

# **KNOWLEDGE & LOCALISATION**



## **NATIONAL NGOS IN PROTRACTED CONFLICT SETTINGS**

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# TO KNOW THAT WE KNOW WHAT WE KNOW, AND TO KNOW THAT WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW, THAT IS TRUE KNOWLEDGE.

NICOLAUS COPERNICUS

## I. ABSTRACT

As the localisation agenda gains traction within the humanitarian sector, this research turns to one of the most challenging of contexts, protracted conflict, and focusses on those who are increasingly charged with leading the humanitarian response to it within their own borders – National NGOs (NNGOs).

Within this study we explore the many barriers NNGOs face to playing a greater role in humanitarian response. The conceptual framework applied is that of knowledge, through the lens of which we focus on the comparative advantages that equip NNGOs for success, including their intimate knowledge of their own country, its inhabitants and their lived experiences.

This study asks how we can define, better value and leverage such knowledge, rather than reducing it to information to be used to adapt externally designed programmes and projects to the 'local context'. It reviews the current standing of such knowledge within the humanitarian sector, whilst also consulting knowledge theory and organisational learning discourse to ask how knowledge of national NGOs and their staff can be appraised and leveraged to serve them well for greater localisation. The research uses a pragmatic, mixed methods approach including an adapted systematic review and a survey of national and international practitioners via online questionnaire.

The results are shared over three chapters, Knowledge and Power, Knowledge and the Organisation and Knowledge and Operations. Findings include an overview of how power dynamics affect the way knowledge of national staff is subordinated in value, how power can enable NNGOs some otherwise absent agency through leverage and how power and language are intertwined and affect humanitarian operations. It also finds that knowledge is deconstructed through current approaches to capacity strengthening, identifies opportunities in mentorship and secondment to allow for multidirectional knowledge sharing, and looks at the possibility of knowledge management for greater organisational knowledge focus. Finally, it deconstructs successes of access, and how these are associated with risk, identity and networks, and also how knowledge could be better understood for humanitarian decision making.

Keywords: Humanitarianism, localisation, conflict, knowledge

## II. STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

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It is also dedicated to the idea of a future where the different types of knowledge that all actors hold are given the consideration and standing they deserve in humanitarian action for protracted conflict.

## V. LIST OF ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance	L/NGO	Local / National NGO
AWSD	Aid Worker Security Database	L2GP	Local 2 Global Protection
CAR	Central African Republic	LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
CBO	Community Based Organisation	MMA	Mixed Methodology Approach
CBPF	Country Based Pooled Fund	MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management	NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
CENDEP	Centre for Development and Emergency Practice	NEAR	Network for Empowered Aid Response
CSO	Civil Society Organisation	NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
CTK	Collective Tacit Knowledge	OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
DAC	Development Assistance Committee	OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation	OOSC	Out of school children
GB	Grand Bargain	SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
GBV	Gender-based violence	SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	RTK	Relational Tacit Knowledge
INGO	International NGO	UN	United Nations
INSO	International NGO safety Organisation	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
JTB	Justified True Belief	WEOG	Western European and Others Group
KM4DEV	Knowledge Management for Development	WHS	World Humanitarian Summit
KMS	Knowledge Management System		

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# CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 BACKGROUND & RATIONALE

According to the World Bank, in 2018 conflict situations drive over 80% of all humanitarian needs worldwide with the number of “global poor” living in conflict-affected states set to rise by 60% by 2030 (World Bank and UN, 2018). Today, conflicts are increasingly fought over many years and more frequently for socioeconomic reasons, rather than strategic ones. These are termed by Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin (1978) as “protracted”, lasting for long periods of time with fluctuations of intensity, variance in frequency of violent episodes and with a lack of a definable end. They note that protracted conflicts can be seen more as a process rather than as an event, and often only conclude through transformation or by dying down. The ICRC (2016) highlight that many protracted conflicts are characterised by fragmentation and mutation. They are also marked by internationalisation, even where conflicts are intrastate, and have a cumulative negative impact on the fragility of states. They affect services across all sectors, which degrade to the point of causing high levels of human suffering amidst casualties as a result of violence (ibid.).

This dissertation is an acknowledgement of the understudied role of national staff knowledge that creates the comparative advantages of NNGOs in protracted conflict settings. It uses this concept to appraise the resultant potential for these actors to take a greater lead in response, despite constraints placed upon them. More than this, it is an attempt to reconcile knowledge theory with practical humanitarianism and how this affects NGOs working in their own countries where conflict has become protracted. This will require synthesis of views on the concept of knowledge and its collection, leverage and dissemination through a review of the current literature, concepts and frameworks and a survey of current practitioner viewpoints, both international and national.

The impetus for writing around the subject of localisation came partly from my work last year in the southeast of Madagascar, where I provided operational support during the collapse of a long-standing partnership between an international NGO and their long-term NNGO ‘implementing partner’. Regrettably, after a decade of neglect and inequitable partnership, the relationship degraded to a point where it became untenable. The NNGO was not autonomous enough as an organisation to survive, despite being full of extremely capable and knowledgeable national staff members who were subsequently absorbed by the INGO. It was clear from my studies at CENDEP this year that many of the same issues that marred the

NNGO's development and the partnership itself also exist in the humanitarian sector, and crucially also within more complex settings, such as protracted conflict.

With the emergence of the localisation promises made in the form of the Grand Bargain following the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, I began to research into the practical implementation of localisation. What about the programming in hard to access, conflict-affected areas? Such situations are still characterised by inequitable partnership models in the form of remote programming and subcontracting agreements (Stoddard, Harmer and Czwaro, 2017) that, whilst allowing for delivery of immediate, lifesaving humanitarian aid in 'constrained' circumstances (Taylor et al., 2015), often reduce national NGOs (NNGOs) to implementors rather than furthering localisation (Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard, 2011). This results in increased transfer of risk (ibid.), dependence on a string of brief contracts with little overhead funding, and often neglects the incorporation of their specific knowledge into programmatic decisions.

The study is largely influenced by the action research being undertaken by CENDEP in relation to the topic in collaboration with Caritas Centrafrique (Piquard and Delft, 2018). Encouragement was given to explore the questions surrounding what we mean by local knowledge and how this shapes NNGO operations and ultimately localisation. The intention, therefore, is that this dissertation will not only partly fulfil the requirements for the award of the MA but may also prove useful in some way for this ongoing collaboration.

## **1.2 AIM**

The aim of this research is to identify and understand the specific types of knowledge held by national staff members of NNGOs and how this enables comparative advantages of such actors within protracted conflict. By doing so, it will also denote the barriers they face and whether such knowledge has a part to play for organisational development and the furtherment of the localisation agenda for such situations.

### **1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

RQ-1: What is the current recognition of the knowledge of national staff of NNGOs within the humanitarian sector, specifically in protracted conflict?

RQ-2: Do humanitarian practitioners think about national knowledge as separate from other concepts (such as capacity, contextual or technical knowledge)? If so, how?

RQ-3: What are the barriers (actual or perceived) that prevent greater understanding of local and national knowledge, its integration into programmatic design, and the humanitarian system in use within protracted conflicts?

RQ-4: How far can local and national knowledge form part of a push for localisation in a protracted conflict setting – i.e. how can this be operationalised?

### **1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY**

The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter one is a brief introduction to the topic and the motivations for its study. It also includes the aim and associated research questions. Chapter two provides an overview of the methodological approach, tools, analysis, limitations and ethical considerations for the study. Chapter three is a literature review to introduce the existing writing surrounding knowledge, humanitarianism and localisation, as well as key concepts that will be referred to throughout the following sections. The next three chapters (four, five, six) present the results and findings of the survey and systematic review, blended with discussion throughout. Chapter seven presents the overall conclusions to the study.

## CHAPTER 2 : METHODOLOGY AND CONSIDERATIONS

This chapter outlines the ontology, epistemology and approach that underpin this research, as well as the practical methods and tools that were used to complete it. It discusses their construction, sampling techniques and limitations. It also notes how the data collected were analysed, as well as limitations to the approach and the ethical implications.

### 2.1 METHODOLOGY

O'Leary (2017, p. 10) defines methodology as the “overarching, macro-level frameworks that offer principles of reasoning [and] provide both the strategies and grounding for the conduct of a study.” This includes ontology, “the study of what exists, and how things that exist are understood and categorized” (ibid.) and epistemology, the “beliefs about the nature of knowledge” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010, p. 5). When constructed and implemented together, these concepts are said to form what is called a ‘paradigm’ (Kuhn, 1970). Additionally, According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010, p. 99), the questions generated for a piece of research cannot be created or interpreted in a vacuum, but are directly related to the ontological and epistemological views of the author (noted in Chapter 1, Research Questions)

#### 2.1.1 ONTOLOGY & EPISTEMOLOGY: CRITICAL REALISM & CONSTRUCTIONISM

Traditionally, realism is the belief that there is a world that is objectively real, and which exists “independently of being perceived, or independently of our theories” (Phillips, 1987, p. 205). According to Walliman (2018), critical realism can be seen as reconciliatory since it notes that individual perspectives of the real world can be understood through interpretation. The implications of this for this study, influenced by Maxwell (2012), were that I approached this topic with the view that international ‘expatriate’ staff and national staff members understand reality differently, express it in different ways (and languages), and that individual interpretation of reality should be referenced in any conclusions drawn.

Crotty (1998) defines constructionism as the view that there is no such thing as ‘objective knowledge’. Rather, truth and meaning are created when we interact with the world. Constructionism highlights the differences between people, and how they engage with and understand the same phenomenon differently – but also how the observer and the event or phenomenon of study are partners in the “generation of meaning”. This is important to this study

since it acknowledges all interactions create a sense of flux for knowledge and belief, and that methods of interaction can influence findings.

### **APPROACH: PRAGMATISM**

To reflect this practical master's degree and the field of humanitarian action, this study will assume a pragmatic approach. Creswell (2014, p. 10) affirms that pragmatists are motivated by 2.1.2 "actions, situations, and consequences rather than antecedent conditions" and that instead of obsessing over methods, pragmatists rather look at what works and how solutions to problems can be achieved using the means that are necessary and available to answer the questions that drive the research. Patton (2002, pp. 71-2) advises that the pragmatic stance "means judging the quality of a study by its intended purposes, available resources, procedures followed, and results obtained, all within a particular context and for a specific audience." Here, that means achieving answers to the research questions as outlined in Chapter one through the methods discussed in the hope of creating useful understanding.

## **2.2 METHODS & TOOLS**

Regrettably, due to the focus on conflict. field based study was not possible due to the university's ethical and risk management policies which prohibit travel to areas deemed unsafe for travel by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In lieu of physical presence, I wanted to broaden my desk-based approach to attain a high level of engagement, albeit from afar. As such, I decided that mixed methods would achieve this. Morse and Niehaus (2009) explain mixed methods research as supplementing a first method with another to access other perspectives or parts of a phenomena and create a more complete study. Morse (2010) notes that it does not have to be cross-paradigmatic methods (i.e. quantitative and qualitative) but rather simply two or more methods of any kind. Mixed methods also allow for incorporation of additional perspectives, which honours the constructionist viewpoint taken above. Furthermore, pragmatism allows for multiple methods based on the requirements of the research question(s) (Goles and Hirschheim, 2000).

The methods used in this study were:

1. A Survey by online questionnaire to survey practitioners (both national and international) who are working or have worked in/with protracted conflict-affected states to provide contemporary perspectives on knowledge

2. An Adapted Systematic Review to systematically assess the relationship between knowledge, its management and humanitarian response in protracted conflict. This will provide academic/grey literature against which the data gained from the survey can be compared and contrasted, but will also constitute data in itself.

We will now look at each of the methods in turn to explain how they will be implemented and any limitations therein.

## SURVEY

A semi-structured questionnaire was used to form the second element of the study, aimed at adding a breadth of information and opinion to the depth that was gained through the systematic review.

## DESIGN

The questionnaire was designed using SurveyMonkey. Both closed and open questions were used to generate qualitative and quantitative data. Closed questions were made up of dichotomous (i.e. yes/no) questions, multiple choices and Likert scales. Open elements included comment boxes after each question to enable free flow text such as elaboration, disagreement or input of missing options. It was constituted of 20 questions, where the first was related to consent (opt-in), the next five were regarding professional history, and 14 content-based questions. The full questionnaire can be found in Appendix C. An information form was hosted online for all participants to access, with a link to it on the first page of the survey, provided in Appendix B.

