



C9



C10



C11



C12



C13



C14



C15



SOLD

No photo



C17

C18



C19

C20

C21



C22

C23

C24



C25

C26

C27



C28

C29

C30

References:

- ALNAP/ProVention, 2005. South Asia earthquake 2005: learning from previous earthquake relief operations. [pdf]. *Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP)*. Available at: <http://www.alnap.org/pubs/pdfs/ALNAPProVention_SAsia_Quake_Lessonsa.pdf> [Accessed: 15 March 2013].
- Bankoff, G., Frerks, G., and Hilhorst, D., 2004. Mapping vulnerability: disasters, development & people. New York: Earthscan.
- Barakat, S., 2003. Housing reconstruction after conflict and disaster. [pdf] *Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG)*. Available at: <http://academia.edu/1093514/Housing_reconstruction_after_conflict_and_disaster> [Accessed 20 June 2013].
- Burnell, J. and Sanderson, D., 2011. Whose reality counts?: shelter after disaster. [pdf] *Centre for Development and Emergency Practice (CENDEP): Oxford Brookes University*. Available at: <<http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/shelter-editorial-burnell-and-sanderson.pdf>> [Accessed 14 March 2013].
- CERP, 2011. Emergency and transitional shelter provision flawed, new evaluation shows. [online] *Center for Economic and Policy Research (CERP)*. Available at: <<http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/emergency-and-transitional-shelter-provision-flawed-new-evaluation-shows>> [Accessed 30 April 2013].
- Collins, S., Corsellis, T., and Vitale, A., 2010. Transitional shelter: understanding shelter from the emergency through reconstruction and beyond. [pdf]. *Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP)*. Available at: <<http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/innovationcasestudyno5-shelter.pdf>> [Accessed 14 March 2013].
- Corsellis, T. and Vitale, A., 2005. Transitional settlement displaced populations. [pdf] *University of Cambridge: shelterproject*. Available at: <http://postconflict.unep.ch/liberia/displacement/documents/Corsellis_Vitale_Transitional_Settlement_Displaced_Population.pdf> [Accessed 1 April 2013].
- Clermont, C., Sanderson, D., Sharma, A., and Spraos, H. 2011. Urban disasters – lessons from Haiti: study of member agencies' responses to the earthquake in Port au Prince, Haiti, January 2010. [pdf] *Disasters Emergency Committee*. Available at: <<http://www.dec.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/Evaluations/Haiti/DEC-Haiti-urban-study.pdf>> [Accessed 18 April 2013].
- Cuny, F., 1983. Disasters and development. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Davis, I., 1978. Shelter after disaster. Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic Press.
- Davis, I., 1982. Shelter after disaster: Guidelines for assistance. [pdf] *Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordination (UNDRO)*. Available at: <<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/E4FE896AFF16709C1256CB10056558E-undro-shelter1-jul82.pdf>> [Accessed 10 June 2013].

- Davis, I. 2011. What is the vision for sheltering and housing in Haiti?: summary observations of the reconstruction progress following the Haiti earthquake of January 12th, 2010. [pdf] Available at: <<http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/1379.pdf>> [Accessed 17 April 2013].
- DEC, 2013. Haiti earthquake facts and figures. [online] *Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC)*. Available at: <<http://www.dec.org.uk/haiti-earthquake-facts-and-figures>> [Accessed 20 June 2013].
- Desvarieux, J., 2010. Haiti's homeless: is 'transitional' housing the solution?. [online] *Time World*. Available at: <<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2004056,00.html>> [Accessed 30 April 2013].
- DFID, 2011. Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR). [pdf] *Department for International Development (DFID)*. 28 March. Available at: <www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/HERR.pdf> [Accessed: 2 September 2013].
- Farmer, P., 2011. Haiti after the earthquake. New York: Public Affairs.
- Frontline, 2011. Battle for Haiti: Interview Jean-Joseph Exumé. [online] *Frontline*. Available at: <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/battle-for-haiti/interviews/jean-joseph-exume.html>> [Accessed 18 August 2013].
- Goyder, H., 2010. Real Time Evaluation of Tearfund's Haiti earthquake response. [pdf] Available at: <<http://www.alnap.org/resource/5940.aspx>> [Accessed 15 August 2013].
- Hirano, S., 2012. Learning from the urban transitional shelter response in Haiti. [pdf] *Catholic Relief Services*. Available at: <<http://www.alnap.org/resource/6539.aspx>> [Accessed 30 April 2013].
- IASC, 2010. Shelter in Haiti. [pdf] *Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)* Available at: <<http://www.habitat.ro/files/resurse/haitigraphicupdatefinal.pdf>> [Accessed 18 June 2013].
- IASC, 2011. Haiti Shelter Cluster. [online] *Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)*. Available at: <<https://sites.google.com/site/shelterhaiti2010/>> [Accessed 14 March 2013].
- IASC, 2012. E-shelter & CCCM cluster Haiti: frequently asked questions. [pdf]. *Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)*. Available at: <http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/jl/pdf/faq_s-e-shelter_CCCM_Cluster.pdf> [Accessed: 14 March 2013].
- IFRC, 2011. The Shelter Cluster: Haiti. [video online] Available at: <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=29M1V6MfnEk>> [Accessed 18 June 2013].
- IFRC, 2011b. Coordinating shelter in Haiti: IFRC and the Shelter Cluster. [pdf] *International Federation for the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC)*. Available at: <[https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&ved=0CEAQFjAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sheltercluster.org%2FReferences%2FDocuments%2FShelter%2520Cluster-case%2520study%2520\(Haiti\).pdf&ei=4pEVUte0FuLD4AOFzoGACA&usq=AFQjCNF3am8ZDOO_AtPakaHsQCfWOHC6Gw&si](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&ved=0CEAQFjAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sheltercluster.org%2FReferences%2FDocuments%2FShelter%2520Cluster-case%2520study%2520(Haiti).pdf&ei=4pEVUte0FuLD4AOFzoGACA&usq=AFQjCNF3am8ZDOO_AtPakaHsQCfWOHC6Gw&si)>

