Professor Peter Edge

First chamber franchise, where a democratically elected first chamber, sitting as the first chamber, appoints members of the second chamber as part of their parliamentary business, is missing from taxonomies of bicameralism both descriptively and normatively. It has, however, operated in the Isle of Man for more than a century. Reflection on that experience contributes to the existing literature on both bicameralism, and small states, in particular at that intersection which is bicameralism in small democracies. The Manx experience shows that first chamber franchise can retain those key advantages of bicameralism most applicable to small democracies, while avoiding problems posed by alternative forms of appointment to the second chamber in such democracies. Doing so, however, needs to take account of the importance of treating the exercise of this franchise as a public duty, rather than a private right; recognising and minimising the danger of party capture of the second chamber; and being attentive to the importance of details of parliamentary procedure in implementation of first chamber franchise.

The Isle of Man, a self-governing Crown Dependency, developed its own response to the global pandemic, including strict border controls and periods of lockdown. In 2020, this was given legal effect through the declaration of a formal state of emergency, while in 2021 similar measures were implemented under public health legislation without a state of emergency. Framing the 2021 lockdowns as a public health crisis led to a more tightly focussed response than the 2020 framing as a national emergency. Within this narrower range, however, the structure of the public health legislation as implemented provided less democratic accountability than the emergency powers legislation, and reduced the emphasis given to the rules as laws, leading to a decrease in formality in relation to both creation and publication of these legal rules, and exacerbating a blurring between law and advice. These disadvantages were not, however, intrinsic to the public health legislation itself, and if corrected the public health response is to be preferred.

In 2020 the Isle of Man responded to the Coronavirus pandemic with the declaration of a State of Emergency under the Emergency Powers Act 1936 (EPA), and exceptional governance of the Isle of Man under a regime of Emergency Powers Regulations (EPR). This brief note describes the legal structure underpinning the Emergency, outlines the extensive body of EPRs, and argues that the distinctive Manx response is best understood as the consequence of the Isle of Man’s status as a small island democracy dependent upon the UK Crown. 

The Isle of Man is a largely autonomous dependent territory of the UK. In 2016, Lord Lisvane was commissioned to report on the functioning of the principal organ of governance, the Tynwald. This Lisvane Review has led to substantial constitutional reform within this small democracy, particularly in relation to the unelected second chamber of Tynwald, the Legislative Council. This reflects an ancient tension within the Manx constitution between the House of Keys, since the mid-nineteenth century a directly elected chamber, and the unelected Legislative Council. The Lisvane period saw important changes to the composition and powers of the Legislative Council, as well as gender diversity within Tynwald as a whole. Placing the Manx experience within a broader small democracy theoretical and comparative framework demonstrates not only the possibility of constitutional reform, but also provides insights into resources for constitutional development, the special challenges of managing intimacy, and the dangers of over-concentration of power in a small democracy.

The Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man is an important member of the Legislative Council, the second chamber of the Manx Tynwald. The shape of Tynwald has changed considerably since the mid-nineteenth century, and there have been frequent reviews of the place of ecclesiastical officers in it. The most recent debates illuminate this form of religious representation, but in particular show the importance of ecclesiastical structures – and the contingent status of the Diocese of Sodor and Man – in the lord bishop retaining a vote, as well as a voice, in the principal organ of governance in the Isle of Man. This article argues that a more critical approach is needed in weighing the ecclesiastical structure argument against other constitutional arguments around the constitutional position of the lord bishop.

Hate preaching is capable of constituting both hate crime and hate speech, lies at the centre of many religions’ understanding of the manifestation of their religion, and frequently raises the contentious issue of regulation of the use of sacred scriptures. This brief article explores the regulation of hate preaching by criminal law, discussing the particular problems posed by oppositional religious speech, before concluding with suggestions for a number of ways to reduce these problems.

The UK provides a marked contrast to the jurisdiction that dominates Anglophone discourse on law and religion—that of the USA. Not only does the UK continue to have at least one Established Church, but until the end of the 20th century there was no overarching guarantee of freedom of religion that could be used to frame discussion of the autonomy of religious organizations. This article treats the Human Rights Act 1998, which provided that frame through partial incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights, as a watershed. It begins with an analysis of the pre-1998 case law, which began to develop a ministerial exception through distinctive interpretation of normal employment law. The article concludes with an evaluation of the long arc of the law in the context of contested ideas of the proper sphere of state action in relation to relationships within a religious organization, and the role of judicial creativity in the legal–religious interface.

The introduction in the UK of the Civil Partnership Act (2004) and it's enactment (2005) seemed to herald a new plurality and inclusiveness in the ceremonial law and practices of marriage. However, the provisions of the Act maintain an historically exclusive demarcation between secular and religious elements. Neither the ceremony nor the approved premises may have any relation to religious content or usage. Consequently, three groups remain unable to participate in religious weddings: same-sex couples, members of small religious communities, and dissidents. The public act of a wedding for these groups is not only exclusive, we argue, but pays little heed to the private needs of participants nor the private ritual significance such acts necessarily include. Moreover, the exclusion of religious elements is both difficult to interpret and police. We examine the nature and limitations of the provisions and guidance on the Civil Partnership Act and argue that maintenance of a standardised secularism within public law, as in marriage law and the Civil Partnership Act, is anachronous in a modern plural state. This article challenges the division between public secular acts and private acts of ritual and personal significance. We suggest that private actors import religious elements and meanings into secular ceremonies and that guidance to registrars officiating in civil ceremonies does not provide absolute prohibitions to couples using religiously significant elements of ritual or practice. We conclude that the Act continues practices of unjustified differential treatment and that reform to a more inclusive legal framework is both possible and necessary.

The function of religion in the sentencing phase of a criminal trial has been comparatively neglected. The structure of the European Convention does not leave it open simply to ignore religion in sentencing--that route to neutrality in relation to religion has been closed. Instead, the developing jurisprudence under the Convention has created obligations in relation to both the manifestation of religion through offending, and the treatment of repeat, conscientious offenders. These obligations have the potential to give too much emphasis to the protection of religious conviction over other pressing state interests, in particular the rights and interests of others, and need to be read narrowly.

This paper explores the relationship between religion and sentencing. It considers what problems may arise when a judge fails to take proper account of a defendant's religious beliefs at the sentencing stage, or takes improper account. It highlights the need for more guidance to be given to judges in order to ensure greater consistency and fairness in sentencing outcomes.