## SAMPLE

The sample used was purposive since it involved identifying “cases with attributes of particular interest”, rather than typicality of the target population (Levine, 2001). The survey link was shared in two ways. Firstly, it was published on relevant social media groups on Facebook and LinkedIn, for example, “Fifty shades of aid” where participants have a link to “aid work”. A complete list of sites used is provided in Appendix D.

Secondly, professionals were contacted via email thanks to public contact lists contained on a site managed by UNOCHA, <http://humanitarian.id>. A total of 3,938 emails were sent to a ‘random’ sample of international and national practitioners who were listed as working or having worked in a conflict-affected area. This included staff of UN agencies, INGOs and NNGOs. Examples of contact lists available can be seen below in Figure 1.

NAME	TYPE	NUMBER OF CONTACTS
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	ORGANIZATION	1159 contacts
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	ORGANIZATION	1074 contacts
Afghanistan	OPERATION	1051 contacts
Iraq	OPERATION	942 contacts
Nigeria	OPERATION	881 contacts
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	ORGANIZATION	718 contacts
Democratic Republic of the Congo	OPERATION	697 contacts
Philippines	OPERATION	669 contacts
World Food Programme (WFP)	ORGANIZATION	667 contacts
Mali	OPERATION	625 contacts
Afghanistan: National Level Coordination	CO-ORDINATION HUB	514 contacts
International Organization for Migration (IOM)	ORGANIZATION	498 contacts
Save The Children (SC)	ORGANIZATION	416 contacts

Figure 1: Example of public contact lists contained within Humanitarian.id (UNOCHA, 2018)

A total of 368 responses were gained, of which 256 were complete. See Table 2 below for a complete breakdown of how responses were gained, as well as response and completion rate. The questionnaire contained disqualifying questions to make sure the respondents both consent and had relevant experience (i.e. have worked in a humanitarian capacity in a protracted conflict-affected setting); those who did not qualify were unable to continue. Responses were deemed complete if all mandatory questions were filled and these alone were included in the analysis.

Collector	Total Responses	Complete Responses	Response Rate	Completion Rate
Email	321	234	8.15%	72.90%
Link	47	22	-	46.81%
Total	368	256	-	69.56%

Table 1: Breakdown of replies by method of distribution, including response and completion rate

Table 2 shows a complete breakdown of respondents by category of working status, such as whether national or international and the type of organisation worked for:

Staff Type	Number	Percentage
National staff of an INGO	32	12.5%
International staff of an INGO	67	26.17%
<b>INGO staff total</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>38.67%</b>
National staff of a National NGO	5	1.95%
International staff of a National NGO	8	3.13%
<b>NNGO staff total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5.07%</b>
National staff of a UN Agency	50	19.53%
International staff of a UN Agency	86	33.59%
<b>UN Agency staff total</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>53.12%</b>
Other	8	3.13%
<b>National staff total combined</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>33.98%</b>
<b>International staff total combined</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>62.89%</b>
<b>Total Participants</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 2 : Breakdown of respondents by designation (national vs international) and current organisational affiliation by type

2.2.2 **ADAPTED SYSTEMATIC REVIEW**

A systematic review is a method of literature analysis that originated from the health and medical sectors (Higgins and Green, 2011). It is favoured within the international development and humanitarian sector to create evidence-based policy whilst ensuring rigour, transparency and replicability (Hagen-Zanker et al., 2012; van der Knaap et al., 2008). Since this systematic review only forms part of the methodology of the overall study, the protocol will be adapted to reflect its co-constructive role whilst attempting to be as replicable as possible by describing the methods for inclusion and evaluation below.

The “PICo” (Population, Interest, Context) framework below focusses the search terms and narrows the scope of the review to a specific conundrum (Waddington et al., 2012):

Population	Interest	Context
NNGOs and related actors	Knowledge for organisational development and localisation	Humanitarian response to protracted conflict settings

Table 3 : PICo framework used to guide the adapted systematic review



Internet search engines, organisation websites and academic databases were searched. These included, but were not be limited to, Google, Google Scholar, Brookes DISCOVER, the Humanitarian Library, ReliefWeb and ALNAP.

The main search string was: 'Localisation OR Localization AND humanitarian AND conflict AND knowledge OR capacity AND strengthening OR development OR building AND "NNGO"

Inclusion and exclusion were formed by decision such as:

- Whether there was mention of knowledge use where the focus was on conflict rather than other contexts, such as natural disaster or epidemic, or where conflict formed a significant part of a studied protracted crisis.
- Where national organisational development was mentioned within the context of humanitarian action in conflict, with clear links to localisation or issues surrounding humanitarian architecture status quo.
- When there was no mention of conflict, documents were excluded, as were those with mentions of knowledge but in disciplines not related to humanitarian action, or without significant implication for the topic.
- Since the research does not solely consist of scientific or academic data but also grey literature, no limiting criteria was placed on the methodological choices of the reports included, though they were scrutinised where appropriate.
- Documents were also assessed for reputability of producer and age, and inclusion of reports predating the modern humanitarian system (pre-2000) were rare.

## SAMPLE

A total of 351 sources were returned matching the search terms above. From these, 178 were selected for review as per the inclusion/exclusion criteria. Of these, 23 were eventually included as per above procedures.

## QUALITY ASSESSMENT & LIMITATIONS

Due to the diversity of the sources used, it was not possible to evaluate each included source document for effectiveness or quality using the same metrics. Additionally, due to time constraints, the review will not be as rigorous as if it were the sole method of research.

Hagen-Zanker et al. (2012) note that systematic reviews can be challenging for humanitarian actors in various ways:

- Bias in selection of sources – unintentional or intentional exclusion due to repository biases (i.e. using ALNAP’s curated collection, or Google Scholar’s indexing ). This was mitigated by use of several search methods.
- Subjectivity in screening – creation of the inclusion criteria by one researcher, and possible subjective interpretation. This was mitigated by stating the inclusion criteria above, as well as an honest and fair roll out during the research process.

## 2.3 ANALYSIS

### QUALITATIVE (QUESTIONNAIRE OPEN RESPONSES AND ADAPTED SYSTEMATIC REVIEW):

There was a large amount of qualitative data to support, explain and provide nuance to the numerical data. Analysis of the qualitative questionnaire data was completed concurrently with the analysis of the adapted systematic review, and thus each informed the other in order to co-create themes. This meant “a constant interplay between collection and analysis that produces a gradual growth of understanding” (Walliman, 2006, p. 129).

Earlier stages of analysis were (whilst concurrent) separated by method. That is, comments from the questionnaire were exported from SurveyMonkey into an Excel spreadsheet where they were cleaned and coded. During the adapted systematic review, quotations were collected into a similar document and coding followed a similar structure. They were then compared and contrasted, which formed the basis for coding and theme creation, which borrowed elements from grounded theory’s axial coding (Corbin and Strauss, 1990) and thematic network analysis (Attride-Stirling, 2001) – moving from individual (more literal) codes to grouping them to form categories that are then recognised to be interlinked themes, which then in turn form more abstract themes that are considered “global” i.e. knowledge and power (Chapter 4), knowledge and the organisation (Chapter 5), and knowledge and operations (Chapter 6).

An example of such coding and theme creation is given below in Figure 2, though this is only illustrative and does not reflect the entire complexity of the process.




Figure 2 : An illustrative example of coding strategy used in analysis in order to construct themes and chapters

#### QUANTITATIVE (QUESTIONNAIRE DATA):

SurveyMonkey provides some level of data analysis, such as production of percentages. Download of raw data allowed analysis in Microsoft Excel for conversion of numerical data to graphs and charts. Data was ordinal, and so precluded the use of any parametric testing, but was used to supplement the results and findings chapters where it proved illuminating and the question topics aligned with the themes being discussed.

## 2.4 ETHICS

As shown by the ethics approval form in Appendix A this research has been reviewed and complies with the university processes for ethical research as set out by the University Research Ethics Committee (UREC). All aspects comply with the 'do no harm' (informed consent, assurance and preservation of anonymity and confidentiality) and 'do good' principles (the study will be shared with participants where requested). Information sheet is included in Appendix B, consent was gained as part of the questionnaire contained in Appendix C. Within this document, all identifying information has been removed from respondents where they are referred to in order to ensure anonymity. They are denoted by "R" plus an assigned number.

## 2.5 LIMITATIONS

- General

As mentioned earlier, access is a major limitation to this research. This is to be expected since we are discussing protracted, violent conflict situations. This meant that the design of the study had to be altered and to desk-based, which as mentioned earlier is not ideal for gaining valid perspectives or interactivity. Additional limitations include the time limits of the module and word count, though this was partially mitigated for by adjustment of scope, research aims and questions. Unexpected circumstances during the research phase, as well as a higher volume of data than expected gained from the first two methods also meant that a third aspect to the study, interviews with staff of Caritas Centrafrique, were not able to be conducted. These would have added a more tangible aspect to the study and would be included were the dissertation to be repeated.

- Survey

The survey was intentionally limited in the time it was live online, a total of seven days to allow time to adequately analyse responses. Originally it was hoped to gain around 100 responses, but this was exceeded and so the time was not extended. Unfortunately, the ratio of international respondents to national was almost 2:1, which denotes an uneven representation of the humanitarian aid worker population, and notably an underrepresentation of national staff of NNGOs. This could be due to the fact it was only available online, and only available in English language, but also due to the methods of sampling used. Further, whilst every effort was made to simplify language as far as possible, some terminology was unavoidable. In retrospect it would have been beneficial to provide a glossary – though this may have impacted on the answers.

- Adapted Systematic Review

Rather than reaching a saturation limit, the scope of the systematic review was limited due to time and was therefore not exhaustive. Inclusion of a greater number of sources would have been beneficial, although certainly the canon of research that is applicable to this topic is currently limited. Further, since it was a co-constructive method, it was limited in its rigour. Had it been the sole feature of the study, then potentially it could have been more stringent, evaluative and critical of the methods used for the studies and papers included.

## CHAPTER 3 : CONTEXTUALISING THE PROBLEM

In this chapter, a general literature review (non-systematic) will enable us to delineate the key concepts, their current mention within academic discourse and the humanitarian sector, as well as their interaction.

### 3.1 LOCALISATION

In the first decade of the new millennium, there was a growing acknowledgement of the important role of national and local NGOs in humanitarian action, however alongside this a realisation that the humanitarian system was not reflecting this operationally or financially. Local and national staff were recognised as having “specific knowledge, language and communication skills” that would allow for faster, more accurate and (crucially) cheaper programme delivery – but to capitalise on this would require dramatic change to the way things were being done, including funding arrangements (MacRae, 2008). According to the Global Humanitarian Assistance Report of 2015, only 0.2% of tracked funding was given directly to national and local NGOs – a decrease of 50% from 2012 (Swithern, 2015).

The 2015 State of the Humanitarian System report Taylor et al. (2015, p. 14) echoed sector-wide outcries for reform to ensure that “the humanitarian system [...] engage better with local leadership and civil society where that capacity exists, help build it where it does not, and bypass it when necessary to save lives”. Some of these hopes were reflected in a report by the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing to the Secretary-General of the UN (2015). It proposed a “Grand Bargain” (GB) acknowledging that:

“National and local responders [...] are often the first to respond to crises, remaining in the communities they serve before, after and during emergencies. We are committed to making principled humanitarian action as local as possible and as international as necessary recognising that international humanitarian actors play a vital role particularly in situations of armed conflict. We engage with local and national responders in a spirit of partnership and aim to reinforce rather than replace local and national capacities.” (Grand Bargain Facilitation Group, 2016, p. 5, emphasis added)

The GB was originally framed as a deal between donors and implementing organisations to change the status quo. The idea was for donors to become more flexible in their award of grants, and for implementors to be more cost-effective and transparent in return. A specific

workstream for localisation was created, headed by the IFRC and the Government of Switzerland, which solidified the commitments of aid agencies and donor organisations. Unfortunately it has seen little achievement since its inception; signatories have thus far focussed mainly on debating the definition of the terms contained within the commitments, including which organisations constitute ‘local and national responders’, or what the phrase “as directly as possible”, since it refers to a financing goal of directing 25% of funding to local and national actors (Metcalf-Hough et al., 2018). The Network for Empowered Aid Response (NEAR) has stated that following a transparent and fair negotiation process, the agreed definitions were then changed without consultation (NEAR, 2017; 2018), suggesting that the process has derailed somewhat from its original intended, inclusive purpose.