g2=uCuKzt5h5TSG8K3Cx_G7Qw> [Accessed 8 August, 2013].

- IFRC, 2012. Sustainable reconstruction in urban areas: a handbook. [pdf] *International Federation for the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC)*. Available at: <<http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/95526/publications/Urban%20reconstruction%20Handbook%20IFRC-SKAT.pdf>> [Accessed 2 May 2013].
- IFRC, 2012b. Shelter technical brief: Haiti earthquake operation - 24 months. [pdf] *International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC)*. Available at: <http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/95899/RCRC%20ShelterTechnicalBrief-24%20months%20FINAL_web.pdf>
- IFRC, 2013. Federation wide livelihoods program evaluation. [pdf] *International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC)*. Available at: <adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=41159&.pdf> [Accessed 20 August 2013].
- Jha, A., 2010. Safer homes, stronger communities: a handbook for reconstructing after natural disasters. [pdf] *The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank*. Available at: <<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2409>> [Accessed 30 April 2013].
- Julmy, S., 2011. Coordinating the earthquake response: lessons from Leogane, western Haiti. [online]. *Humanitarian Practice Network*. Available at: <<http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-49/coordinating-the-earthquake-response-lessons-from-leogane-western-haiti>> [Accessed 14 March 2013].
- Kelman, I., Ashmore, J., Leon., E., and D'urzo, S., 2011. From research to practice (and vice versa) for post-disaster settlement and shelter. [pdf] *Environmental Hazards*, 10:3-4, 262-278. Available at: <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17477891.2011.590877#.UcyjPPnVCS0>> [Accessed 20 June 2013].
- Levine, S., Bailey, S., Boyer, B., and Mehu, C., 2012. Avoiding reality: Land, institutions and humanitarian action in post-earthquake Haiti. [pdf] Available at: <<http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7930.pdf>> [Accessed 10 June 2013].
- Lloyd-Jones, T., 2006. Mind the gap! Post-disaster reconstruction and the transition from humanitarian relief. [pdf]. *Max Lock Centre at the University of Westminster*. Available at: <<https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/haiti/Crisis%20Documents/Reconstruction%20and%20Recovery%20Resources/RICS%20Report-Mind%20the%20Gap!.pdf>> [Accessed 14 March 2013].
- NGO&DEV, 2012. The Definition of Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA). [online] *ngo&dev.com*. Available at: <<http://www.ngoanddev.com/2012/06/definition-of-participatory-rapid.html>> [Accessed 10 June 2013].
- NGO-A Area Coordinator (AC), 2013. NGO-A key staff interview. Interviewed by Avery Doninger. [semi-structured interview] Leogane, Haiti. 28 August, 2013.

