Dr Ben Kenward

Although children enact third-party punishment, at least in response to harm and fairness violations, much remains unknown about this behaviour. We investigated the tendency to make the punishment fit the crime in terms of moral domain; developmental patterns across moral domains; the effects of audience and descriptive norm violations; and enjoyment of inflicting punishment. We tested 5- to 11-year-olds in the UK (N = 152 across two experiments, 55 girls and 97 boys, predominantly white and middle-class). Children acted as referees in a computer game featuring teams of players: as these players violated fairness or loyalty norms, children were offered the opportunity to punish them. We measured the type (fining or banning) and severity of punishment children chose and their enjoyment in doing so. Children only partially made the punishment fit the crime: they showed no systematic punishment choice preference for disloyal players, but tended to fine rather than ban players allocating resources unfairly – a result best explained by equalisation concerns. Children’s punishment severity was not affected by audience presence or perpetrators’ descriptive norm violations, but was negatively predicted by age (unless punishment could be used as an equalisation tool). Most children did not enjoy punishing, and those who believed they allocated real punishment reported no enjoyment more often than children who believed they pretended to punish. Contrary to predictions, retribution was not a plausible motive for the observed punishment behaviour. Children are likely to have punished for deterrence reasons or because they felt they ought to.

In 2019, the environment began to rival the economy among priority issues for the UK public. The COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to shift this balance in either direction, because the crisis is not only causing serious economic damage but is also highlighting the usefulness of expert warnings. The current work examines the balance between public prioritisation of environment and economy in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic. A nationally representative YouGov sample of 1654 UK adults were presented with two political speeches, either linking COVID-19 to climate and prioritising environment as part of planned economic recovery, or separating the issues and stating that environmental prioritisation is now unaffordable. Most participants (62%) were positive towards the environmental prioritisation speech, and it was more popular than the other speech (which 36% were positive towards). The same proportion of Conservative voters (62%) were positive towards the environmental prioritisation speech (with 50% positive towards the other speech). Higher support for the environmental prioritisation speech was associated with more education but not with socioeconomic status. Voting history and socioeconomic status were therefore less predictive of differences in support for the speeches than expected based on previous research. Consistent with these results is the suggestion that environmental concern in the UK is becoming less tied to social identity and more tied to concern for personal well-being. These findings suggest that foregrounding environmental concerns is politically realistic in post-COVID-19 economic policy, consistent with suggestions from economists and environmental scientists that an environmental focus is feasible and necessary.

The creation of artificial moral systems requires us to make difficult choices about which of varying human value sets should be instantiated. The industry-standard approach is to seek and encode moral consensus. Here we argue, based on evidence from empirical psychology, that encoding current moral consensus risks reinforcing current norms, and thus inhibiting moral progress. However, so do efforts to encode progressive norms. Machine ethics is thus caught between a rock and a hard place. The problem is particularly acute when progress beyond prevailing moral norms is particularly urgent, as is currently the case due to the inadequacy of prevailing moral norms in the face of the climate and ecological crisis.

Traditional board games are a common social activity for many children, but little is known about the behavioral effects of this type of game. The current study aims to explore the behavioral effects of cooperative and competitive board games in four-to-six-year-old children (N = 65). Repeatedly during six weeks, children in groups of four played either cooperative or competitive board games in a between-subject design, and shortly after each game conducted a task in which children’s cooperative, prosocial, competitive and antisocial behavior were observed. Type of board game did not have an effect on cooperative, prosocial or antisocial behavior. Cooperative and competitive board games elicited equal amounts of cooperative and prosocial behavior, which suggest that board games, regardless of type, could have positive effects on preschoolers’ social behavior. Our results suggest that children may compete more after playing competitive board games; but the measure of competitive behavior in particular was unreliable. Preschoolers enjoyed playing cooperative board games more than competitive board games, which may be one reason to prefer their use.

The development of gaze following begins in early infancy and its developmental foundation has been under heavy debate. Using a longitudinal design (N = 118), we demonstrate that attachment quality predicts individual differences in the onset of gaze following, at six months of age, and that maternal postpartum depression predicts later gaze following, at 10 months. In addition, we report longitudinal stability in gaze following from 6 to 10 months. A full path model (using attachment, maternal depression and gaze following at six months) accounted for 21% of variance in gaze following at 10 months. These results suggest an experience-dependent development of gaze following, driven by the infant’s own motivation to interact and engage with others (the social-first perspective).

Hoerl and McCormack (H&M) risk misleading about the cognitive underpinnings of the belief in a privileged now-moment because they do not explicitly acknowledge that the sense of existing in the now-moment is an intrinsically temporally dynamic one. The sense of happening that is exclusive to the now-moment is a better candidate for the source of belief in a privileged now.

In this study, we propose that infant social cognition may ‘bootstrap' the successive development of domain‐general cognition in line with the cultural intelligence hypothesis. Using a longitudinal design, 6‐month‐old infants (N = 118) were assessed on two basic social cognitive tasks targeting the abilities to share attention with others and understanding other peoples' actions. At 10 months, we measured the quality of the child's social learning environment, indexed by parent's abilities to provide scaffolding behaviors during a problem‐solving task. Eight months later, the children were followed up with a cognitive test‐battery, including tasks of inhibitory control and working memory. Our results showed that better infant social action understanding interacted with better parental scaffolding skills in predicting simple inhibitory control in toddlerhood. This suggests that infants' who are better at understanding other's actions are also better equipped to make the most of existing social learning opportunities, which in turn may benefit future non‐social cognitive outcomes.