In a report commissioned by the Disaster and Emergencies Preparedness Programme, the authors Van Brabant and Patel (2018) summarise the localisation agenda in their ‘seven dimensions of localisation framework’.

FUNDING	PARTNERSHIPS	CAPACITY	PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION	COORDINATION MECHANISMS	VISIBILITY	POLICY
25% As directly as possible Better quality	Less sub contracting More equitable relationships	Institutional development Stop undermining local capacity	Participation of crisis affected communities Inclusion: Gender, age, disability.	National actors have greater presence and influence	Roles, results and innovations by national actors	National actors greater presence and influence in international policy debates

Figure 3 : Seven dimensions of localisation framework (Van Brabant and Patel, 2018)

This shows the main areas where localisation is needed on an operational level, with indicators given below each. Aspects that are considered contextual are not included, and thus there is no reference to whether such indicators are relevant to conflict situations.

**LOCALISATION IN CONFLICT**

There is a noticeable lack of differentiation in the localisation agenda regarding type of crisis at hand, and there is often no distinction made between natural disaster scenarios and conflict. It is referenced within the Grand Bargain quotation above, however to address the perceived incompatibility with principled humanitarianism. McGoldrick of the ICRC notes that situations of armed conflict bring specific concerns for localisation, including local actors’ adherence to humanitarian principles (especially neutrality) and potential negative effects on protection (McGoldrick, 2015; McGoldrick, 2016). A report by Trócaire (2017) however, recognises that some of the strengths local and national NGOs are admired for are due to their strong links with local communities and authorities – which is also why they may be

perceived as partial or not neutral. They argue that how the humanitarian principles are understood may in fact need to be revisited for localisation situations of conflict – could, for instance, INGOs partner with a range of NNGOs do not comply with principles in differing ways in order to achieve overall neutrality and impartiality? Such concerns are not present in, for example, the humanitarian landscape following a natural disaster. Schenkenberg (2016) of MSF argues that confronted with an insecure environment, difficulties for maintaining the level of service provision for affected populations are compounded by the fact that protracted conflict situations also have a direct and prolonged effect on local actors which inhibit their ability to potentially take on more responsibility, which again may not be true for natural disasters or epidemics in the way that it is for conflict.

An additional reality of localisation in conflict, especially protracted and violent situations, is that the insecurity of a context can often demand it as a risk management technique, rather than it being an altruistic endeavour such as that framed by the localisation agenda. Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard (2011) note that rather than a tactic of risk aversion, localisation via means of remote management programming or subcontracting offers a last resort risk management strategy for INGOs that is an alternative to extreme ‘bunkerisation’ or complete withdrawal. These terms mean either maintaining a contingent of national staff at the field level with removal of expatriates, or complete evacuation but engaging the services of an NNGO as an implementing partner allowing vital programmes to continue (Van Brabant, 2000). Regrettably, whilst in many situations remote management or subcontracting arrangements are unavoidable, it has also emerged that such modalities have also become a more elective practice amongst INGOs that could do more in order to stay and engage in fuller partnerships with civil society actors (UN OCHA, 2017).

### **3.2 KNOWLEDGE**

Within the initial GB report, it is claimed that localisation initiatives will “help strengthen the capacities of national NGOs and assist in channelling funding and knowledge [to them] so they can contribute to improved responses, preparedness, and early warning initiatives” (High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, 2015, p. 19). Whilst it is true that the flow of funds will remain one directional, to say this of knowledge lacks recognition that locally held knowledge can contribute to improving response. It also propagates the status quo of the international humanitarian system as one of “giver[s] of assistance motivated by charity” (Gibbons et al., 2018).

Rather paradoxically, on one hand conforming to the international humanitarian system is seen as the key to ‘allowing’ NNGOs to participate in the sector, but on the other there is also the widely accepted concept that local and national actors are the first responders, ‘know the context’, respond quicker, access populations better, stay longer and better link humanitarian action with development (Swithern, 2015, p. 74). It is therefore surprising that there not more of a focus on how the existing knowledge that NNGOs have allow them to accomplish such feats, as well as how this can be complimented by the transfer of international, technical knowledge where necessary. The problem may be that often we confound the concepts of information and knowledge, as well as the types of knowledge we are dealing with in a humanitarian context.

### DEFINING KNOWLEDGE

3.2.1 Nonaka (1994) defines information as the “flow of messages” whereas knowledge is “created and organized by the very flow of information, anchored on the commitment and beliefs of its holder”. Within this definition, information is something passive that can be easily transferred, and is not influenced by the knower. He contrasts this with interaction, which “emphasizes an essential aspect of knowledge that relates to human action”. This active part of knowledge is vital – that we can perceive someone as having knowledge or being knowledgeable through their actions, which cannot be said of systems (ibid.). Davenport et al. (1998) define the difference as the following:




Figure 4 : Data, Information and Knowledge (adapted from Davenport et al., 1998)

Interestingly, the authors also contest that these categories are also not static – data can be transformed into information and then knowledge, but knowledge can also move down the chain to become data once again through “de-knowledging” (ibid.). This is the process whereby



aspects of knowledge are stripped away, or meaning is lost. This can be due to the transfer process, an overload of knowledge that becomes non-sensical, misinterpretation or a loss of persons key to decoding it. This fluidity is especially pertinent for NNGOs in conflict settings, as will be seen. Knowledge itself has been contemplated since the ancient era, but still an agreed definition still eludes philosophers. In *Theaetetus*, Plato offers that is it in fact “justified true belief” (JTB) (Plato, 1987). This is often called:

1. Propositional knowledge (to know *that* something)

e.g. “I know that a certain armed group is acting to gain control of a certain area due to the natural resources that are located there. This may help us to understand the conflict better”.

However, modern epistemologists recognised two further types of knowledge that are important to bear in mind:

2. Ability knowledge (to know *how* to do something)

e.g. “I know how to negotiate with the leader of a village in such a way. This may help to secure access for our operations”

3. Acquaintance knowledge (to know some *thing*, some *one*, or some *place* through direct, sensory contact)

e.g. “I know the controlled town since I have lived there. As such I can draw a map and explain the intricacies of the local culture, lived history and persons of importance”

(Russell, 1917; Ryle, 1945, examples fictional and author's own)

When we discuss the knowledge that local and national humanitarian actors hold, it is often all these that we refer to – yet distinction is infrequently made. This may be because such knowledge is not always evident, or explicit.

### TACIT KNOWLEDGE

Polanyi states that there is a ‘tacit’ element to knowledge that is ‘ineffable’; personal knowledge that we cannot accurately articulate to the extent that would be necessary to convey it completely. He gives examples of knowing how to ride a bicycle or recognise one’s coat – both of which can be done with relative ease, but one cannot explain how (Polanyi, 1958). Collins (2010, p. 149) refutes Polanyi’s concept of “personal knowledge”, however, as too mythical or magical; rather, he believes that it is better explained as the process of making good

judgements which is closely associated with having “stores of tacit knowledge”. Tacit knowledge has been discussed across multiple disciplines; it forms part of business studies literature for organisational development, and even computer science literature for emerging research surrounding artificial intelligence (Fenstermacher, 2005). Stiglitz (2003) hypothesises that it can be placed on a matrix, with two axes: 1) general to local, 2) codified (explicit) to implicit (tacit), adding a geographical dimension:

	Codified knowledge	Tacit knowledge
General knowledge	Global public goods. Generally applicable and ‘downloadable,’ i.e., can be transferred by conventional vertical teaching methods—but ‘rediscovery’ improves ownership.	General tacit knowledge (e.g., implicit grammatical rules of English) could be learned by horizontal methods (e.g., natural language learning) or might be (partly) codified and taught.
Local knowledge	Localised explicit knowledge. Even if hypothetically available from center, should be locally ‘reinvented’ to have ownership	‘The hard stuff.’ Combines horizontal learning and local reinvention.

Figure 5 : Knowledge matrix originally by Joseph Stiglitz, originally appears in Stone et al. (2000)

Humanitarian intervention often requires the entire spectrum of knowledge types above to construct effective response mechanisms. Here, general (or global) codified knowledge would be the technical humanitarian knowledge required for successful technical interventions i.e. those that that rely on STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) expertise. Local tacit knowledge may be intricate cultural mores, understanding of hierarchical leadership dynamics and associated behaviours steeped in history that are required to navigate complex social structures and act in accordance with etiquette.

Collins (2010) breaks tacit knowledge into three levels, two of which are important here:

1. Collective Tacit Knowledge (CTK)

CTK is the idea that knowledge can only be acquired by “being embedded in society”, and “is a property of society rather than the individual”. This is relevant to local knowledge of national staff since this type of knowledge is something that is unique to a specific group of people (i.e. those of a specific nationality, region or locality) and not a property of those who visit (i.e. international aid workers). This shares similarities with the work of Nonaka (1994) in organisational learning theory, where organisations as a collection of people have a reserve of knowledge that staff members (the populous) can draw upon when making decisions. He states

that staff may not be aware that they are doing so, or even able to differentiate between their own personal knowledge and the organisational knowledge that they draw upon.

## 2. Relational Tacit Knowledge (RTK)

RTK is also important since it is a type of weak tacit knowledge that is kept hidden but can be shared. It encompasses deliberate secrecy that arises out of the dynamics of relationships, but also accidental secrecy either due to not knowing that you know something or due to a failure to understand the need of another party to know (potentially due to misunderstanding or language) (Collins, 2010). This type of knowledge is alluded to where discussion of humanitarian terminology or jargon comes to the fore, such that language is a barrier that creates a situation of RTK through a lack of understanding or an inability to accurately describe such knowledge.

### KNOWLEDGE AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION

3.2.3 Knowledge is not well discussed or defined within humanitarian action, but more so within development. During the 1980s there was a growing conscientisation of the need to better involve affected populations and civil society with development interventions by writers such as Chambers (1983) in order to mitigate for negative effects and avoid paternalism. With the 1990s came a focus more on rights-based approaches (Fiori et al., 2016) and a participation revolution that transformed beneficiaries into 'rights-holders' and those working in development into 'duty-bearers'. With this came a greater recognition of agency and knowledge that is held by the people that are experiencing a crisis.

The UN FAO (United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation) defines 'local knowledge' as:

“a collection of facts [that] relates to the entire system of concepts, beliefs and perceptions that people hold about the world around them. This includes the way people observe and measure their surroundings, how they solve problems and validate new information. It includes the processes whereby knowledge is generated, stored, applied and transmitted to others.” (FAO, 2005, p. 7)

The agency differentiates this from traditional knowledge, which is associated with persons living in cultures untouched by and isolated from other knowledge systems, and indigenous knowledge, that which is associated with persons indigenous to an area (ibid.). Recently, indigenous knowledge has been increasingly incorporated into disaster response programming, including for disaster risk reduction and preparedness initiatives. Tanner (2016) summarises that “in many disaster-prone contexts, local people communicate about how to

predict and mitigate disasters using local stories and folklore”, but once again, her report lacks mention of any indigenous cultural practices or knowledge forms related to conflict.

Repositories of information relating to localisation which touch on conflict also rarely mention knowledge; for example, the Local2Global Protection initiative conducted a literature review where knowledge was only mentioned within the frame of capacity building. This is odd, since knowledge, and arguably local knowledge, is needed at every stage of a humanitarian intervention in protracted conflict. King (2005) divides the knowledge needs into four categories, as shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6 : Basic categories of humanitarian information needs and associated questions (King, 2005)

King (ibid.) notes that background and situational knowledge are most often needed by all actors in the response to an emergency, whereas operational knowledge needs vary by actor. Tanner (2016, p. 10) note that local and national actors are extremely adept at providing situational knowledge, which can be “extremely dispersed across individuals, households, community leaders and other key local actors.” Such knowledge is constantly in flux and will require constant monitoring and assessment, whereas background knowledge is more static. National staff may be able to provide some of this knowledge too, especially where it is needed for areas they are familiar with. Tanner (ibid., p. 11) note that operational knowledge can also be derived from national actors where they can advise on practical issues such as “local methods of construction, materials, health risks and protection concerns”. Finally, analytical (or functional) knowledge is more tacit, or abstract, and can be experiential and help to inform

strategic decisions. This is often where the knowledge of national staff members is less likely to be considered.