- NGO-A Beneficiaries. 2013. NGO-A Beneficiary interviews. Interviewed by Avery Doninger. [semi-structured interview] Leogane, Haiti. 5 and 8 July, 2013.
- NGO-A Construction advisor (CA), 2013. NGO-A key staff interview. Interviewed by Avery Doninger. [semi-structured interview] Interviewed on Skype. 27 June 2013.
- NGO-A Project Manager, 2013. NGO-A key staff interview. Interviewed by Avery Doninger. [semi-structured interview] Santo, Leogane, Haiti. 27 July 2013.
- NGO-B Beneficiaries, 2013. NGO-B Beneficiary Interviews. Interviewed by Avery Doninger. [semi-structured interview] Leogane, Haiti. 10 and 11 July, 2013.
- NGO-B Informant-1, 2013. NGO-B key staff interview. Interviewed by Avery Doninger. [semi-structured interview] Port au Prince, Haiti. 9 July 2013.
- NGO-B Informant-2, 2013. NGO-B key staff interview. Interviewed by Avery Doninger. [semi-structured interview] Port au Prince, Haiti. 9 July 2013.
- NGO-B Project Manager, 2013. NGO-B key staff interview. Interviewed by Avery Doninger. [semi-structured interview] Interviewed on Skype. 15 August, 2013.
- NGO-C Desk Officer (DO), 2013. NGO A key staff informant. Email correspondence with Avery Doninger. 20 August, 2013.
- Pierre-Louis, F., 2011. Earthquakes, nongovernmental organizations, and governance in Haiti. [pdf] Available at: <<http://jbs.sagepub.com/content/42/2/186>> [Accessed 16 June 2013].
- Sanderson, D., Knox-Clarke, P., and Campbell, L., 2012. Responding to urban disasters: learning from previous relief and recovery operations. *Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP)*. Available at: <<http://www.alnap.org/resource/7772.aspx>> [Accessed 20 July 2013].
- Saunders, G., 2004. Dilemmas and challenges for the shelter sector: lessons learned from the sphere revision process. [pdf] *Disasters*, 28(2). 160–175. Available at <<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0361-3666.2004.00250.x/abstract>> [Accessed 10 June 2013].
- SC, 2012. Transitional shelter guidelines. [pdf] *Shelter Centre (SC)*. Available at: <<http://www.sheltercentre.org/node/25121>> [Accessed 17 April 2013].
- SSRP, 2010. Shelter Sector Response Plan, as a contribution to a Common Action Plan. [online] Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Haiti Shelter Sector Response Plan (SSRP). Available at: <http://www.ipred-iisee.org/database/temporary%20housing/100310_Haiti_Shelter_Sector_Response_Plan_Final.doc> [Accessed 25 June 2013].
- Turnball, W., 2005. Hidden meanings: truth and secret in Haiti's creole proverbs. Durham: Light Messages.

- Turner, J.F.C., 1976. *Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environments*. Marion Boyars: London.
- Twiggs, J., 2002. Technology, post-disaster housing reconstruction and livelihoods security. [pdf] *Benfield Hazard Research Centre*. Available at: <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/abuhc/resources/working_papers/working_papers_folder/wp15> [Accessed 26 June 2013].
- UN, 2010. Shelter after disaster: strategies for transitional settlement and reconstruction. [pdf] *United Nations (UN)*. Available at: <<https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCsQFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sheltercluster.org%2FReferences%2FDocuments%2FShelter%2520After%2520Disaster%2520Guidelines%25202010.pdf&ei=RiQWUujWE-z84AOAt4DQDw&usg=AFQjCNEhtWkG4O2vZealxY36LmVWw23Tw&sig2=DhCr2WcQmlQwTZwaAgjQNg&bvm=bv.51156542,d.dmg>> [Accessed 18 July 2013].
- UN, 2013. Haiti: humanitarian action plan 2013. [pdf] *United Nations (UN)*. Available at: <https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDYQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fhaiti.humanitarianresponse.info%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2Fdocuments%2Ffiles%2FHAITI%2520HAP%25202013%2520MASTER.pdf&ei=FQ1zUYC7GsOvObv0gYgN&usg=AFQjCNGTZIDU_2piPzfGhf_PWY3Xwf-IVQ&sig2=t7NDzm6md-vqmJQ1RDE0zw&bvm=bv.45512109,d.ZWU> [Accessed 18 April 2013].
- UNOPS, 2011. Rebuilding Haiti: annual report 2011. [pdf] *UNOPS*. Available at: <http://www.unops.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Publications/LCO/haiti_twoyears_web.pdf> [Accessed 30 April 2013].
- VENRO, 2006 Linking relief, rehabilitation and development: Approaches and financing instruments to improve the transition between relief, rehabilitation and development co-operation. [pdf] *Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungs Organisationen e.V. (VENRO)*. Available at: <http://www.venro.org/fileadmin/Publikationen/Einzelveroeffentlichungen/Humanitaere_Hilfe/arbeitspapier_17_en.pdf> [Accessed 10 June 2013].