Studies of infants' and adults' social cognition frequently use geometric-shape agents such as coloured squares and circles, but the influence of agent visual-form on social cognition has been little investigated. Here, although adults gave accurate explicit descriptions of interactions between geometric-shape aggressors and victims, implicit association tests for dominance and valence did not detect tendencies to encode the shapes’ social attributes on an implicit level. With regard to valence, the lack of any systematic implicit associations precludes conclusive interpretations. With regard to dominance, participants implicitly associated a yellow square as more dominant than a blue circle, even when the true relationship was the reverse of this and was correctly explicitly described by participants. Therefore, although explicit dominance judgements were strongly influenced by observed behaviour, implicit dominance associations were more clearly influenced by preconceived associations between visual form and social characteristics. This study represents a cautionary tale for those conducting experiments using geometric-shape agents.

Using eye tracking, we investigated if 10-month-old infants could discriminate between members of a set of small forms based on geometric properties in a deviant-detection paradigm, as suggested by the idea of a core cognitive system for Euclidian geometry. We also investigated the precision of infants' ability to discriminate as well as how the discrimination process unfolds over time. Our results show that infants can discriminate between small forms based on geometrical properties, but only when the difference is sufficiently large. Furthermore, our results also show that it takes infants, on average,

Infants have an early understanding of giving (the transfer of an item by one agent to another), but little is known about individual differences in these abilities or their developmental outcomes. Here, 9‐month‐olds (N = 59) showing clearer neural processing (Event‐related potential, ERP) of a give‐me gesture also evidenced a stronger reaction (pupil dilation) to an inappropriate response to a give‐me gesture, and at 2 years were more likely to give in response to a give‐me gesture. None of the differences in understanding and production of giving‐related behaviors were associated with other sociocognitive variables investigated: language, gaze‐following, and nongiving helping. The early developmental continuity in understanding and production of giving behavior is consistent with the great importance of giving for humans throughout the life span.

The human tendency to impose costs on those who have behaved antisocially towards third parties (third-party punishment) has a formative influence on societies, yet very few studies of the development of this tendency exist. In most studies where young children have punished, participants have imposed costs on puppets, leaving open the question as to whether young children punish in real third-party situations. Here, five-year-olds were given the opportunity to allocate desirable or unpleasant items to antisocial and neutral adults, who were presented as real and shown on video. Neutral individuals were almost always allocated only desirable items. Antisocial individuals were instead usually allocated unpleasant items, as long as participants were told they would give anonymously. Most participants who were instead told they would give in person did not allocate unpleasant items, although a minority did so. This indicates that the children interpreted the situation as real, and that whereas they genuinely desired to punish antisocial adults, they did not usually dare do so in person. Boys punished more frequently than girls. The willingness of preschoolers to spontaneously engage in third-party punishment, occasionally even risking the social costs of antagonizing an anti-social adult, demonstrates a deep-seated early-developing punitive sentiment in humans. 

The current study is the first to investigate neural correlates of infants' detection of pro-and antisocial agents. Differences in ERP component P400 over posterior temporal areas were found during 6-month-olds' observation of helping and hindering agents (Experiment 1), but not during observation of identically moving agents that did not help or hinder (Experiment 2). The results demonstrate that the P400 component indexes activation of infants' memories of previously perceived interactions between social agents. This leads to suggest that similar processes might be involved in infants' processing of pro-and antisocial agents and other social perception processes (encoding gaze direction, goal directed grasping and pointing). (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Behaviour benefitting others (prosocial behaviour) can be motivated by self-interested strategic concerns as well as by genuine concern for others. Even in very young children such behaviour can be motivated by concern for others, but whether it can be strategically motivated by self-interest is currently less clear. Here, children had to distribute resources in a game in which a rich but not a poor recipient could reciprocate. From four years of age participants strategically favoured the rich recipient, but only when recipients had stated an intention to reciprocate. Six- and eight-year-olds distributed more equally. Children allocating strategically to the rich recipient were less likely to help when an adult needed assistance but was not in a position to immediately reciprocate, demonstrating consistent cross-task individual differences in the extent to which social behaviour is self- versus other-oriented even in early childhood. By four years of age children are capable of strategically allocating resources to others as a tool to advance their own self-interest. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

In over-imitation, children copy even elements of a goal-directed action sequence that appear unnecessary for achieving the goal. We demonstrate in 4-year olds that the unnecessary action is specifically associated with the goal, not generally associated with the apparatus. The unnecessary action is performed flexibly: 4-year olds usually omit it if it has already been performed by an adult. Most 5-year olds do not verbally report the unnecessary action as necessary when achieving the goal, although most of them report an equivalent but necessary action as necessary. Most 5-year olds explain the necessary action in functional terms, but are unsure as to the function of the unnecessary action. These verbal measures do not support the hypothesis that children over-imitate primarily because they encode unnecessary actions as causing the goal even in causally transparent systems. In a causally transparent system, explanations for over-imitation fitting the results are that children are ignorant of the unnecessary action's purpose, and that they learn a prescriptive norm that it should be carried out. In causally opaque systems, however, for children and for adults, any action performed before achieving the goal is likely to be inferred as causally necessary-this is not over-imitation, but ordinary causal learning.