### KNOWLEDGE AND PROTRACTED CONFLICT

3.2.4 Since protracted conflict situations are often marked by a gradual degradation of infrastructure, this includes education establishments, i.e. primary and secondary schools, as well as higher education. UNESCO (2011) note that conflicts occurring in low-income countries last on average 11 years and up to 22 years in low-middle income countries, and that an increasingly large percentage of the world's out of school children (OOSC) are found in conflict-affected states. The EFA Global Monitoring Report by (UNESCO, 2015) found the percentage of OOSC living in conflict-affected countries from rose 30% in 1999 to 36% in 2012, and within conflict-affected countries, the proportion of the school-age population deemed OOSC rose from 42% in 2008 to 50% in 2011 (Martinez, 2013).

Conflict also seems to worsen gender parity in education, for example in Chad and the CAR around half as many girls were in education as boys in 2012 (UNESCO, 2015). Conflict situations can also reduce the number of teachers available, for example in South Sudan, Chad and the CAR, the ratio of trained teachers to the number of pupils was higher than 100:1 (ibid.). Whilst we cannot treat access to education more in-depth within this discussion, issues affecting access to education are numerous and the lack of said access severely impacts on individual development. Furthermore, physical development can be affected during conflict due to secondary effects. Whilst undernutrition and hunger (resulting in malnourished infants, and stunted growth) have complex causation, there is evidence to support that conflict can lead to comparatively high levels (von Grebmer et al., 2015).

This, in combination with a decrease in the stability of family environment, results in a disruption to the "skill formation process" and therefore labour market outcomes as shown in Figure 7 below:

# CONFLICT



Disrupts the **skill formation process** by affecting familial and social environments, and the health care and school systems




Figure 7 : Skill Formation Process over the Lifecycle (World Bank and UN, 2018)

Such skills deficits, though varying by context, are likely to be somewhat reflected in the staff pool of NNGOs, which can contribute to perceptions and preconceptions of the lack of knowledge by international actors. As a result, recognising different types of knowledge and alternative ways of capturing and reinforcing them is important within protracted conflict.

This will be mentioned in the following chapters where the results and findings are presented alongside the discussion.

## CHAPTER 4 : KNOWLEDGE AND POWER

This is the first chapter of three focussed on blending the findings of both the survey and systematic review with discussion on three broad themes and smaller sub-topics under each. Here, we discuss issues relating to power, how it manifests and how it affects how knowledge of national staff members of NNGOs is received and relayed within the wider humanitarian system.

### 4.1 VALUING KNOWLEDGE

According to Foucault, knowledge and power are not simply equivalent, but are interconnected as “pouvoir/savoir”; that there are “relations of power which pass via knowledge and which [...] lead one to consider forms of domination designated by such notions as field, region and territory” (Foucault and Gordon, 1980, p. 69). Further, he asserted that “there is no point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power” (Foucault, Sheridan and Smith, 1995, p. 52). Such a reality emerged from the open responses to the survey. Codes and basic themes relating to power at were alluded to in over 30% of the comments across all questions regarding the value of local knowledge (or lack thereof) by international actors and the humanitarian system at large. A pervasive belief amongst respondents seemed to be that local knowledge is viewed as inferior when compared with international humanitarian knowledge, or rather that which is technical or thematic.

Morreira (2016, p. 11) argues that although colonialism as a period is over, “coloniality” is still alive and well, and that “the underlying hierarchising logic that places peoples and knowledges into a classificatory framework (such that the European is valorised) is still very much with us.” Further, she equates modernity with “the creation and maintenance of the kind of knowledge and ways of being in the world that are considered legitimate” (ibid.). This legitimacy is a true barrier, since humanitarianism is currently affixed on scientific, or evidence-based knowledge and assessment of legitimacy by criteria that are derived by Western European and Other Groups (WEOG). Akpan (2011) suggests that reflective of such a value differential, even the focus on ‘local’ knowledge is belittling and naming it such sets it apart from scientific knowledge, creating a false dichotomy with the ‘international’ or global. Rather, he argues, since both concepts are socially constructed, the two are not opposites and therefore not mutually exclusive as usage would suggest. Furthermore, this ‘othering’ only serves to perpetuate the status of local as the lesser.

R41 agrees with Akpan’s appraisal above, stating that even the term “local” has, in some cultures, become a derogatory word that is “undermining to skills and capacity”, rather than being terminology associated with geographic provenance. There is also a bitter sense in such responses that anything deemed to be “local” insights distrust from international actors, who are assumed to think that “they know it all and their systems are the best since they are internationally recognised” (R50). Respondents thus note that such hierarchising also affects the ways in which local knowledge is appraised and worked with. R36 argues that local knowledge is often assessed “through the lenses and paradigms that international actors prefer” and that at best this means that local knowledge becomes invisible, and at worst it is obstructed, or knowledge bearers disenfranchised.

In total, a minority of respondents that thought that existing knowledge of national staff of NNGOs is currently sufficiently valued, whilst half agreed that it was somewhat valued and one third stated that it was not valued enough.




Figure 8 : Radar chart showing responses by staff type relating to a three-point scale appraisal of how far existing knowledge of national staff of national NGOs is valued by international actors

Interestingly, national staff (of UN agencies, INGOs and NNGOs) were less likely to say that the existing knowledge is not valued enough, compared to international staff members. The



inverse was true of the 'sufficiently valued' category too, suggesting that this may be an area where perspectives are not aligned, and greater research into comparative value systems surrounding knowledge would be beneficial.

Shepherd (2015, p. 3) investigates the representations of civil society by UN agencies involved in peace building discourse in conflict-affected states, noting that "local knowledge is at once valued (in the process of extraction) and yet subordinated". This similarities with how the knowledge of CSOs and NNGOs is approached in humanitarian action, highlighting that even when there is recognition of the value of local knowledge and perspective, if the process is one of simply accessing and codifying it as information rather than listening to national and local actors' views or inviting meaningful participation, it is still devalued. She poignantly observes that "books are consulted; people are involved" (ibid., p. 9). Reflecting on the larger agenda, one respondent argues that despite localisation commitments there has not been any concrete progress, and that this is because the entire agenda is "determinate on the mindset of the sector, which is currently northern-led and Eurocentric in nature." (R72).

Obrecht (2014) summarises the hierarchical mentality behind some of the above points quite well in stating that we often assume the humanitarian system is a global panacea to which the 'local' must be "made to fit". National actors are seen as "potentially underused 'local' resources" that need to be brought up to speed and to conform to international standards in order to be legitimised and to operate correctly in their own society. This reflects the way capacity strengthening activities are often framed, which will be discussed in a later section.

## 4.2 LEVERAGE

Whilst it seems that 'local' knowledge may not currently enjoy the same status as international, technical knowledge on the humanitarian stage, that does not mean to say that it is not inherently valuable. As mentioned previously, "contextual knowledge" is sought after – so where knowledge is power, NNGOs are in a position of leverage. Howe, Stites and Chudacoff (2015) assert that "local context and knowledge of the pre-crisis situation is critical in shaping responsive, appropriate, and therefore impactful and effective interventions" and partnerships with local and national NGOs can mean better transition throughout the emergency response cycle and into the future. R164 notes that "existence of locally capable staff is needed by all for functional reasons, too, such as for translation services, understanding local bureaucracy, community liaison and ensuring low cost local procurement."

Participants have evidently experienced instances where NNGOs have used their knowledge and related capacities as leverage for a stronger position. When asked whether knowledge sharing and management for NNGOs could open possibilities for greater localisation, R25 noted:

“It's up to them to divulge [such knowledge] - it's not because we decide in a survey that it's important that they're going to share it. National staff and national NGOs use their local knowledge to assert some limited control over INGOs - this gives them agency they otherwise don't have. Don't expect them to hand it over easily (but they'll certainly go through the theatre of "knowledge sharing" - just not the stuff you really need to know).”

This shows a somewhat jaded view of cooperation and partnerships with NNGOs, yet also acknowledges an understandable use of knowledge as tantamount to a bargaining chip where otherwise NNGOs may be in a weaker position. This places the responsibility firmly with national staff and NNGOs as withholding, rather than examining the power structures and systems in place to better enable sharing. Where withholding of knowledge is deliberate, this constitutes RTK, since the knowledge is tacit due to social structures that prevent sharing where it would otherwise be possible. R154 notes that if NNGOs were “empowered enough to gather, analyse and share knowledge” then this could significantly boost their ability to contribute to the humanitarian system and create agile programming at vital points in a response.

Ó Súilleabháin (2015, p. 51) recommends that local knowledge should not simply be used as “a passive source of input for project design or conflict assessment”, but rather as an “existing source of capacity and an ongoing resource”. More of this kind of recognition, by both the NNGOs themselves and international actors could shift the power dynamic in a meaningful way and lead to a system that capitalises on existing knowledge to create responses that are not transplanted and tailored from other contexts. It may not, however, just be a case of adjusting the power differential, but could be an issue to do with the methods used to engage national actors, or levels of trust. As R25 notes, “It's hard to get access to this knowledge - because it requires trust to be built up over time”

### 4.3 LANGUAGE

Apart from where it is deliberate, knowledge can also remain “relationally” tacit if we do not have the means to communicate it (or code it) so that it can be understood by another party, as posited by Collins (2010) in his concept of RTK. According to respondents, language can both be a key to greater integration and a prohibitive factor for NNGOs, both in terms of sharing their own existing knowledge and accessing that of the sector.

61% of respondents regarded the terminology used in the humanitarian sector to be either a significant obstacle or somewhat of an obstacle for NNGOs to express their existing knowledge. R234 linked language to previous points surrounding power and coloniality stating that it is “just another form of colonization”. Language can also be construed as power or a form of control since accepted languages, dialects and terminology dictate how one is perceived, locates a speaker’s position within a social structure and either grants or restricts access to fora (Bourdieu et al., 1991).

Certainly, local and national staff who do not speak UN languages may be unable to communicate their knowledge without the use of an interpreter, which then raises issues of re-coding of knowledge and the loss of nuance therein. R150 notes that words and terms can carry different meaning, or not exist at all in local languages, and that attempting to implement projects with terms (such as resilience) can consequently lead to different results.

Within responses there was a general rejection of the use of overly technical language, or “jargon”. R25 stated that

“a good INGO worker doesn't use jargon. Crap ones do (insecurity). Good local NGOs don't know jargon, because they're busy working delivering services. Never trust a local NGO that knows the jargon.”

This shows an opinion that whether national or international, the use of jargon is often unhelpful – but also, controversially, that the respondent felt that where national/local NGOs are engaged in implementation, they should not be apprised of terminology of the sector for fear of losing focus on delivery. R115, however, disagreed and felt equally clearly that national staff of national NGOs should be well versed in terminology, regardless of language spoken:

“Professionals should know what they want to work in. I would not trust a doctor who did not know what a scalpel is just like I wouldn't trust an aid worker who wasn't clear on 'indicators.' Whatever the language.”

Language can therefore also be the key to opportunities through where learning terminology equates to being better able to converse with other professionals in the sector. R213 notes that the ability to apply for international funding is dependent on “the use and understanding certain terminology”. If learnt, this can unlock funds or partnerships which would otherwise be out of reach. R26, however, notes that this is unfair, since NNGOs may have the capacity on the group, but not the “logframe language” to submit good proposals.

Language can also be a barrier when it comes to learning new information. R94 notes that “large technical documents which are in English with little background are prohibitive to national NGOs” and that this is one means by which NNGOs are locked out of gaining new forms of humanitarian knowledge. R100 notes that additionally there are “constant developments, SOPs and advances in humanitarian practice” decided at the headquarters level that are distributed via the internet which NNGOs are unable to access. Here, the use of the internet (although technically a medium) may indeed constitute a ‘language’ by which knowledge can or cannot be accessed. R100 notes that this affects dissemination of concepts, since working in deep field sites it took them over five years to know and understand “accountability”.