RESEARCH ETHICS FORM E1BE FOR STUDENTS ON TAUGHT COURSES

Please read the Guidance Notes at www.brookes.ac.uk/res/ethics/forms

Section A - You & your project

What is your name?

First name	Surname
Avery	Doninger

What is your student number?

1	2	0	7	8	4	2	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

What is your email address?

12078427@brookes.ac.uk

What is your supervisor's name?

First name	Surname
David	Sanderson

What is your supervisor's email address?

dsanderson@brookes.ac.uk

In which Department are you studying?

Architecture
 Planning
 REC

What course are you taking?

MA in Development & Emergency Practice

What is the topic area of your research?

shelter after disaster

On what kinds of topics will you be collecting data from the participants in the research?

Questions about their transitional shelter and whether or not they have or will upgrade it.

Section B - Your participants

What kind of participants will be involved in your research? (Please tick one – if more than one, then complete a separate form)

Professional/management group
 Members of the general public
 Vulnerable individuals

Briefly describe these participants

Haitian people who recieved + shelters after the 2010 earthquake

How many participants will be involved?

±90 Number of people

How will the participants be selected?

At random from beneficiary lists of NGOs who provided their + shelter.

Section C - Your data collection

When is your data collection likely to start?

D	D	M	M	Y	Y	Y	Y
0	1	0	7	2	0	1	3

What will be your method of data collection?

In-depth interviews
 Face-to-face surveys
 Direct observation
 Other, please specify

Telephone
 Email
 Post

What kind of data will you be collecting?

Quantitative/statistical/numerical
 Qualitative/written/text
 Images/drawings/maps

Will it be possible to avoid asking for personal data from the participants?

Yes No

Will it be possible to ensure the participants are not being deceived in any way?

Yes No

Will it be possible to ensure the participants remain completely anonymous?

Yes No

Will it be possible to ensure the participants do not suffer any negative consequences?

Yes No


Section D – Declaration

I declare that I will

- give all participants an information sheet conforming to university guidelines
- not contact any participant until my supervisor has approved my information sheet, research questions and methodology
- be sufficiently well-trained in necessary methods of data collection and analysis

Student signature

Date

 15/5/13


Supervisor signature

Date

 15/5/13

Module Leader signature

Date

 15/5/13

You may only start fieldwork when this form has been signed by your supervisor & your Module Leader

RESEARCH ETHICS FORM E1BE FOR STUDENTS ON TAUGHT COURSES

Please read the Guidance Notes at www.brookes.ac.uk/res/ethics/forms

Section A - You & your project

What is your name?

First name	Surname
Avery	Doninger

What is your student number?

1	2	0	7	8	4	2	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

What is your email address?

12078427@brookes.ac.uk

What is your supervisor's name?

First name	Surname
David	Sanderson

What is your supervisor's email address?

dsanderson@brookes.ac.uk

In which Department are you studying?

Architecture
 Planning
 REC

What course are you taking?

MA in Development & Emergency Practice

What is the topic area of your research?

shelter after disaster

On what kinds of topics will you be collecting data from the participants in the research?

transitional shelter in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake

Section B - Your participants

What kind of participants will be involved in your research? (Please tick one - if more than one, then complete a separate form)

Professional/management group
 Members of the general public
 Vulnerable individuals

Briefly describe these participants

key staff from NGOs who provided + shelter after the earthquake.

How many participants will be involved?

10 Number of people

How will the participants be selected?

based on involvement in + shelter programs, knowledge on topic, willingness to participate.

Section C - Your data collection

When is your data collection likely to start?

D	D	M	M	Y	Y	Y	Y
0	1	0	7	2	0	1	3

What will be your method of data collection?

In-depth interviews
 Face-to-face surveys
 Direct observation
 Other, please specify
 Telephone
 Email
 Post

What kind of data will you be collecting?

Quantitative/statistical/numerical
 Qualitative/written/text
 Images/drawings/maps

Will it be possible to avoid asking for personal data from the participants?

Yes No

Will it be possible to ensure the participants are not being deceived in any way?

Yes No

Will it be possible to ensure the participants remain completely anonymous?

Yes No

Will it be possible to ensure the participants do not suffer any negative consequences?

Yes No


Section D - Declaration

I declare that I will

- give all participants an information sheet conforming to university guidelines
- not contact any participant until my supervisor has approved my information sheet, research questions and methodology
- be sufficiently well-trained in necessary methods of data collection and analysis


Student signature

Date

 15/5/13


Supervisor signature

Date

 15/5/13

Module Leader signature

Date

 15/5/13

You may only start fieldwork when this form has been signed by your supervisor & your Module Leader