#### CHAPTER 4 KEY FINDINGS

- Power dynamics of the sector are also reflected in the value assigned to knowledge held by national staff, whereby international, technical or thematic knowledge is valued above others.
- Where knowledge is equal to power, the knowledge of national staff can constitute leverage for NNGOs to increase their agency – though this is controversial
- Power is also manifested through language where it inhibits the transfer of national knowledge to international actors, and also prevents national staff incorporating sector level learning into their knowledge canon.

# CHAPTER 5 : KNOWLEDGE AND THE ORGANISATION

This section focusses on the findings and discussion relating to how knowledge inside of NNGOs is dealt with internally, as well as how it is affected by other actors, including in issues of human resource management such as attrition, capacity strengthening initiatives and knowledge management.

## 5.1 DE-KNOWLEDGING VIA ATTRITION

Once recognition of knowledge within an organisation occurs, importance is placed on nurturing it and leveraging it towards organisational development, as well as ensuring that it is put to good use during operations. This can take many forms, but most involve the staff themselves as owners of such knowledge. The loss of staff (and therefore their knowledge) appeared to be a substantial issue mentioned in both the systematic review and in the responses to the questionnaire. There was a clear suggestion of a self-perpetuating cycle that leads to loss of knowledgeable individuals and institutional knowledge for NNGOs across contexts. This is alluding to what Ignatieff (2010) labelled “capacity sucking out” and though this is not specific to protracted conflict, it is certainly an aspect of it according to the data.




Figure 9 : Cycle of organisational knowledge loss via staff attrition

Six separate respondents mentioned the cycle detailed above in Figure 10 over multiple questions, suggesting it may be a root cause for the chronic lack of sustained organisational knowledge in NNGOs working in conflict-affected states, and one not without cause by the international community. Words such as “poaching” (R27) and “stealing” (R32) were invoked, alongside much lamentation that the problem is perennial. Some respondents strongly noted pay as a factor which meant increased attrition of staff, since “the usual way to value national staff of national NGOs is to hire them to INGOs” (R35) and that “local NGOs cannot compete” with the UN and INGOs salary payments (R25).

The role of the capacity building in this cycle is cited as a driver by some respondents, including R224 who aptly points out that training is based on the expectations and needs of INGOs, and once local and national staff are adequately trained, they are then poached to run INGO programmes. R35 argues that such a cycle “maintains a lower level of performance in NNGOs which lose their best human resource assets”. This then means that “there is a need for continual support of national NGOs” (R79), and that this impacts on NNGOs’ abilities to retain and capitalise on knowledge held by the organisation.

Trócaire (2017) found in a study of INGOs in eastern DRC that the head of one international organisation viewed localisation as a secondary strategic priority since their organisation “employed mostly local staff”. The study found that this leads to frustration and resentment, and that such a “localisation” strategy is hardly sustainable. Here we can clearly see the cycle of building NNGOs up only to “de-knowledge” them by removing their knowledge assets (i.e. their staff). In this way, CTK or organisational knowledge cannot be built up and sustained, but is continually in flux. The reason for this is complex, since there are counter reports that argue that local and national partnerships are characterised by lower costs, representing a better option for INGOs than direct implementation. Ramalingam, Gray and Cerruti (2013), for example, found that salaries are lower “by anything up to a factor of 10”, and that lower overheads, subsistence and security costs are also beneficial compared to hiring national staff. Suder et al. (2017) suggest that whilst international capacities are useful to INGOs operations, for organisational development “acquiring knowledge at the local level is also critical”, and could potentially be for access reasons.

## **5.2 CAPACITY STRENGTHENING**

The survey results confirmed that individuals from stakeholders across the board feel that capacity strengthening initiatives are not sufficient and often exist as a top-down initiative for local and national NGOs in conflict-affected states.

Respondents argued that INGOs are often unaware of existing knowledge and capacities of NNGOs and that even simple identification local and national actors takes more time than is available – and that the process “is often slower than the pace of the conflict itself” R247. R35 argues that assessment is only completed “when [NNGOs] are about to be engaged or when there is funding that can support working with them”. There was a consensus that this is less than ideal and that more comprehensive capacity needs assessments of all actors involved in humanitarian action in the country in question would be preferable. 45% responded towards insufficiency of pre-assessment of knowledge for capacity strengthening initiatives (i.e. either somewhat insufficient or insufficient), compared to 37% who regarded it as being towards sufficient.

Unfortunately, due to the above, it seems a reality that instead of custom designed capacity strengthening, often initiatives are simply copied over – which would result in poor outcomes were this applied to programming. R150 honestly observes that “the tendency has been to adopt international practices already designed to reduce costs. At times it’s a challenge to try to adapt to local conditions which may be complex in terms of culture and language.” R164 has had similar experience, and said that “capacity strengthening activities are mostly pre-designed during project proposal development and training delivered once funding is secured” but that sometimes this can be adjusted retroactively.

Respondents cited that the factor preventing NNGOs from delivering effective programming is “very limited/almost nil knowledge on humanitarian work” (R35), referring to technical knowledge or knowledge of the system, however agreed that this is surmountable via mentoring initiatives that enable them to transcend this perceived barrier. Such thinking is in fact in line with King (2005) who notes that proximity is a great factor in transferring tacit knowledge through “horizontal methods of twinning, apprenticeship and seconding” (appears in Stone et al., 2000, p. 31). Such alternative methods were floated by respondents to the survey, and a lack of these more inclusive and close methodologies were noted as a barrier to greater localisation. R48 stated that due to the lack of funding specifically ringfenced for capacity building funding, INGOs are not able to provide long-term mentoring (rather than training based) support for NNGOs. Conversely, Q10R35 noted that they had seen mentorship be initiated for NNGOs in conflict-affected settings, but not on a long-term basis.

A tangible example was given by research participant R255 who notes that the mentorship of NNGOs made a significant difference to the GBV (Gender-based violence) response in Iraq, and was “such that the capacity to respond to GBV in emergency situation[s] is institutionalised”.

The participant explained that their agency, the UNFPA, made a proactive and conscious effort to mentor an Iraqi NGO named Al Masella, which is now one of the foremost organisations within the country for SRHR (sexual reproductive health and rights) programmes within conflict, having worked in high risk areas such as Mosul. The respondent notes that such accomplishments were achieved by a mixture of monthly informal sessions, comprehensive needs assessments and the creation of a case management mentoring plan. This mentoring plan included an element of “train the trainer” pedagogy which meant that Al Masella is able to mentor upcoming local and national NGOs itself.

When mentioning “long-term” solutions to capacity strengthening, respondents often inferred that this was synonymous with organisational capacity development. That is, it should focus on infrastructural or functional components such as HR system development, increasing financial acumen within the organisation, project and programme design, as well as grant writing. R27 noted that this is often what is really missing, since local and national organisations may well have the actual capacity to deliver on the ground, but they do not have a grasp of the “logframe language” to submit good proposals. R26 laments disrespect in the current status quo where initiatives do not incorporate such longer-term thinking:

“What would be more respectful in terms of partnership would be to design capacity building in a way to increase National NGOs' capacities in terms of assessments, program design, advocacy and networking, in order to build stronger, equal, partners.”  
(R26)

Svoboda, Berbelet and Mosel (2018) were introduced to the idea of a seconding model by respondents of Syrian organisations, whereby a placement system would work to host international staff in NNGOs, but also vice versa. They note that although this would be an experimental approach which may have ethical implications in a crisis setting, and would require radical systemic change, it would offer a truly collaborative and bi-lateral knowledge transfer opportunity. Ellerman and Hirschman (2009) support this, stating that most tacit knowledge “needs to be transmitted by special methods such as apprenticeship, secondment, imitation, study tours, cross training, twinning relations and guided learning by doing”.

Reasoning for avoidance of longer-term mentoring and the transfer of more functional knowledge is posited by Brinkerhoff (2007) in his theme paper on capacity development in fragile states. He notes that such longer-term initiatives are harder to prove in their effects, and without proof of causation it can be harder to access funding for them and hit accountability markers. Since they are less numerical in their outputs – i.e. “training courses held, individuals



trained, and organizations assisted”, it is harder to prove that mentorship of one national staff member lead to an overall increase in organisational development and capacity, and that this then impacted on their ability to deliver impactful programmes. Additionally, until the mentality of donors shifts to multi-year funding, this may well not be within their interests. Brinkerhoff (ibid.) also notes that for sustainable change, shifting political and power dynamics would be needed but “are more complex, time-consuming, and involves a higher degree of change”, which again are less measurable, less fundable and a longer-term goal.

Even though longer-term mentoring initiatives may offer a better option, Hellmüller (2014) argues that this can still propagate a one-way transfer of knowledge from international actors who hold the ‘valued, thematic knowledge’ to “local actors [that] are seen as in need of capacity-building”. She further notes that this lack of mutuality or bilateral learning serves to propagate the hegemony of the system whereby “information is taken from local actors, but capacities and knowledge are seen as the realm of international actors”. Some respondents refused to see capacity strengthening as a dichotomy between unilateral and bilateral (i.e. one way or two-way learning) (R73) and argued rather that it is up to national staff members to engage in such a way that the dynamic becomes more of an exploration of mutual knowledge. Freire (2014, originally published in 1970) notes that this is possible in any situation of learning (which, arguably, any crisis setting is). Knowledge is co-constructed by both the “teachers” and “students”, and the dynamic can shift between the two actors and their roles can reverse depending on the subject at hand. Through exploration of knowledge, the effort is ‘co-intentional’ where two parties unveil reality as they recreate knowledge together. Such a dynamic and equalisation of power, potentially through mentorship, is undoubtedly a goal of the localisation agenda.

Other related concerns included considering the context of protracted conflict settings, and whether even longer-term initiatives or multilateral learning would be enough. R214 notes that capacity levels can be low because of disruption to the education system and “for this reason capacity building activities might not be sufficient to bring these organizations up to a level in which they can work autonomously.”. R20 notes of the situation in CAR, “we shouldn’t feel ashamed to say that national staff have a low level of education, but this is a very specific context” – warning against making assumptions across protracted conflicts. It is true, however, that the aspect of education should be considered and not hidden from discussion of capacity strengthening in order to adapt approaches. Certainly, capacity strengthening cannot take the place of education, but there not often a suggestion that it should or could.

### 5.3 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

Du Plessis (2007) defines knowledge management as a process that manages flows of knowledge within an organisation by locating it and recording it, either physically or within someone's mind. It is a way to ensure knowledge is used effectively for the long-term benefit of the organisation. Further to this, it can be the mark of a "knowledge-oriented" organisation that goes on to influence strategic decision, innovation and serves as an organisational asset. King (2005) argues that such a systematic approach to knowledge management is often missing in complex emergencies, and this impacts on programming since access to knowledge is required for decision-making in the form of lessons learned and best practices.

Responses to the survey harkened back to inferences of power and knowledge hierarchies. R36 felt that knowledge management is "a way of disciplining "local" knowledge to fit the categories of international actors" and that they "don't see this improving localization in a way that international actors desire." This suggests that that attempts to manage national staff knowledge within NNGOs should be done without reference to internationally contrived methods, but through systems designed and implemented in-house to ensure no value is lost or distorted through external interference. This does not mean it should not happen at all, however. When asked whether internal focus of NNGOs on aspects such as knowledge management and organisational development could increase localisation achievements in conflict-affected settings, an overwhelming majority of 93% of respondents agreed, however, this was supplemented with many comments speaking to the interweaving of other issues related to localisation.

Respondents seemed uneasy when asked to focus on this one issue of knowledge management above others in the localisation debate, for example, R23 noted that localisation is not about knowledge management but "institutional capacity to manage agent problems". They list internal issues of NNGOs such as corruption, nepotism, reluctance to manage staff (including letting them go), corruption and prejudicial attitudes in needs assessment, and that "[localisation] is not going to happen tomorrow, or thanks to some knowledge database".

This shows that knowledge management must be considered in combination with a host of other organisational development techniques within NNGOs, rather than in isolation, or potentially that it is undervalued within the sector. Another respondent stated that within the humanitarian sector, even "INGOs have no idea of their own institutional knowledge, and nor do they take much time to curate it" (R26). Given that the mention of knowledge management in

literature related to the humanitarian sector, this is not a surprising attitude to have found. There is currently a greater focus on compiling and understanding evidence-based intervention (Darcy et al., 2013), which often requires curation of knowledge management at the sector level rather than at the organisational.

Some respondents related knowledge management issues back to the “de-knowledging” of organisations due to the “capacity sucking out” cycle; for example that “knowledge management is not feasible with high levels of staff turnover” (R15). This may be true, since loss of staff members can equal a degradation of collective organisational knowledge, however with incremental creation of a knowledge management system or set of processes, this can be gradually mitigated. It was also noted by R67 that “determining what people know, don't know, think they know (but don't), and need to know takes time and is hard.” That is not to say, however, that it is impossible or not worthwhile.

Others note that within NNGOs, as well as INGOs, change regarding knowledge management must come from the highest level. R115 argues that the “first and last focal point and for [an organisation's] growth and development is their director, or directors. If they don't take growth and improvement seriously, why should others? As such, a change is clearly required here from within L/NNGOs to reorient their organisations towards more of a knowledge management culture – certain parts of which can be done without the need for additional resource or funding, but rather a change in mindset.

## CHAPTER 5 KEY FINDINGS

- Organisationally held knowledge is damaged through a process of ‘de-knowledging’ due to attrition that can be linked to levels of funding and salary inequality that attracts NNGO staff to INGOs and UN agencies
- Capacity strengthening initiatives are often copied over from other contexts or contrived at proposal, lack thorough pre-assessment of knowledge needs and would benefit from longer-term modalities such as mentoring or seconding
- Knowledge management is poorly considered within humanitarian action as a whole, yet offers opportunities for NNGOs to consolidate their knowledge assets to work towards organisational development and better inform strategic decisions

## CHAPTER 6 : KNOWLEDGE AND OPERATIONS

This chapter addresses aspects of operations that came to the fore within the research that are affected by the knowledge that national staff of national NGOs possess. It is not exhaustive but focusses on including how knowledge can increase access to affected populations, as well as the interplay with knowledge, social capital, and how it can contribute to better decision making.

### 6.1 ACCESS AND RISK

As was clear in the literature review, there is a strong feeling amongst respondents that in protracted violent conflict, localisation is not necessarily pursued for the reasons common to disaster-affected situations. R157 states that “localisation has been primarily driven by access constraints on international actors, not by issues of legitimacy [and] effectiveness.” This alludes, again, to necessity rather than a concerted effort to recognise local and national NGOs, along with the knowledge contribution they offer for response. Unfortunately, where international actors have issues of access, national actors are often affected too. Protracted conflict-affected states can mean a chronically weakened civil society not comparable to those in development or disaster-affected situations. R25 argues that in situations of conflict, “weak states and weak institutions mean we are faced with a

choice: effective response or local response”, explaining that any setting where the state has been degraded to the point of weakness or fragility will have equally weak NNGOs as they will “suffer the same agent/institutional problems as the state itself”. Aside from this, it is clear that increased access is seen as one of the comparative operational advantages that characterises national actors in conflict situations. When ranking such advantages, “better and more prolonged risk” was ranked second for NNGOs (37.5%), as shown in **Figure X** below:




Figure 10: A Tree Map showing the ranking of comparative advantages of NNGOs

Respondents were quick to point out that comparatively increased access may well be a demonstration of the knowledge that national and local actors hold, but that knowledge and access does not necessarily mean a reduction in risk, often referencing statistics.

Figure 12 presents data from the AWSD (Aid Worker Security Database) which shows that since 2007 the percentage of aid worker victims that are national has consistently stayed above 75% and has often been at least three times as high as the number of international victims. This may be representative of the estimated 9:1 ratio of national staff to international (Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard, 2011), or that national staff are more frequently field-based compared to their international counterparts – yet still the proportions are high.




Figure 11 : Aid Worker Security Database – Kidnapped, injured, killed statistics comparing national and international victims - Figures accurate to 9<sup>th</sup> August 2018

Stoddard, Harmer and Haver (2006) reference qualitative evidence from their study undertaken regarding providing aid in insecure environments that shows that local aid workers might underestimate risk to themselves:

“While their superior local knowledge and information networks will provide them with more detailed ‘situational awareness’, it is also true that familiarity can breed over-confidence.” (ibid., p.44)

They note that when entrenched in a familiar situation, any changes may not be perceived as easily, and this might cause local and national staff to miss new threats that emerge. This is an interesting point that may help to explain another facet of the higher number of incidents affecting national aid workers. Along similar lines, R25 argues that any advantages in knowledge that national staff may possess are simply overshadowed by a lack of operational security management:

“[NNGOs] don't have the same protocols and these are much more flexibly followed, which creates insecurity. They may have a "sense" of security on the ground and better local information, but this is outweighed by the lack of procedure.”

It is hard to substantiate causality due to a generalised weaker approach to operational security management and procedures on behalf of local and national NGOs. It has been noted,

however, that where programming is conducted through sub-contracting and remote management, it is clear that NNGOs are “typically are provided with fewer security resources, materials, and training than their international counterparts” (Stoddard, Harmer and Renouf, 2010) which nonetheless highlights a disparity in resource if not in adherence. This highlights an area where, although knowledge may provide an advantage, technical knowledge of risk assessment might overshadow it – but could be improved.

## 6.2 IDENTITY AND NETWORKS

Some respondents mentioned that they feel that identity has a significant impact on increased access. Some noted that NNGOs lack some of the protections that are afforded to INGOs. Q8R61 notes, for instance, that “having the international banner of the agency as well as presence of some international staff can create additional protective elements (in certain situations)”. This is explained by respondents due to INGOs being somewhat removed from a conflict situation and having greater focus on principled humanitarianism, which allows for the distance needed to withstand pressures that might affect national and local organisations such as governmental or community pressure, threats or arrest. In this way, identity as a national staff member of a national NGO may increase risk. Q9R20 notes that in CAR, they feel that being a national NGO is “even more dangerous” and that such actors are disqualified from negotiation with armed groups, where “INGOs have protection [...] local actors don’t”. Collinson et al. (2013) found that risk can be increased for national staff in conflict situations due to their ethnic or community identity, especially where these are mobilised in the conflict itself.

This is, however, in contrast with the experience of Caritas Centrafrique as noted in their co-hosted workshop with Oxford Brookes, where conversely they found negotiation to be possible thanks to a shared national identity, in combination with adjustment of behaviours such as choosing not to wear PPE (personal protective equipment such as bullet proof vests) and refusing to show fear (Piquard and Delft, 2018). The behavioural aspects here may be more reflective of action knowledge, i.e. “know[ing]-how” to act based on tacit knowledge derived from being embedded in and absorbing societal norms. In addition, it could be behaviour informed by ‘knowledge of acquaintance’; knowing the behaviours of armed actors in the past and using these to predict reaction and therefore willingness to cooperate.

The use of such knowledge to adjust behaviour and therefore secure access is a shared finding of the report by Svoboda, Berbelet and Mosel (2018):

“Knowledge of and familiarity with armed groups allows local organisations to better understand their motivations and goals. In Syria, for instance, organisations change the language they use (revolutionary or religious) depending on the ideology of the armed group, or use local religious authorities as intermediaries to negotiate access.”

However, when attributing successful negotiation and access purely to shared national identity, however, Haddad and Svoboda (2017) advise caution that this can sometimes constitute an oversimplification. In Syria, they found that whilst being Syrian is clearly key, it cannot contribute to access alone without being supplemented by organisational legitimacy, strong networks, community acceptance and programmes that bring tangible change.

It seems that identity can open doors, knowledge can be leveraged to adjust behaviour to supplement this, but that the identity and actions of the organisation behind the interaction are important. There is definitely, however, something specific here to national staff, since it is not unreasonable to assume that if international staff were to attempt to use national knowledge from national staff to inform their behaviour, regardless of being affiliated with a reputable organisation, they may not enjoy the same successes.

It is also important to note here that both the responses to the survey and the systematic review highlighted that knowledge is relative, as are the definitions of national, regional and local. Being a national aid worker does not necessarily mean knowledge of the entirety of a country since no country is homogenous across the entirety of its area. Assuming similar levels of knowledge across a group (whether national or international) can be as dangerous as assuming that because a person belongs to contrived categories that they share the best or worst characteristics of that group. Q11R187 noted that “national NGO staff can also have the same problem as international ones - they do not ask and listen in a meaningful way - instead they have pre-conceived ideas depending on where they come from (e.g. capital city vs rural area)” - meaning that where national staff originate can result in identities that shape their knowledge, outlook and decisions.

Thomas et al. (2018) challenge the boundaries of the rhetorical term ‘local’ within humanitarian action and argue that the definition of what is ‘local’ is constantly in flux, especially in conflict. As such a staff member who is considered ‘local’ to one area may not have knowledge related to a nearby village, and the validity of their knowledge may change from one moment to the next as the conflict moves, intensifies or as dynamics change. Equally, many respondents rejected the division of national staff of national NGOs and national staff of INGOs or UN agencies, stating that they are the same people with the same “local” knowledge, but what



differs is their contractual affiliation. Van Brabant (2017) argues this point, stating that there is no “magical transformation” of national aid workers when they are hired by INGOs or UN agencies, and that such a division is, in fact, unhelpful.

Another aspect at play here is access to networks, which again can be confused with knowledge and also be strongly tied to identity. Knowing people or places is ‘knowledge of acquaintance’ (Russell, 1917), however when referring to the knowledge that national staff have of networks or knowing how to use these for operations and access, what is in fact being referenced can be construed rather as the idea of ‘social capital’. This is the idea that blends “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups” (Brian, 2007).

In a study of how violent protracted conflict affects civil society, Stephen (2017) found across three case studies (Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Myanmar) that although local networks are often disrupted during protracted conflict, civil society actors still invoked ‘bonding’ social capital – those networks which rely on shared identity to be created and function (e.g. ethnicity or religious affiliation). These were leveraged for information, access and protection. The UNHCR & UNDP Regional Joint Secretariat (2017) in their second compendium of best practice from responses in Iraq and Syria note that an aspect of the strength of local knowledge is the ability to adapt existing networks and build new ones which can “respond to specific needs [and] take aligned action to solve problems”. They note that these networks, when combined in partnerships with INGOs can successfully blend to create strong contributions to a response that are transparent and accountable. They also found that involving local stakeholders in decision making, including civil society actors and the community themselves, actually helped to rebuild some of the lost “bridging” social capital mentioned in Stephen’s (2017) work across multiple locations in Syria as part of UNDP programming. Interestingly, such networks and social capital can be one of the reasons for which national actors are seen to be biased and therefore compromise on humanitarian principles – but they are also one of their key strengths.

### **6.3 DECISIONS AND OPINION**

Collinson et al. (2013) argue that humanitarian action is characterised by weak contextual knowledge and analysis, and that even if international actors acknowledge the standing of national staff in terms of national knowledge, it is rare for them to actively draw on this when making decision. This seems to be a direct issue within the localisation agenda, and incorporation of national knowledge is rare, especially at higher levels. R27 notes that “many decisions are

still being taken in fora to which NGOs / civil society / local communities do not have access”, in reference to policy and response level decisions. This seems to be variable, however, since R61 avows that in the contexts they have worked in “most Cluster Leads were national staff (even if of UN or INGOs), Heads of Bases were often national staff, and Program Managers were national. The knowledge of our local partners (NGOs, CBOs, etc) was fully taken on board and valued.” This shows that there is hope regarding greater integration.

Alongside this, however, there is also a feeling that integration of local knowledge should not replace factual aspects of decision making. Respondents argue that whilst greater integration of local knowledge in decision making is good, it is not a replacement for “avoiding primary assessment” especially when making intervention decisions, since a cross-sectional overview of needs cannot be substituted by staff knowledge or opinion (R41). Fairbanks (2018) writes that whilst it is important that local knowledge be included in operational risk management and capacity strengthening initiatives, close examination of such knowledge is necessary to separate opinion and fact. She invokes an example given by a participant at a localisation event held in June at the ICRC Humanitarium in which a local driver in CAR “recommended driving at night in order to avoid being attacked”. She notes that this was contrary to the existing operational security policies and procedures for the country and was constituted more by personal opinion rather than objective information and individual risk profiles, which vary due to identity. She concludes that “solely relying on individual thinking to inform security decisions without analysing different sources of information can be dangerous”. Though this is true for any individual thinking, it is important to note when attempting to actively integrate national staff opinion, since inclusion bias may override rigour.

Respondents also noted that where input is sought from national staff, it should be supplemented by international standards in order to function as verification. R208 warns that “lack of supervision/guidance by international counterparts may lead to information distortion, misuse of resources and bias”. This notes that an objective eye should be cast on all decisions, though it could be argued that this includes decisions at all levels and by all actors, not just national staff members. R214 supports this by contending that “applying principles of accountability on all sources of information & experiences used to reach certain decisions can help to reduce the magnitude of misinformation that leads to mismanagement of resources or outright corruption.”

Darcy et al. (2013) argue that “experienced humanitarian staff tend to base decisions mainly on past experiences, instinct, and assumptions”. This, according to Kolodner (1993 cited in Zhang,

Zhou and Nunamaker Jr, 2002) is 'case-based reasoning', where similarities of the problem at hand are compared to previous similar issues experienced in order to adapt previous solutions and avoid starting from scratch. Such reasoning is logical, but often results in simply attempting to transport over interventions or solutions and can lead to a pattern whereby programmes repeat mistakes, share similar attributes without evidential reasoning, or even do not take the context into account as much as they should. Here, national staff of national organisations can make a difference, and not simply by providing contextual information.

It is therefore clear that there is a clear argument for better inclusion of national staff knowledge in decision making, but as with all knowledge it must be separated from opinion, especially in cases where risk is involved, and ideally should be supplemented with accurate assessment and standards of accountability.

#### **CHAPTER 6 KEY FINDINGS:**

- A clear comparative advantage of NNGOs' knowledge is better and prolonged access to affected populations but this does not always translate to reduced risk, presenting an opportunity to supplement knowledge with better operational security management
- NNGO access is formed not only by knowledge and behaviours, but also their identities and access to networks in the form of social capital. A combination of all of these result in a powerful advantage, but it is beneficial to understand them separately
- Decisions should be influenced by national staff knowledge, but in combination with evidence-based assessment, and separation of opinion from fact is key to ensuring accountable, transparent and safe decisions.

## CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSION

In order to best reflect on this study, the reader is encouraged to refer to the original research questions within 1.3 - Research Questions.

Given the abstract nature of some of the concepts identified within this research, there is still a low level of understanding relating to what knowledge is, what the differing types are and how these are borne out on a day to day basis within humanitarian action. Concepts can be confused, and there is a tendency towards “de-knowleging”, reducing national staff knowledge to information which is then only used to inform background or situational analysis. Save for a few pieces of research, types of knowledge within humanitarian action are undertreated, especially when discussing conflict. Despite this, with a stronger focus on professionalism within the sector, a technical form of knowledge is (maybe subconsciously) seen as more complex and therefore more important than the ‘softer’ one of context. Such a technocratic view is reflected on greater focus on reducing humanitarian action to numbers and indicators rather than people affected, and certainly when using case-based reasoning to inform decision rather than ensuring incorporation of local and national staff members’ knowledge.

It is clear from this research that there are several barriers to greater understanding of local and national knowledge. These include the power dynamics currently inherent in the humanitarian system. Whilst this is changing, it is currently understudied how this power inequality is reflected in the different value assigned to knowledge. Furthermore, the current carbon copy templating of capacity strengthening initiatives is a clear barrier, not only to the learning goals of L/NNGOs (both technical and organisational) but to international NGOs learning from L/NGOs. Better assessments of knowledge and capacity of the entire CSO landscape (prior to funding proposal submission) would help this, however a change to more mentoring or secondment-based capacity strengthening would help to break down this barrier further. Weak knowledge management was a further barrier identified. Improvement here is within the reach of NNGOs through a change of focus, though there is clearly also work for INGOs who also lack a knowledge-orientation. Such organisations could lead the way together in partnership and innovation. Lastly, where knowledge helps NNGOs to gain better and more prolonged access, there is a barrier of associated risk which may prevent INGOs and UN agencies from fully appreciating such knowledge. This can be worked on by stronger focus on operational security management and risk assessment to complement the innate abilities of

NNGOs to operate in such insecure environments. By doing so, both operational success and a more risk aware working method may shine more light on national knowledge as best practice within the sector.

In retrospect, regarding RQ-4, it is difficult to answer how far local and national knowledge can form part of a push for localisation, since localisation is such a patchwork of different issues. Many of the highlighted ways in which knowledge could be better valued, reinforced and managed may, in the long term, result in NNGOs becoming stronger and therefore a greater part of the wider humanitarian system in contexts of protracted conflict.

For example, transforming capacity strengthening into mentoring or seconding initiatives would serve to better connect international staff with local and national counterparts, thus enabling multidirectional sharing of knowledge. This would then help all actors to acknowledge the hidden dynamics of power, hierarchy and language use that prevent better valuing of knowledge, and also lead to greater consideration of such knowledge when making informed decisions. Where NNGOs implement knowledge management through strong leadership, this will make knowledge assets more visible to the wider humanitarian community since the 'knowledge orientation' of organisations will shine through into operational decisions, partnerships and strategic choices. Also, further research by NNGOs into the ways in which they operationalise their knowledge, identities and social capital networks would serve to better understand how localisation can apply to conflict settings and encourage greater use of true partnerships rather than remote management and subcontracting modalities. This could also contribute to better understanding how principled humanitarianism can be better understood or interpreted so that it can be preserved whilst also creating meaningful engagement with national and local actors.

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# CHAPTER 9 : APPENDICES

## 9.1 Appendix A: Ethics Form



TDE Form E1

Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment - Ethics Review Form E1

- (i) **Project Title:** Knowledge Management in National NGOs: A pathway to greater localisation in protracted conflict settings
- (ii) **Name of Supervisor and School in which located:** Dr Brigitte Piquard, CENDEP, TDE
- (iii) **Name of Student and Student Number:** Robert Jones, 17082658
- (iv) **Brief description of project outlining where human participants will be involved (30-50 words):**

Three (3) methods of a total of four (4) will make use of human participants. This will be in the form of 1) a single questionnaire sent electronically and 2) pre-arranged semi-structured interviews in two tranches. A total of up to ten interviews will be conducted. Around half of these are expected to be with national staff members of a faith-based organisation operating within CAR. The topic for both will be based around concepts of knowledge and localisation.

		Yes	No
1.	Does the study involve participants who are unable to give informed consent (e.g. children, people with learning disabilities)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2.	If the study will involve participants who are unable to give informed consent (e.g. children under the age of 18, people with learning disabilities), will you be unable to obtain permission from their parents or guardians (as appropriate)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3.	Will the study require the cooperation of a gatekeeper for initial access to groups or individuals to be recruited (e.g. students, members of a self-help group, employees of a company)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4.	Are there any problems with the participants' right to remain anonymous, or to have the information they give not identifiable as theirs?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

5.	Will it be necessary for the participants to take part in the study without their knowledge/consent at the time? (e.g. covert observation of people in non-public places?)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6.	Will the study involve discussion of or responses to questions the participants might find sensitive? (e.g. own traumatic experiences)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7.	Are drugs, placebos or other substances (e.g. food substances, vitamins) to be administered to the study participants?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
8.	Will blood or tissue samples be obtained from participants?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
9.	Is pain or more than mild discomfort likely to result from the study?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
10.	Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
11.	Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing of participants?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
12.	Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time) be offered to participants?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
13.	Will deception of participants be necessary during the study?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
14.	Will the study involve NHS patients, staff, carers or premises?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Signed:		Supervisor Dr Brigitte Piquard
Signed:		Student Robert Jones
Date:		

## 9.2 Appendix B: Information Sheet (Questionnaire)

### Leveraging Knowledge in National NGOs:

#### The key to greater localisation in protracted conflict?

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully.

#### **What is the purpose of the study?**

The aim of this research is to better understand the types of knowledge held by national NGO staff members in protracted conflict settings and how these could be better integrated into capacity strengthening or training initiatives, organisational development plans or communities of practice.

The study follows a mixed methods approach including a systematic review of relevant literature, a survey of international sector-level perspectives and an instrumental case study of a specific, micro-level case constructed through interviews with the national NGO staff in the Central African Republic.

#### **Why have I been invited to participate?**

You have been targeted to take part in this study thanks to your professional standing within the humanitarian community on the basis of your current or previous job role, academic contributions or personal interests. Selection may also have been based on the specific geographical focus of your work (i.e. within a protracted conflict-affected state), or your membership to a relevant social media group or contact list.

#### **Do I have to take part?**

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you may keep this information sheet, and will be asked to provide your explicit consent within the questionnaire.

If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason by contacting the author at 17082658@brookes.ac.uk.

#### **What will happen to me if I take part?**

You will be asked to complete a short questionnaire online, which will take a minimum of five minutes to complete. The majority of the survey is comprised of closed questions, however there are also open questions towards the end which allow you the freedom to express your opinion at greater length if desired.

Your participation is of great value to the study and will constitute an important contribution to the body of knowledge regarding the localisation agenda for conflict-affected states. There are no risks involved since confidentiality is assured, and the only cost to you will be the brief amount of time that the survey takes to complete.

#### **Will what I say in this study be kept confidential?**

All information collected will not be directly attributable to you, since no questions regarding personal information will be asked. You can therefore be assured that confidentiality, privacy and anonymity will be ensured in the collection, storage and publication of research material.

Research data will be kept securely at all times and retained in accordance with the University's policy on Academic Integrity and the General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR). The data generated in the course of the research will be kept securely in electronic form for a period of ten years after the completion of a research project.

**What should I do if I want to take part?**

If you would like to take part in the study, please follow the link provided and answer all questions within the survey to the best of your ability.

**What will happen to the results of the research study?**

The results of the research will be integrated into the findings and discussion chapters of the author's dissertation, which will be submitted in partial fulfilment of the Master of Arts in Development and Emergency Practice at Oxford Brookes University.

The final dissertation will be made available online at <http://architecture.brookes.ac.uk/research/cendep/dissertations> at some point within the coming academic year. Alternatively, a copy of the final submission will be available immediately following 28<sup>th</sup> September 2018 by emailing the author at [17082658@brookes.ac.uk](mailto:17082658@brookes.ac.uk).

**Who has reviewed the study?**

The research has been approved by the University Research Ethics Committee, Oxford Brookes University.

**Contact for Further Information**

For further information, please contact Robert Jones (author) at [17082658@brookes.ac.uk](mailto:17082658@brookes.ac.uk). If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, you should contact the Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee on [ethics@brookes.ac.uk](mailto:ethics@brookes.ac.uk).

Thank you for taking the time to read the above information.

This document will be updated and available here until the 28<sup>th</sup> September 2018.

**Version Number 1.0**

## 9.3 Appendix C: Questionnaire

**This survey focusses on the use of knowledge and its link to localisation of humanitarian action in conflict-affected states.**

You have been invited to take part thanks to your link to the humanitarian sector on the basis of your current or previous job role, the specific geographical focus of your work (i.e. relating to a conflict-affected state), or your membership to a relevant social media group or public contact list that invites contact directly related to the furtherment of humanitarian aid worldwide. Referral or recommendation may also have occurred from colleagues or acquaintances. Please forward this survey to any colleagues you think may be interested.

- **Participation is completely voluntary, and 'opt-in'.** Please disregard this email if you do not wish to participate. You will not be contacted again, and your address will be removed from the list following the **expiry of the survey on 07/09/2018 at 23:45 GMT+1.**
- The survey will take a minimum of **five minutes to complete** (depending on optional additional commentary), with a total of **five background questions**, and **fifteen questions relating to the topic.**
- **No identifying personal or contact information will be collected**, nor will your IP address be stored or associated with your answers; **participation is completely anonymous.**

This survey is part of a dissertation to be submitted in partial fulfilment for the award of an MA in Development and Emergency Practice by the [CENDEP](#), Oxford Brookes University. Please refer to the information sheet [here](#) for details relating to the project, or contact the author at [17082658@brookes.ac.uk](mailto:17082658@brookes.ac.uk).

Thank you in advance for your kind participation.

\* 1. Do you agree to take part in this survey? Your responses will be anonymous and used to inform a thesis to be submitted to Oxford Brookes University.

- Yes
- No

The first section is made up of five basic questions about you and your experience of the context in question.

\* 2. Do you currently, or have you previously, worked in a conflict-affected state (or in programming and partnerships for such contexts?)

Yes

No

Other (please specify)

\* 3. Which most closely describes your most common working category?

International staff of an INGO

National staff of an INGO

International staff of a UN Agency

National staff of a UN Agency

International staff of a National NGO

National staff of a National NGO

Other (please specify)

\* 4. How many years approximately have you been involved in the humanitarian sector?

0 - 2 years

3 - 4 years

5 - 9 years

More than 10 years

\* 5. Which conflict-affected countries have you worked in (or with)?

Mali

Yemen

Syria

Central African Republic

Iraq

Afghanistan

Democratic Republic of Congo

South Sudan

Other (please specify)

6. Which organisation(s) have you predominantly worked for? (optional)

In this section, we are interested in your views relating to the localisation agenda within the humanitarian sector.

\* 7. How much progress do you feel has been made towards the localisation of humanitarian action in the last few years?

A great deal	A lot	A moderate amount	A little	None at all
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Comments (optional)

\* 8. In your opinion, there are \_\_\_\_\_ to the localisation of humanitarian response in conflict-affected states

Many barriers	Some barriers	A few barriers	No barriers
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Comments (optional)

\* 9. Which three (3) of these do you believe are the most important barriers to localisation in conflict?

- Principled humanitarianism
- Working languages of the humanitarian system
- Infrequent capacity strengthening for national actors
- Inappropriate of capacity strengthening for national actors
- Rigidity of the humanitarian system
- Lack of collaboration between national NGOs
- Subcontracting agreements/remote management
- Lack of accountability
- Lack of direct funding for local & national NGOs
- Lack of commitment by international community
- Other (please specify)



\* 10. Have you had experience with any of the following involving national NGOs in conflict-affected states? Tick all those that apply:

- National NGO-led Communities of Practice
- Knowledge Sharing Platforms
- Long-term mentoring initiatives
- Cluster co-leadership (or other prominent positions)
- National NGO-led capacity strengthening plans

Please note if other, or expand on choices above:

\* 11. The following is a list of operational advantages often associated with national NGOs in conflict settings.

In your opinion, how accurate is each? If you disagree with any, please select 'N/A' and provide an explanatory comment below.

	Extremely accurate	Somewhat accurate	Neither accurate nor inaccurate	Somewhat inaccurate	Not at all accurate	N/A
Better and longer access to conflict-affected communities	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Contextually-tailored, nuanced programming	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Linguistic (translation/interpretation, communication with communities etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Greater ability to link humanitarian action with long-term development	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Greater operational security	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Greater cost-effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ability to act faster	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Comments (optional)

In this section, we would like to explore your views relating to issues surrounding knowledge use and localisation

\* 12. In your opinion, the existing knowledge of national NGOs working in conflict is often \_\_\_\_\_ by international actors

Accurately assessed	Somewhat accurately assessed	Neither accurately nor inaccurately assessed	Somewhat inaccurately assessed	Inaccurately assessed
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Comment (optional)

\* 13. In your opinion, the terminology used within the international humanitarian sector can be \_\_\_\_\_ for national NGO staff to accurately express existing knowledge.

A significant obstacle	Somewhat of an obstacle	Neither an obstacle nor a help	Somewhat of a help	A significant help
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Comment (optional)

\* 14. In your opinion, the existing knowledge of national staff of national NGOs in conflict-affected settings is \_\_\_\_\_ by international actors

Sufficiently valued	Somewhat Valued	Not valued enough
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Comment (optional)

\* 15. In your opinion, capacity strengthening activities for national staff of national NGOs are often designed with \_\_\_\_\_ pre-assessment of existing staff knowledge.

Sufficient	Somewhat sufficient	Neither sufficient nor insufficient	Somewhat insufficient	Insufficient
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Comment (optional)

\* 16. Which do you believe is most effective for organisational development at the national level?

- Unilateral technical capacity strengthening (delivered from international actors to national actors)
- Bi-lateral training (where international and national actors learn from one another)
- Other (please specify alternative)

\* 17. Do you think that more importance could be placed on the experience-driven knowledge held by national NGO staff?

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Comment (optional)

\* 18. When partnerships occur between international and national actors, do you think that humanitarian projects in conflict-affected states need to be designed, implemented and monitored with significant input from national staff?

Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Comment as to why (optional)

\* 19. Do you think greater internal focus on knowledge management and organisational development by national NGOs could increase localisation achievements in a conflict-affected setting?

- Yes
- No

Comment (optional)

20. Do you have any further **comments** or **experiences** on the themes of knowledge of national staff of national NGOs and localisation within conflict that you would like to share?

## 9.4 Appendix D: Locations of weblink sharing via social media

Platform	Name	Description	Audience	Link
Facebook	Personal Post	A post on my profile with weblink available for contacts to share	831/Public	<a href="http://bit.ly/2yE6jkY">http://bit.ly/2yE6jkY</a>
Facebook	Fifty Shades of Aid	A safe space for aid workers to speak their minds without fear	19,714	<a href="http://bit.ly/2SzPgsQ">http://bit.ly/2SzPgsQ</a>
LinkedIn	Personal Post	A post on my profile with weblink available for contacts to share	377/Public	<a href="http://bit.ly/2qlVyPD">http://bit.ly/2qlVyPD</a>
LinkedIn	ReliefWeb Humanitarian Discussion Group	A location for humanitarians to post information, links and documents, as well as discuss humanitarian topics and issues	16,733	<a href="http://bit.ly/2qIKlPI">http://bit.ly/2qIKlPI</a>
LinkedIn	Humanitarian Logistics Association	A membership association for humanitarian logistics professionals who respond to take relief to and create infrastructure for those affected by global emergencies.	4,162	<a href="http://bit.ly/2PCdQKG">http://bit.ly/2PCdQKG</a>
LinkedIn	Emergency Managers Global Forum	Global network of individuals supporting emergency and disaster management related organizations.	18,178	<a href="http://bit.ly/2yKVI7O">http://bit.ly/2yKVI7O</a>
LinkedIn	Global development professionals	A platform to share knowledge, best practice and connect global development professionals.	7,865	<a href="http://bit.ly/2qlVAad">http://bit.ly/2qlVAad</a>
Twitter	Personal Post	A post on my profile with weblink available for contacts to share	159/Public	<a href="http://bit.ly/2CQhtWN">http://bit.ly/2CQhtWN</a>

Table 4 – Appendix D: Locations of weblink sharing via social media

## 9.5 Appendix E: Survey Respondents - Countries of professional focus (Past and present)

Country	Mentions
South Sudan	60
Democratic Republic of Congo	57
Iraq	54
Afghanistan	49
Syria	40
Nigeria	36
Central African Republic	35
Yemen	30
Somalia	26
Mali	23
Sudan	17
Burundi	11
Chad	11
Pakistan	10
Ethiopia	8
oPt	8
Ukraine	8
Philippines	7
Colombia	6
Libya	6
Niger	6
Uganda	6
Bangladesh	5
Cameroon	5
Cote d'Ivoire	5
Myanmar	5
Nepal	5
Haiti	4

Liberia	3
Sierra Leone	3
Angola	2
Indonesia	2
Kosovo	2
Rwanda	2
Timor-Leste	2
Turkey	2
Venezuela	2
Azerbaijan	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
Burkina faso	1
Cambodia	1
Congo	1
Ecuador	1
El Salvador	1
Eritrea	1
Georgia	1
India	1
Kenya	1
Lebanon	1
Madagascar	1
Mauritania	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Serbia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Tajikistan	1
Zimbabwe	1

Table 5 : Appendix E - Survey Respondents' countries of professional focus (Past and present)

## 9.6 Appendix F: Survey Respondents - Years of experience in conflict-affected settings

Years of Experience	Number	Percentage
0 - 2 years	26	10%
3 - 4 years	47	18%
5 - 9 years	86	34%
More than 10 years	97	38%
<b>Total</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 6 : Appendix F - Survey Respondents - Years of experience in conflict-affected settings

## 9.7 Appendix G: Survey Respondents' Organisations (Past and present)

Organisation	Count
Declined to answer	50
UNOCHA	34
UNICEF	25
Save the Children	25
UNHCR	24
Action Against Hunger	18
WHO	14
UNDP	12
IOM	12
MSF	11
ICRC	11
UNFPA	9
Catholic Relief Services	9
ACTED	8
World Vision	8
Norwegian Refugee Council	7
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	7
IFRC	7
UN (unspecified)	7
FAO	6
Danish Refugee Council	6
Oxfam GB	6
WFP	5
MONUSCO	4
Merlin	4
Mercy Corps	4
Islamic Relief Worldwide	3
World Bank	3
Concern Worldwide	2
Solidarités Internationales	2
Plan International	2
Cesvi	2
iMMAP	2
FHI360	2
CARE	2
Food for the Hungry International	2
Première Urgence Internationale	2
GOAL	2
Help Refugees	2
Caritas Internationalis	2
FEEDAR & HR (Cameroon)	2
PAHO	1

Caritas Diocese of Kumba	1
Search For Common Ground	1
IEDA Relief	1
NPA	1
CFA	1
Refugee Support	1
Equal Access	1
UNAMA	1
Indonesian Red Cross	1
Nepal Red Cross Society	1
INMA	1
Oxfam Intermon	1
International Medical Corps	1
Health	1
International Monitoring Team (Mindanao)	1
RTI	1
Colombian Red Cross	1
Ukrainian State Customs Service	1
Internews	1
UNDPA	1
Canadian Red Cross	1
Muslim Aid	1
IREX	1
AVSI Foundation	1
ISCO SC	1
ActionAid	1
Concern Universal	1
Oxfam Novib	1
UNOPS	1
UNTAC	1
REACH Initiative	1
Finn Church Aid	1
RRD	1
Alliance for International Medical Action (ALIMA)	1
ADRA	1
American Red Cross	1
United Nations Peacebuilding Fund	1
DFID (UK)	1
UNMISS	1
African Risk Capacity	1
ECHO	1

UNDPKO	1
Crown Agents	1
BelgrAid	1
Federal Foreign Office, Germany	1
UNIFEM	1
MAG	1
UNMAS	1
MDM	1
ARD Inc.	1
COOPI	1

CORDAID	1
USAID	1
Asylum Access	1
Asia Foundation	1
LMNG Hope Foundation (DRC)	1
MADERA	1
Jesuit Refugee Service	1
Learning Through Skills Acquisition Initiative (Nigeria)	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>425</b>

Table 7 : Appendix G - Survey Respondents' Organisations (Past and present)

## 9.8 Appendix H: Likert Scale Scoring for Analysis

	1	2	3	4	5
Question 6	None at all	A little	A moderate amount	A lot	A great deal
Question 7	No barriers	A few barriers	Some barriers	Many barriers	-
Question 11	Extremely inaccurate	Somewhat inaccurate	Neither accurate nor inaccurate	Somewhat accurate	Extremely accurate
Question 12	Inaccurately assessed	Somewhat inaccurately assessed	Neither accurately nor inaccurately assessed	Somewhat accurately assessed	Accurately assessed
Question 13	A significant obstacle	Somewhat of an obstacle	Neither an obstacle nor a help	Somewhat of a help	A significant help
Question 14	Not valued enough	Somewhat valued	Sufficiently valued	N/A	N/A
Question 15	Insufficient	Somewhat insufficient	Neither sufficient nor insufficient	Somewhat sufficient	Sufficient
Question 17	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
Question 18	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree

Table 8 : Appendix H - Likert Scale Scoring for Analysis

N.b. Whilst the higher score is always attributed to the most positive response, within the questionnaire the order was not always presented from left to right but sometimes reversed in order to reduce acquiescence bias or survey fatigue